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Foreword
Disneylands, Parables, or Value-Free
Knowledge For Its Own Sake: Why Do
We Need a Past?
On Saturday March 28th, 1987 a conference took place at Bradford University, on the theme
of 'EXTRACTING MEANING FROM THE PAST'. The invited speakers were all
archaeologists, and represented the many and varied roles that archaeologists fulfil in
contemporary society: museum curators, university teachers and research scientists, pro-
fessional field archaeologists - but all employed by local or central government to look after
and interpret the nation's past.
Archaeology's public role is causing the profession many practical difficulties nowadays,
as well as much soul searching about what its practitioners are trying to do with 'The Past'.
On the one hand, the Government is keen to see responsibility for Britain's 'Heritage' left in
the hands of quangoes, and increasingly commercial agencies. This has led to 'The Past' being
defined in terms of museum objects or impressive ruins, which need to be 'protected', but
whenever possible featured in current and future plans for self-funding public 'theme parks'.
Most speakers at the Bradford Conference stressed the neglect that could ensue, with these
approaches, of a rounded, educational experience portraying our past in all its rich complexity.
'Disneylands' understated the ability of the general public, with its increasingly technical
background and social awareness, to enjoy a genuine mixture of spectacle and educational
display, as successfully achieved at Fishbourne Roman Palace and the Jorvik Viking Centre.
Several speakers also criticised the mismanagement of Stonehenge, as an example where
immense popular interest in an ancient site had not been channelled into an imaginative but
informed educational experience, with access to all. The ambivalent attitude of the authorities
to the Druids and the Hippie Convoy raised the question: Whose Past Is It Anyway?
Similar problems of communication with the general public appeared in contributions
reflecting the role of the nation's museums' service. Most displays were not aimed at 'the
person in the street', and many museums seemed to exist to cater for the elite tastes of those
who ran them or advised in their running. Access for archaeologists to the media was also
highlighted as generally very weak, and whilst the newsagents' shelves are overflowing with
specialist popular journals in other fields, popular archaeology journals have failed to establish
themselves in this market. Likewise, books on archaeology are usually only widely read if
they are written by journalists and television personalities or are fanciful astro-archaeology
potboilers of the 'spacemen and ley-lines' variety. Most speakers stressed the urgency of
training archaeologists to communicate their findings better, or alternatively, of collaborations
with the media and its journalists in joint presentations of accurate but attractive reports on
our 'past'.
Several important theoretical questions to do with the 'meaning' of the past were raised
during the Conference, and led to deep and wide-ranging debate. Should archaeologists strive
to interpret the past with total objectivity, aiming to produce 'scientific' truths and general
principles about human society like the laws of Physics or the axioms of Mathematics? All
1
2 John Bintliff
the speakers were agreed that human beings are too variable in behaviour, both as individuals
and as whole societies, ever to justify a search for 'laws' in history and prehistory. On the
other hand, a profession devoted to what has already happened, but which left others to draw
any conclusions and lessons from the past for today's society, hardly deserved public interest
or financial support.
Yet, on the question of what kind of interpretations archaeologists should put across to the
public, opinion was divided. There was certainly agreement that the past can demonstrate
'parables' about important current issues such as Ecology, Politics, Economics, Religion and
Morality. Some speakers supported a conscious 'politicizing' of archaeology, underlining the
key message 'the Past' could bring into contemporary debates, to help swing opinion in
particular ideological directions. Other speakers pointed out that successive governments and
wide sectors of the public would be unwilling to fund a discipline with too obvious a
'party-line'. On the other hand, there was clear evidence that major research themes in
archaeology tended anyway to follow closely current intellectual and social trends in modern
society. In the end, a helping hand might be recognised from the resolution of current
controversies in the teaching of History in Secondary Schools. Here for some time teachers
and professional associations have been at odds with the Government about what should and
should not be taught as 'significant' in our history (with strong political overtones). Whatever
comes out of this debate might be borrowed by archaeology in order to introduce 'value'
without undue 'bias' into our selection of 'significance' in the story of past societies.
A final question, more of a philosophical one, centred on the reasonable query: How
knowable is 'the Past'? It seems that until early modern times, it is almost impossible to
discover with any degree of certainty what past individuals really thought about events they
participated in or were responsible for. For Roman times, for example, only Cicero has left
us sufficient intimate, personal detail in his letters and speeches for any adequate biography
to be written. We must therefore interpret what happened in the past 'from the outside' by
cataloguing things that occurred, and by piecing together by archaeological excavation and
survey, or the study of historical documents, the interplay of different components that made
up the organic system of a past society.
In the last analysis, the patterns we claim to detect as archaeologists, and which we pass
on to the public as the 'significant' trends and events, are difficult to justify by the techniques
of laboratory science - we cannot experiment on the past. Yet as the philosopher of science,
Karl Popper has pointed out, a scientist validates his results by achieving the confirmation
of his scientific peers - what Popper calls 'inter-subjectivity'. We perceive the key features
that 'explain' the human past, the 'pattern', because we are human beings, a species that
specializes in sorting the important out from the background 'noise' - hence our probably
unique capacity amongst animals for abstract thought. One speaker likened the process of
testing-out models of the past on each other to a court of law: the jurors are not specialists
in the law, but we accept their ability to adjudicate between the opposing arguments (or
'theories') offered by opposing counsel.
The past is knowable, and archaeologists' reconstructions have to pass the test of fire of
their informed colleagues, which is a form of scientic validation. Archaeologists should aim
to reach out and interest more and more of the general public in their heritage (the objects
and the knowledge), not by over-trivialising the past, nor by overt party-lines. The past has
a lot to tell the present, and archaeologists should speak up more often on issues where they
have relevant 'parables'.
John Bintliff, Bradford University
A Review
of Contemporary Perspectives
on the 'Meaning' of the Past
John Bintliff
Bradford University
The 1980's is promising to be a highly innovative and exciting period in the development of
the discipline of Archaeology, and it is therefore an appropriate moment both to look back
over the way we have recently trod and scan the horizon ahead of us. The title of this
Conference encapsulates what I take to be the central issue in contemporary archaeology, and
one which all the signs point to as becoming the focus of theory and practice for future years.
In the introductory paper to a volume recently appeared (Archaeology at the Interface. BAR
1986, edited by myself and Chris Gaffney), I have tried to "map out" what seem to me to be
the major trends in British (and to some extent European and American) archaeology since
the last war. It proved instructive to eavesdrop on similar self-analyses carried out lately by
historians, geographers, sociologists and even architects. It appears that we have all had similar
experiences in both the theoretical developments and practical/public practice of our dis-
ciplines.
Practical Perspectives
Part 1
Firstly, on the PRACTICAL side, the postwar decades witnessed a growing involvement of
academic disciplines in the rebuilding of Europe, the planning of the landscape (rural and
urban) and of society itself. Enthusiasm for 'public service' was matched increasingly by
government's desire to extract immediate practical benefits from educational establishments
and their offspring. The prominence given by professional field archaeologists to conservation
and "rescue" meshed easily with the State's wish to redefine Archaeology as Heritage
Management. "Public Archaeology" is therefore confronted by demands to be accountable and
productive, either to the nation of taxpayers, or increasingly, to private entrepreneurs into
whose hands much of the responsibility for the funding of archaeology may be heading. In
essence, practical or public archaeology might be seen to be the victim of its own success.
Through increasing government awareness of the threat to the national physical past, our data
has become part of management and central government ideological strategies - the "heritage"
is too important to be left to archaeologists. Moreover, the "heritage" is defined as a tangible
set of historic objects or structures, rather than an understanding of the societies which
produced artefacts and ecofacts. This kind of object-centred past requires guardians not
interpreters, exploitation along commercial lines not educational holistic experiences. In my
view, the archaeologist is an historian and a social anthropologist of past cultures; objects as
data define the special operational sphere of archaeologists within those broader disciplines,
but they are our particular means to the same ends.
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The very obvious danger« that now confronts public archaeology is that the "meaning" a
historian or anthropologist tries to extract from observation of a developing society will be
largely discarded in favour of two linked approaches to the "meaning" of the past: firstly that
it is not the State's role to sponsor research into the society which produced an ancient
monument, the State should protect such sites with minimal expense as a cultural resource;
secondly, that wherever possible money needed to conserve the physical heritage should
come from private, and in that case, commercial exploitation of the heritage, by selling the
past for all it is worth. My criticism of the first approach is that starving the nation of people
who make sense of the heritage hands over our past to those who know little about it, except
for the physical conservation of its fragments. For the second approach, it is all too easy to
conceive that by trivialising ancient sites and concentrating inevitably on the mind-boggling,
the sensational, rather than the thought-provoking potential of our heritage, pots of money
may be made at the expense of any real understanding of the past being handed over to the
general public.
Behind this discussion is a fundamental issue, which seems to be being bypassed all too
often in that familiar shortcut of governments (manage people and things as form, not content,
and spend as little as you can get away with before public outcry). That issue is the real
potential or Meaning of the Past to our society. We need to investigate the use and relevance
of the past, both in terms of already-existing purposes the past serves, and in terms of untapped
potential. Unless we have a clear idea of this many-facetted function, and this is essentially
an intellectual process of evaluation and criticism by those of us involved with the past as a
profession, no imposed management strategy or commercial hard-sell can hope to do justice
to our heritage.
I would like to discuss briefly a number of kinds of response to the past which such a
broader debate needs to take account of.
Disneylands
It has rightly been pointed out that our presentation of the past in terms of monuments or
museum collections is still largely overtechnical, uninspiring and lacking emotional stimula-
tion. There are many exceptions we all can think of, but there is little doubt that a radical
change is called for to sharpen public interest and support. Fishbourne and the York Trust
Heritage Projects have certainly shown the way, but at Jorvik one begins to wonder whether
what is done in terms of the smell-rich, train-ride through the centuries, to enliven the more
formal displays, in other hands might not become a titillating end in itself, a Disneyland of
fantasy fullfilment. Future scenarios might include reconstructed ancient sites complete with
human actors, and here we are hardly a missile's length from the already vastly popular
entertainments involving re-enactments of Civil War battles and medieval tournaments run
by the Sacred Knot and smaller organisations.1 The world of Great Men and Famous Battles
is part of the real past, but fantasy re-enactment offers a flavour of the past which need have
no real basis and, even if factually correct, encourages an oversimplified and sensual contact
which undervalues the full complexity of bygone societies. It would be a poor History teacher
who continued to teach teenagers through Illustrated Histories and encouraged them to
comprehend t}ie past in Dressing-Up games, but there is a real danger that formal presentation
of the past to intelligent adults in this country may come to rest on similar principles.
At the same time as we show concern about future plans to trivialize the life of past
communities by commercial organisations, we see official hypocrisy towards grass-root or
popular involvement in the past. Chris Chippindale (1985) and others have reminded us that
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we undermine what we are trying to achieve, with an informed Knowledge of the past, in the
mishandling of monuments such as Stonehenge. The spending of three quarters of a million
pounds to keep the hippie convoy out, when in other years the British Druids are allowed in,
betrays a total confusion in official circles: neither of these groups has a more tangible
connection to the original function of the monument than the other, and both have a basic
right to visit a site that has so many resonances for them. We academics may pour scorn on
their interpretations and mystic experiences, but have no real understanding ourselves of the
meaning of Stonehenge to its builders and users.
Landscapes of the Mind
It came as a real shock to big-time property speculators and the trendy end of the architectural
profession to find a public outcry at the demolition of a collection of Victorian and Edwardian
buildings in order to make way for an enormous glass skyscraper (the Mansion House Square
project). It was argued that the old buildings were second or even third rate designs and hence
discardable. But such attitudes show total ignorance of how a society interacts with its visible
past. David Lowenthal and others have shown in a number of important and perceptive studies
(Lowenthal 1979, 1985; Lowenthal and Binney 1981), that our awareness of the past in our
community is a subtle and complex set of sensations. An analysis for example of public
responses to different English townscapes has shown clear-cut and unexpected results: the
higgledy-piggledy juxtaposition of unpretentious buildings reflecting the almost random
accretion of centuries, received vastly greater affectionate response than the formal, alien
groups of Jacobean and Georgian classical buildings. Aesthetic classifications are only one
facet of our perception of value in the past, and many monuments or groups of buildings
attract the interest and emotion of the public: 'because of their association with the private
work and family lives of large numbers of common people in the past' (Lowenthal 1979). A
critical awareness of the several meanings attached by different groups and subcultures in
society to the physical past should lead not only to informed judgement on issues of
conservation, and presentation, but is inseparable from a commitment to action. By far the
most striking paper in an otherwise dry and scholarly volume on the history of European
towns (Barley 1977) was a highly-charged account by Mannoni and Poleggi of the changing
social composition in the historic old town quarters of Italian Renaissance cities. Originally
a medieval social mosaic or multi-cultural community, early modern times saw the old town
centres left to decay in the hands of the poor; most recently the rich have returned from the
smart outer suburbs and aim to oust the proletariat, so as to ape the Medicis from expensively
refurbished 'medieval' penthouse flats.
For an evocative meeting with different landscapes of the mind, a visit to the medieval
Yorkshire monasteries of Rievaulx and Fountains shows how during the 18th century the
rising taste for the Romantic, especially Gothic, became integrated with the Classical house
and garden tradition of the English country house. By 1768 the Aislabie family had
incorporated the splendid ruins of Fountains into the great formal garden at Studley Royal -
the Abbey formed the culminating part of the whole design (Fleming and Gore 1979, 128).
At Rievaulx, a great grass terrace was made, with a Classical rotunda at one end and a temple
at the other (begun 1750). As one walked from one to the other, the hillside below was covered
with trees, but vistas were cut to give different "picture" vews of the Abbey ruins which rose
at the foot of the hill (Fleming and Gore 1979, 127). Another landscape of the mind is found
in Pugin's wistful Contrasts (1841). In these illustrations a Catholic town of 1440, idealized,
is compared with its Protestant and materialistic successor of 1840 (Figure 1).
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Conclusions: We need to be more sensitive to the subtleties as well as the better-known
romantic fantasies that coexist in the 'mindscapes' of the public. There is an endless spring
of interest that can be tapped by those of us concerned with understanding and explaining the
past, yet we need a genuine, informed feedback with our public. We certainly should not
indulge the taste for the sensational and vulgar, the false and overly tendentious, just to make
money; we underestimate the ability of the public to respond to a less glamorous but more
insightful past if we take that route to their pockets and appetites. A final point: it is a central
tenet of current thinking in academic and intellectual life, sometimes called post-Modemist
thought, that we professionals should become much more self-aware, more explicit about our
own experience of our data and tasks; by clarifying what we wish to share with our public
we will also expose to ourselves the nature of our personal interaction with the past - this is
actually the more important exercise, since we have chosen to devote our lives to unravelling
what is past and gone.
Practical Perspectives
Part 2: Reflexive Archaeology - The Scholar in his/her Social Context
Whilst many academic disciplines, including Archaeology, have recently spent one or two
decades trying to sweep away subjective attitudes and replace them with a unified, objective
and scientific methodology (cf the New Archaeology), the current post-Modemist, post-
Positivist perspective seeks to emphasize how far individual scholars are influenced by their
personal background and beliefs, in their approaches to and interpretations of their data bases.
These studies of particular scholars or whole generations of scholarship are uniformly
eye-opening, exposing bias and blinkered thought as well as a more forgivable tendency for
a generation to explore concepts and themes of great topicality in their own society. Some
commentators would use these studies to demolish Archaeology's pretensions to recover an
agreed reality in the past, claiming that in the future our activity will be recognised to be
self-projection onto an essentially unknowable past (Hodder 1986).
Take Biblical Archaeology for example. In a scathing critique, Dever (1981) has dismissed
a major part of archaeological work carried out till the 1970's in Palestine, because its
practitioners were motivated by religious insights and paid scant attention to the progress of
practical techniques in Archaeology, preferring to match old-fashioned excavations to events
and personalities in the Bible. Or let us consider the role assigned to women in Human
Evolution: a recent review article on this topic (Fedigan 1986) showed with undeniable clarity
how all our supposedly objective interpretative theories of how human society evolved, how
tool-using began, how human diet became established, rest on the assumption of male
innovativeness and a male centrality to early human communities. The evidence from
Palaeolithic studies and ethnographic inferences make a major female role not merely equally
plausible but in some areas likely to be more significant for Human Evolution.
McNally (1985) has provided a stimulating commentary on the development of Classical
Archaeology and its recent ambivalent position towards adopting the supposedly value-free,
scientific ethos of the New Archaeology. She argues:
Art history, archaeology and aesthetics began in the 18th century with their basis in
certain fundamental and interlocking concepts of the period: that individuals achieve
dignity through reason; that great individuals determine the course of history by both
exemplifying and developing the values of their societies; that there is a hierarchy
of human achievement based on dignity, rationality, and leadership; and that the
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A Catholic Town in 1440
1. St Michaels on the Hill;, 2. Queens Cross, 3. St Thomas's Chapel, 4. St Maries Abbey, 5. All
Saints, 6. St Johns, 7. St Peters, 8. St Alkmunds, 9. St Maries, 10. St Edmunds, 11. Grey Friars,
12. St Cuthberts, 13. Guild Hall, 14. Trinity, 15. St Olaves, 16. St Botolphs.
The Same Town in 1840
1. St Michaels Tower; rebuilt in 1750, 2. New Parsonage House & Pleasure Grounds, 3. The New
Jail, 4. Gas Works, 5. Lunatic Asylum, 6. Iron Works & Ruins of St Maries Abbey, 7. Mr Evans
Chapel, 8. Baptist Chapel, 9. Unitarian Chapel, 10. New Church, 11. New Town Hall & Concert
Room, 12. Wesleyan Centenary Chapel, 13. New Christian Society, 14. Quakers Meeting, 15.
Socialist Hall of Science.
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highest achievements sprang from the Greeks and were transmitted through the
Renaissance to the modern western world.
All these views came under criticism in the 19th century, and even more
compellingly in the 20th. Nevertheless, they continue to provide the intellectual
framework for much everyday activity in western civilisation and, seen or unseen,
control the activities of many - I think most - art historians and classical
archaeologists (1985, 2).
In my own brief analyses of the career of Mortimer Wheeler, and then of the influence of
Arthur Evans on our approach to the Minoan civilisation of Crete, there seemed clear evidence,
for the former, of the limitations imposed on his achievement created by a belief in a "Battles
and Famous Men" past, and, for the latter, a dominant but subconscious desire to create a
romantic paradise as a contrast to the real world where Evans felt so little at home (Binlliff
1983, 1984a).
A related theme now being actively explored is the form given to archaeological research
by the existence of separate research communities within the discipline. Thus Patterson (1986)
in an analysis of Americanist Archaeology in the States over the last sixty years, identifies
distinct interpretative communities whose values reflect separate clusters of class, occupation
and ideology. Jim Lewthwaite, in last year's NUARS annual thematic conference (Lewthwaite
1986) provided us with a rich overview of competing research groups in the history of French
Geography and explored the relevance of such an analysis to the recent history of Archaeology.
In fact, as with virtually all major new ideas in our discipline, the source of this self-analysis
lies outside Archaeology in earlier soul-searching in sister-disciplines. Thus Sir Edmund
Leach, the doyen of British Social Anthropology, provided us several years ago with a candid
but illuminating anthropological analysis of British anthropologists, including himself (Leach
1984):
At world level, academic anthropology has developed as a consequence of the
interaction of prominent individual scholars and the cross-fertilization of their leading
ideas. But these "prominent individual scholars" were ordinary human beings who
had private as well as public life histories. Whatever they did or said as
anthropologists was simply a "structural/metaphoric transformation" of what they did
and said in quite nonanthropological contexts (1984, 3).
Comparable analyses are commonplace in History and Geography and particularly in Literary
History where often modern criticism is so intent on the experience of the reader as to seem
to wish to deprive us of our authors altogether.
For Archaeology much the clearest discussion of the modern filter effect on interpretations
of the past can be found in a stimulating paper by R R Wilk (1985) entitled: The Ancient
Maya and the Political Present. Raising the two obviously contrasted positions (1) that our
models of the past are merely due to contemporary fashion and the search for personal status,
or (2) genuinely reflect steady scientific progress, Wilk comments perceptively:
I suggest that neither the critique nor the defence do justice to the true complexity
.... of archaeologists' relationships to the past. The process of explaining the past is
not a frivolous game, but neither is it a simple scientific quest for objective truth.
There are elements of truth in lay perceptions of the profession: hypotheses about
and explanations for the past are not generated in an abstract, objective way, and the
acceptance and/or rejection of these hypotheses is not necessarily based on rigorous
scientific tests. But to accept this as fact does not require that we adopt the cynical
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pose that all prehistory is just academic gamesmanship lacking in any scientific
credibility.
Archaeology has a dual nature; it simultaneously engages in a fairly rigorous
pursuit of objective facts about the past and in an informal and sometimes hidden
dialogue on contemporary politics, philosophy, religion, and other important subjects.
It is this second dialogue, based on archaeologists' perception of the present and their
experience of the world ... which brings motivation, passion, interest, and relevance
to the whole enterprise. This is what makes archaeology an essentially 'reflexive'
science, one which reflects back on the present as much light as it sheds on the past
(1985, 307-308).
My next illustration (Figure 2) is a neat and amusing summary of Wilk's convincing
correlation of changing interpretations of the Maya civilisation in terms of contemporary
American life since the War. Following early 20th century escapist, anti-modern models,
recent decades have shown a progression from war and invasion approaches during the
Vietnam '60s, through late '60s and early '70s "middle class movement" models involving
Ecology, Population Pressure and the Soft-Drug Culture, into models reflecting the end of the
'70s to mid '80s impact of Conservative politics and Religious Fundamentalism. This most
recent trend in Maya studies has seen a renewed concern for elite lifestyles and religious
underpinnings, the importance of the family unit, and even pressure to "get government off
the backs" of the Maya!
It seems to me that Wilk's attitude is just right. Of course we ought to be "in the past"
professionally because we believe it has a value for us and for everyone else in our society,
i.e. it has modern relevance. To claim that Archaeology, because it reveals ever new data,
needs no further justification, strikes me as quite absurd. The key question of course is whether
we can operate a "reflexive" discipline without prejudicing the pursuit by whatever means
necessary of what actually happened in the past And here, procedures of critical evaluation
are quite essential. Already in 1951, the notable anthropologist Evans-Pritchard pointed out
that anthropologists' personal interests were important in the theory selected for testing in the
field, and indeed:
One can only interpret what one sees in terms of one's own experience and of what
one is, and anthropologists, while they have a body of knowledge in common, differ
in other respects as widely as other people in their backgrounds of experience and
in themselves. The personality of an anthropologist cannot be eliminated from his
work any more than the personality of an historian... Fundamentally, in his account
of a primitive people the anthropologist is not only describing their social life as
accurately as he can but is expressing himself also. In this sense his account must
express moral judgement, especially where it touches matters on which he feels
strongly... (But) If allowances are made for the personality of the writer, and if we
consider that in the entire range of anthropological studies the effects of these personal
differences tend to correct each other, I do not think that we need worry unduly over
this problem in so far as the reliability of anthropological findings is in question
(1951).
In the Philosophy of History, Steinberg (1981) reminds us of Popper's realistic comments
(1972):
We all have our philosophies, whether or not we are aware of this fact... the impact
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of our philosophies upon our actions and upon our lives is often devastating. This
makes it necessary to try to improve our philosophies by criticism.
And Steinberg provides a practical context:
To tell an undergraduate that his essay needs to be improved is to make assertions
about methodology, and every methodology, however inchoate, is applied philosophy.
By "philosophy of history" in this context, I mean that analytical and critical activity
by which we scrutinize the things we do and say as historians (Steinberg 1981,
455-56).
There is also an even simpler answer to this problem: do we as practitioners feel that we are
infinitely more knowledgeable, as our subject evolves, about each past society we are
studying? That notable historian, W H McNeill has recently given this response to the issue
of subjective versus objective reconstruction (1986):
I actually believe that historians' truths, like those of scientists, evolve across the
generations, so that versions of the past acceptable today are superior in scope, range,
and accuracy to versions available in earlier times.2
Thus one may, as an act of faith, believe that our historiographical myth making
and myth breaking is bound to cumulate over time, propagating mythistories that fit
experience better and allow human survival more often, sustaining in-groups in ways
that are less destructive to themselves and to their neighbours than was the case or
is the case today.
(And here he cites the way future histories will give due and novel emphasis to women,
coloured populations and the Third World).
Anyone who reads historians of the 16th and 17th centuries and those of our own
time will notice a new awareness of social process that we have attained. As one
who shares that awareness, I find it iempossible not to believe thaet it represents an
advance on older notions that focussed attention exclusively, or almost exclusively,
on human intentions and individual actions, subject only to God or to a no less
inscrutable Fortune, while leaving out the social and material context within which
individual actions took place (1986, 9-10).
Going back to Biblical Archaeology, we might now reasonably ask of Professor Dever whether
his antiseptic Palestinian New Archaeology (Dever 1981) is much the poorer by passing a
floundering Biblical Archaeology on the other side of the road. A dispassionate application
of the latest techniques to sites in the Holy Land, as long as that includes a healthy scepticism
about misuse of inadequate data, can and should contribute to our understanding and
appreciation of the Jewish and Christian Bibles. I am thinking for example of a recent
newspaper article (The Guardian, October 20th, 1986) where Mark Rudall wrote the following
in an admirably reflexive way:
When archaeologists went to work on the city of Lachish, in Israel, a few years back,
they found that the remains from the llth century BC showed the ancient walled
city to have been composed of small dwellings all of similar size. The remains from
300 years later, however, looked very different. They consisted of the foundations
of a number of very large dwellings spread out within the city walls, yet there was
also a group of ill-found shanty-like slums jammed up in one quarter of the city.
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Explanation in Recent Maya Archaeology
Warfare, Ecology, and Religion
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This latter picture represents, of course, the period of Jewish Old Testament history
that saw the emergence of the great prophets. It was gross inequality and feckless
exploitation that wound the springs of men like Isaiah of Jerusalem and his depressive
colleague, Jeremiah, in particular.
I have recently moved to the South-east from the city of Liverpool. I now live in
Enfield, very much a part of North London's suburbia, and as the family settles into
the new atmosphere I am absorbing something that everyone who has ever lived in
the North of England has feared, or if not feared, certainly sensed for a very long
time. I now read Isaiah's words with new eyes...
Conclusions: An Archaeology that is reflexive in Wilk's terms is given "Meaning" in our
own lives and let us hope in those of our contemporaries. We have a serious responsibility
to make the past "count", not least to give value to our own lives as professional dealers in
the past. On the other hand, only a careful balance between our personal views of
contemporary life and an explicit rigour in academic research will prevent our creating a
spurious past by conscious or more likely unconscious design.3
Theoretical Perspectives
Part 1: The New 'Old Archaeology' and the Old 'New Archaeology'
Post-Positivism in Current Theoretical Archaeology
In terms of THEORY, in parallel with the postwar public service ethic there expanded an
all-embracing Positivism,4 which culminated in a proliferation of dehumanising approaches
both in public life and the educational world, and such as were highly suited to statistical and
computer manipulation (Bintliff 1986). Archaeology adopted these late, in the 60's and 70's
as part of the more complex package of the New Archaeology. Characteristic features were
mechanistic or deterministic models (cf Economic Man, Catchment Analysis, Carrying
Capacity) and the use of a Systems Theory perspective (cf also the Cultural Morphology of
Clarke). Likewise emanating from the optimistic planning perspective for a renovated Western
World arose the belief that the sciences of Man could discover and operationalise the general
principles of human society, past, present and future. Discovering the "laws of cultural
process" was a specifically American gloss on postwar Positivism in Archaeology (Binford).
In the 70's Geography and History saw mounting criticism of this programme, which was
becoming dominant in their disciplines (as the "New Geography", "New History"); since the
inception of the 1980's Archaeology in its theoretical literature has witnessed an identical
about-face (Bintliff 1986). Some scholars reject the New Archaeology's idea of making
generalisations about the past as unattainable (eg Trigger 1984), advocating a return to the
traditional approach of the "thick description" of unique events. Others retain the potential of
cross-cultural comparison, but only in so far as arguing that shared properties of the human
mind create similar patterns in material culture (Symbolic and Structural Archaeology - cf
Hodder 1982), or that our common cultural heritage and the 'psychic unity of mankind' allow
us to reenact the thoughts of free-willed individuals in the past through the medium of their
behavioural residues (Hodder 1986, after Collingwood).5 Yet other scholars reject postwar
Positivism as a veiled ideology that serves to perpetuate the structure of capitalist society by
projecting it into the past, preferring instead to explore the potential of a priori theories such
as Marxism. Meanwhile some of the original proponents of general theory in New Archaeol-
ogy have retreated to the limited perspectives of Middle Range Theory.
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We have here defined a cluster of new attitudes to interpreting the past, which Ian Hodder
(1982, 1986) and other theorists would identify as a new movement contrasting with the "New
Archeology" movement of the '60s and '70s. It is probably most economical to look at these
approaches via a critique of Hodder's recent theory volume, Reading the Past (1986). The
main arguments put forward by Hodder as the platform of Post-Positivist or Post-Processualist
Archaeology are as follows:
(1) Independence. Archaeology must renounce its slavish borrowing from and striving towards
the sciences, and formulate its own distinct methodology. It is rather difficult to accept this
argument since a great deal of Reading the Past is a successful transfer into our discipline
of Post-Positivist approaches in Geography, History, Social Science, Literary History, General
Philosophy and the Philosophy of Science. Hodder's new book is a helpful guide to recent
theoretical developments elsewhere, for a profession that clearly does not read much in other
subjects, just as his previous bestsellers served as channels for preceding non-archaeological
theory packages (the New Geography and Spatial Analysis, Structuralist Anthropology and
Symbols in Action, Structuralist and Symbolic Archaeology).
The question of Archaeology's necessary distinctiveness is a question regularly but
superficially treated of. Geographers with their usual greater maturity of disciplinary outlook
have dealt with this extensively for their own subject. In acknowledgement that the study of
Man in space and landscape is ultimately and especially currently, not only Geography but
also Sociology, History, Archaeology, Economics, Politics, Ecology and Philosophy, the latest
textbooks seriously raise the suggestion that Geography should and will disappear into an
holistic Science of Human Society (cf Eliot-Hurst's 1985 paper: Geography has neither
existence nor future).
(2) The Active Individual in the Past. The New Archaeology is rightly criticised by Hodder
for paying inadequate attention to the role of individuals in the past, preferring to model
whole communities or subcultures. With a focus on individual historical actors there arise the
necessary questions of freewill and personal unique initiative in moulding events, and these
are again topics peripheral to or largely ignored by the New Archaeology.
Although this topic merely introduces into Archaeology a debate current in sister
disciplines, it is certainly an area we must take seriously. In this neglected theme Hodder is
making a connection backwards to the pre-New Archaeology generation of Hawkes, Daniel
and Piggohtt with thheir humanistic concern for a past peopled by rational actors creating
their own future.
Unfortunately, Reading the Past conspicuously fails to produce any really convincing
methodology or archaeological case-studies for revealing the unique individual at work in the
past. The closest Hodder gets is to resurrect the increasingly popular 'empathy' technique of
the pre-War historian and philosopher, R G Collingwood. In this approach (see especially
Collingwood 1948) one immerses oneself in all the contextual material data for a particular
event or circumstance - then, using one's imagination and ability to step into the mental shoes
of the relevant historical actors, one is able to make explicit why certain decisions were made,
why certain things happened, through the medium of reconstructing the thought processes of
past individuals.
The logical weaknesses in this approach are rather obvious and there are serious difficulties
in maintaining that we can relive with any confidence the thought processes of historical
personages, except for the extremely rare cases where very full biographical details are
available from historic sources. That situation is so rare as not to be of any overall value to
the archaeologist or historian of pre-modern times. In fact the Collingwood method, far from
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discovering the unique, unpredictable individual, abolishes him, because its fundamental
assumption is that past personages are like you and me, and their responses to situations are
normative enough to belong to general human types of response. 'Given the background in
class, education, given assumed unchanging properties of human nature, we are led to suggest
that the Emperor χ would have thought such and such about this situation', etc.
Collingwood is often grouped in the philosophical school of Idealism, which argues that
our mental states filter the evidence of our senses and act as semi-independent controllers of
our actions. But Collingwood's theory of reconstructed action is actually highly positivistic:
it rests on the belief, not only that the underlying reasons for past actions are the motives of
rational historical actors, but also that we can always recover these motives by a critical
analysis of the contextual circumstances in which the decisions were made (cf also
Lewthwaite, this volume). In this very important respect Collingwood's approach, in so far
as anyone might want to use it as a speculative tool for processual research, is hardly at odds
with the model-building positivism of the New Archaeology. What it lacks though, and this
is surely crucial, is any means for validation.
From this discussion we are led to an acceptance that the past was formed by individual
people and individual actions, yet also to an affirmation that in almost every historical and
every prehistoric context, the way particular individuals conceived of their situation, and the
way particular individuals reached mental decisions which altered the course of the past, are
likely to remain beyond the analytical grasp of archaeologists and historians, even though
we may speculate with Collingwood, and with varying degrees of plausibility.6
In Geography, a version of Collingwood's "Idealist" approach has been propagated by
Guelke (1974, 1982). Critical evaluation of his work has exposed familiar limitations. Gregory
(1978) for example, has commented on Guelke's attempts to comprehend actions and their
perpetrators as "rational responses to their situations as they saw them": 'who is to regard
them as rational and on what basis?' Baker (1979) points out that false consciousness, where
the technique has not actually been realistic, cannot be recognised unless the analyst retains
his own external frame of reference. In general, reviewers of Guelke's work have found it
impossible to agree that thoughts can be rethought convincingly in this fashion. Moreover
they suggest that Guelke is unintentionally hypocritical in that the method advocated is not
culturally relative but a new form of 20th century positivism reformulated to include human
thought (Baker 1979, 565).
However, as mentioned above, in Reading the Past, whilst we are given Collingwood's
empathy in theory, in practice all the relevant examples from archeology and ethnography are
cases of group not individual mental processes. These are paradoxically labelled as exhibiting
the active individual, but this is only apt in so far as each individual in the culture or subculture
actively shares the group ethos Hodder is seeking to derive from material culture. Thus in a
lengthy case study of a Kenyan tribe Hodder argues that the significance of decorating milk
containers is to express communal female frustration at their social inferiority.
It seems to me inevitable that except for recent heavily documented history, we are only
very rarely given the data from which to infer the contribution of a unique event or a unique
person to the course of the past. On the other hand, by implication, such specific occasions
and specific individuals only become objects of importance because of their wider ramifica-
tions and influence on society as a whole. It is at that stage that we can hope to pick up
transformations in particular societies. In this respect our focus must necessarily rest on
phenomena at the local group and regional population level upwards. Even when historic
personages make their literary presence felt, our understanding of their significance comes
from a critical analysis of their impact within the major observable features of their society,
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and our treatment becomes merely speculative when we turn our focus on their own personal
psychology and detailed motivation.
I could demonstrate this point simply by reminding you that despite the immense wealth
of historical records available from the last war, we still cannot clarify a central historical
question, namely whether Hitler was responsible for, or even aware of, "The Final Solution".
It is even more relevant to bring to your attention an excellent and perceptive review article
by Bradley of several recent publications in Roman imperial history. Commenting on a new
book about Nero which attempts a psychological biography (Griffin 1984), Bradley writes:
If there can be no doubt about the theoretical value of this approach and its superiority
over a straightforward chronographical account, the key to judging its success must
lie on what can be discovered about Nero's personality... This is why it is such a
hazardous undertaking to write not just a biography of Nero but imperial biography
at large, because it is very rare for the modern historian to have access to sources
contemporary with the subject or personally detailed enough to permit him to go
beyond superficial character study. What the historian needs to establish character
and personality convincingly are letters, diaries, notebooks, that is, literary material
of a private sort, but none of these materials exists for Nero. Indeed the only
prominent Roman from the Classical era who has left private correspondence in bulk
is Cicero, and it is the availability of his letters, and comparison of them with his
voluminous public works, that allows some understanding of Cicero the man to
emerge in a way impossible for any other Roman figure...
In the final analysis it may well be possible to measure Nero's performance as
emperor against conventional, institutional expectations of him without relying so
much on his personality. After all, this is what Suetonius did to some extent. Certainly
by Suetonius' day, and probably as early as that of Nero, there were ways in which
the Roman emperor was supposed to behave; by showing his concern for the material
welfare of his subjects, for example, an area in which Nero's performance was
unquestionably sound. The tradition that Nero was extravagant and wasteful of money
cannot and sohotuld not be altogether denied, but whether weaknesses of personality,
insecurity, paranoia, the need for self-justification, or a simple lack of political
judgement provided the basis for the tradition is an open question. The victimisation
of political opponents and even the possibility of a real reign of terror are issues that
cannot be brushed aside, yet by nature the principale was a repressive form of
government which did not allow for any sustained sort of opposition (Bradley 1986,
93-96).
(3) The Search f or Meaning in the Past. Hodder picks up on a very lively debate in our sister
disciplines in mounting a prolonged critique of the limited conception of Meaning attributable
to New Archaeologists. In his view, what passes for a meaningful analysis by a New
Archaeologist merely links up data in supposed cause and effect chains, apeing the methods
of the hard sciences. As philosophers have repeatedly pointed out, notably Dilthey in the last
century, the fundamental distinction between explanation in the hard sciences and the
humanities is that between an approach that places phenomena in conjunction in a billiard
ball model, describing from "outside" what is seen to occur in sequence, and an approach
that derives human events from inner thoughts, the "inside" of events, the "meaning" lying
in past mental landscapes that obey no necessary rational laws.
It would seem therefore that we are being advised that the key to the human past is to
reconstruct the mental landscapes of past cultures (we can forget the solitary individual, as
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noted above), using language clues left in the symbolism of material culture. Unfortunately,
Hodder has soon to admit that reading off the meaning of symbols works fairly well in cases
such as water designs on water jugs, monumental tombs that are pseudomorphs of houses,
but rapidly becomes highly problematic with more typical items in cultural assemblages. In
fact we are reduced to inferences about the mental processes of past peoples, using an
"outsider" technique based on comparative sociology. Now the critical analysis of the
significance, in context, of a past community's actions, as preserved in material culture, using
what amounts to ethnohistoric analogue, is quite characteristic of the New Archaeology and
its emphasis on cross-cultural comparisons and anthropological guiding models. In practice,
therefore, Hodder's approach is a variant of New Archaeology. What about validation (again)?
Hodder, in denying his reliance on uniformitarian assumptions of cross-cultural analogue,
offers us internal validation by "contextual archaeology". This turns out to look very like
traditional systems theory analysis of the interconnections traceable across a culture in order
to comprehend its several dimensions of meaning, and as such, still requires external
interpretation. On the positive side, there is a need to remind archaeologists (but not historians)
that past societies acted through the filter of their particular perceptions of the world about
them; these mental landscapes of the past should be sought for within material culture
(especially in art and other forms of ideological and symbolic expression, cf Renfrew 1982),
or through their expression in historical records (if we have them), using traditional methods
of ethnohistoric analogy critically. But let us be quite sure about how we achieve this: for
historic and ethnographically-recorded societies we can collect verbal expressions of
worldviews, for prehistoric societies we have only the mute patterns of material culture to
decipher. In the former case we are often privileged with an "insider" view of the past, in the
latter case we are always operating "outsider" interpretations.
A second major criticism of the "insider meaning" approach is that it assumes that all
historic actors at the individual or community level always act perfectly consciously, and that
therefore all important processes affecting past societies find expression in conscious material
culture symbolism. A corollary of this is that all of importance that happened to and within
a past society was created by the independent functioning of innumerable mental landscapes
directing external action. Such a view is difficult to reconcile both with our own experience
of the world and the careful analyses of sociologists, anthropologists and historians. It simply
is not correct that we weigh up consciously everything we do; human infants have an
exceptionally prolonged rearing in order to be programmed into the most complex cultural
patterns. Most of the time we conform to the established norms of our society, or most of us
do; all societies tolerate both individual deviants and a major part of their populations
fluctuating their behaviour around predictable norms. We do make decisions, but generally
between a limited range of normative behavioural choices common to our society or
subculture, age or sex, class or occupatioon, nationality and religion.7
Furthermore, the study of History demonstrates a whole range of forces acting on or
operating within societies and severely limiting their members' development, detectable as
medium-term climatic cycles, agrarian cycles or demographic cycles. Since most contemporar-
ies were unaware of the secular trends our scholarship reveals, it is not possible to view these
important developments merely by studying short-lived symbols.
Hodder implicitly admits to such interpretations, (communal, insider and outsider), of the
"meaning" of the past in almost every example he provides of "reading the past". Thus as
we have seen, in his Kenya tribe, the stated reason given by the women who decorate milk
containers is 'to make them beautiful'. Clearly not content with the "actors' version" Hodder
treats us to a long and undoubtedly "outsider" analysis of the role of milk containers in the
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changing socio-economic structure of the community, ending up with an elaborate explanation
that would never have occurred to the tribe.
Indeed, so much of what goes on in any particular society is not patterned consciously, and
the sociologist reveals a myriad of interconnections of which participants are unaware at an
explicit level. The understanding of a society must therefore occur at two levels: a sincere
attempt to reconstruct the mental landscape of a past community or subculture, seeing events
through the "participant observer" perspective - in general we needs must rely on ethnohistoric
models for much of this even where literary evidence is available; and a distanced, "outsider"
analysis of what seems to be going on beyond the immediate cognised perception of historical
actors. In practice, Hodder's own examples are almost entirely of the latter variety.
In operating in effect a two-tier analysis of human actions in society, (or a three-tier if he
proceeds to compare one society with another case study society), Hodder has adopted a
recognised variant within traditional Social Anthropology methodology).8
In Ancient History, the same conflict between cultural relativity and an overarching search
for cross-cultural synthesis can be found (Bradley 1986). On the one hand we have historians
such as Millar, whose book The Emperor in the Roman World (1977) prides itself on the
following approach:
In preparing the work I have rigidly avoided reading sociological works on kingship
and related topics, or studies of monarchic institutions in societies other than Greece
and Rome... For to have come to the subject with an array of concepts derived from
the study of other societies would merely have made even more unattainable the
proper objective of an historian, to subordinate himself to the evidence and to the
conceptual world of a society in the past (1977, xii).
In contrast we have sociologists of the ancient world such as Keith Hopkins, whose reply to
Millar ran as follows:
This position is untenable. It is untenable on a literal level because Millar hdeas
written in English, not in Latin or Greek. Over the last century, the English language
has developed abstract concepts to cope with the increasing complexity of social
arrangements. Besides, the historian interprets a lost world to modern readers through
the medium of a living language: one of his objectives may well be to enter the
thought world of his subjects, both actors and sources... but he must also relate the
lost world to contemporary concerns, whether consciously or unconsciously...
(Millar's) declared objective of subordinating himself to the ancient sources... is
unnecessarily restrictive, impossible to achieve and undesirable (1978, 180).
In an illuminating and original paper, John Haldon (1986) has recently opened up discussion
in Byzantine history on the same key issues of the Post-Positivist agenda. He, like Hopkins,
highlights the limitations of Collingwoodian "empathy" with the past and opts for a two-tier
analysis based on Social Anthropology.9 Firstly, we identify what the Byzantines thought they
were doing and their general and subcultural worldviews, then by using a systemic perspective
we analyse what we as "outsiders" think they were doing -which is not the same thing.10 The
Byzantinist has a rich literature to help achieve both "insider" and "outsider" goals, and Haldon
lays stress on the analysis of contemporary historical narratives as guides that relate concepts
of self to events. Nonetheless, throughout this analysis there is a constant appeal to make
explanatory frameworks explicit and testable by critical and interpretative frameworks of
validation.
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The particular theme chosen by Haldon to illustrate his argument is the "antisocial" in
Byzantine society, but he also tackles the natural reaction that Byzantine mentality is too alien
for us to bring it into any kind of anthropological cross-cultural analysis. For instance, we
might cite the alien religiosity of the Byzantines. However:
"religious" in a pre-industrial context is effectively an equivalent of "social" for us:
the universe was made sense of through a vocabulary which we refer to as religious
because it is not our vocabulary. It invokes non-human agencies and, in the terms
of our common sense, an often impenetrably "irrational" logic... at every level. Which
means that religious, in the broadest sense, is also an equivalent of ordinary/everyday/
commonplace. Ungodly, or impious or even godless signifies thus by no means "not
religious", but rather not conforming to the norm: different, alien, or even simply,
"anti-social" (Haldon 1986, 71).
(4) Anarchic Subjectivity. Alongside these fairly uneven attempts to get at people's mental
processes in the past, Hodder offers a very contrasted approach to history and prehistory,
once more borrowing from trends in sister disciplines. I will dub this "anarchic subjectivity"
because it basically states that the past is unknowable, and our professional efforts to penetrate
its mysteries merely serve as a means of expression for modern ideology, public and private.
There is no validation possible for our personal visions of the past, each is as good as any
other, and originates in our own viewpoints of the present.
Although in some disciplines such as Literary History this approach is widespread (and
devastating in its negative effects), the inroads of such reductionism are less common but still
recognisable in History and more peripherally in Geography.
In Steinberg's (1981) discussion of Post-Positivist approaches to History, the subjective
approach to an unknowable past is focussed on the influence of Barthes' Structuralism on
historians such as Hayden White. Kuzminski is quoted (463) as commenting:
From this point of view the meaning of an historical narrative lies not in its ability
to depict truly or falsely independently existing facts; rather, it lies in its ability to
purport to do so... The actual historical process is not so much denied, as decreed
to be unintelligible. The unprocessed historical record consists in events, but they
only come in meaningless one-damn-thing-after-another sequences.
Steinberg points out that this kind of Structuralist dogma, applied say, to a history text by
Le Roy Ladurie,
is irrefutable... What I can do is to choose between two propositions: (a) Le Roy
Ladurie is making statements about the past; (b) Le Roy Ladurie only thinks that he
is making statements about the past. I prefer (a) on grounds of economy... I behave
rationally if I choose the simpler statement (467).
In the conclusion to Steinberg's evaluation of the subjective/objective debate, Steinberg writes:
How much "authentic history" in Dr. Johnson's sense is there? More than he thought.
Popper is right to show us the objective evidence of the past around us. We have
no reason to think that the perception of such evidence is more or less problematical
than any other perception. That all perception has its problems is one thing; to say
that the historian's are worse or different from any other now seems to me to be
false. There is, then, "out there" a knowable past. In that sense I have come through
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this epistemological total immersion a convinced realist about the past as such. I
am sure that we can make statements about the past which are either true or false...
The past is knowable, but not all of it by the same techniques nor with the same
degree of certainty. Some knowledge, however secure it may feel to the knower,
will not easily be contested and proved false; other knowledge can be refuted by
techniques not all that different from the scientist (1981, 471-472).
We have already examined the interesting 'reflexive' role of Archaeology, and seen fit to
support it wholeheartedly provided principles of validation are observed. Anarchic subjectivity
on the other hand revels in a contradictory variety of viewpoints, and can best be summed
up in the words of one of its philosophical idols, Feyerabend:
There is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all
stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes (quoted in Skinner
1985, 8).
It is a curiosity of Hodder's Reading the Past that this apparent negation of scientific
endeavour is frequently encouraged throughout the volume, side by side with continuing and
equally well reasoned attempts to make sense of the past as a real and recoverable set of
processes. As Waldemar Janusczak has commented, on the equivalent trend in Post-Modernist
Art, there is a lack of educational, didactic and creative purpose, the only subject left being
the artist himself, enforcing Expressionism as the chosen painting style of the 1980's (The
Guardian, December 2nd, 1986).
Theoretical Perspectives
Part 2: Towards a New Synthesis? - Some Cogent Pointers
In the first three parts of this paper I have identified and discussed a wide-ranging debate
about the 'meaning' of the past, its meaning to us in the modern age, and independently to
those who lived through the events we seek to unravel through Archaeology and History.
Firstly we saw that the necessity to clarify what the past means to us is an urgent task in the
current political and economic climate. We next moved on to demonstrate how closely our
general models of the past interact with modern life, reinforcing our responsibility to seek to
say something relevant whilst hopefully yielding to the judgement of scientific, peer group
validation. Finally we analysed the main themes of the so-called Post-Positivist or Post-
Processual Archaeology and found that in reality an outside imposition of analytical meaning
must take precedence over speculative but imaginative reconstructions of meanings attributable
to past historical actors. The niew 'Old Archaeology' is in reality a more sophisticated version
of the old 'New Archaeology'.
I would like now to summarise a number of recent developments and some not quite so
recent, in sister disciplines, which seem to me to point to an exciting future prospect for
Archaeology, perhaps towards a new synthesis of the Sciences of Man, in which the apparent
difficulties exposed in New Archaeology by the Post-Positivist package can be turned to the
profitable improvement of our discipline. The ultimate aim is to link arms with the other
disciplines of Man under a unitary theoretical umbrella, recapturing that grand synthesis in
which Archeology basked as an essential component discipline during late Victorian times.
Inspired by the victory of Darwinism, a coherent paradigm for the evolution of Nature and
Man was created at that time between Anthropology, Prehistory, Zoology, Geology and
Sociology (cf Sterud 1973: Bintliff 1984b, Introduction; Bintliff 1986).
20 John Bintliff
Social Anthropology
European archaeologists tend to think of Social Anthropology as providing a methodological
model for tackling how societies work, in the form of the Structural-Functionalist tradition
that has dominated British Anthropology for most of this century. To our minds, S-F is typified
by a rather static, equilibrium model of societies, each one of which is made up of an
interactive cluster of subsystems. The aim of every persistent feature in a society is the
functional stability of the whole structure of that society. Practitioners of SF are supposed to
reject historical and evolutionary perspectives.
Now this characterisation certainly holds for many of the anthropologists who dominated
the subject in the first half of this century. But over the last 30-40 years a more subtle version
of this approach has appeared. Let us consider the later work of that giant of ethnography,
Evans-Pritchard. He began research with a strongly functionalist approach adopted from
Radcliffe-Brown, equally strongly rejecting an historical perspective. But in his later works
his attitudes changed. The central concept which made sense of society was still its structural
coherence, and here he did not deviate from orthodoxy, quoting Radcliffe-Brown (1931)
approvingly:
the function of culture as a whole is to unite individual human beings into more or
less stable social structures, ie. stable systems of groups determining and regulating
the relation of those individuals to one another, and providing such external
adaptation to the physical environment, and such internal adaptation between the
component individuals or groups, as to make possible an ordered social life. That
assumption I believe to be a sort of primary postulate of any objective and scientific
study of culture or human society (1951, 54-55).
Here we have an ordered pattern of custom and social relations essential to the coherence of
society and offering systematic and experienced reaction to the potential of the physical
environment. But then Evans-Pritchard takes a critical stance towards other central concepts
of orthodox Social Anthropology at the time he was writing (1951):
social anthropologists are maintaining that societies are natural systems of which all
the parts are interdependent, each serving in a complex of necessary relations to
maintain the whole, and that social life can be reduced to scientific laws which allow
prediction (49).
This set of concepts can be traced back to the Victorian pioneers of Anthropology and
the assumption they had inherited from the Enlightenment that societies are natural
systems, or organisms, which have a necessary course of development that can be
reduced to general principles or laws. Logical connections were in consequence
presented as real and necessary connections and typological classifications as both
historical and inevitable courses of development (42).
Evans-Pritchard attacks in this fashion:
I now come to the postulate of functional anthropology, that social systems are natural
systems .which can be reduced to sociological laws, with the corollary that the history
of them has no scientific relevance. I must confess that this seems to me to be
doctrinaire positivism at its worst... Up to the present nothing even remotely
resembling what are called laws in the natural sciences have been advanced - only...
assertions. The generalisations which have so far been attempted have, moreover,
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been so vague and general as to be, even if true, of little use, and they have rather
easily tended to become mere tautologies and platitudes on the level of common
sense deduction.
Such being the case, I think that we may ask again whether... a legal system is
really comparable to a physiological system or the planetary system... Those of us
who take the view I have expressed above... must ask ourselves whether... the claim
that the history of an institution is irrelevant to an understanding of it as it is at the
present time is acceptable... for history is not merely a succession of changes but,
as others have said, a growth. The past is contained in the present as the present is
in the future... It is also evident that problems of social development can only be
studied in terms of history, and furthermore that history alone provides a satisfactory
situation in which the hypotheses of functional anthropology can be tested (57-60).
The kind of understanding of societies here being offered is still focussed on orderly, structured
sets of relationships between people and with the physical environment, but now these
patterned behaviours float free of rigid deterministic laws of society, of "inevitable" sequences
of development, or ecological determinism. It is the coherent pattern of society that ensures
its functioning, but the form and especially the content of this pattern owes as much to the
particular historical trajectory of a culture as to the requirements of structural stability at any
one point in time. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or even predictable about how
a society is transformed over time, yet always we can expect dominant patterns of behaviour,
structurally comparable between numerous societies, to hold a society together as a successful
body of people. The particular or historical is a unique variant of the general, the principle
of structural coherence.
Edmund Leach, a pupil of Evans-Pritchard, takes this a stage further (1984), whilst arguing
likewise that human cultures and societies cannot merely be read off from a priori determinism
of an environmental, Darwinian or law-like nature. Societies are complex wholes with an
internal logic that only we as human beings can penetrate. At the same time our created
societies must follow strong structures if they are to hold up and endure, and there must also
be functional adaptation to the realities of human nature and physical conditions if a society
is not to dissolve rapidly. Turning to the 18th century philosopher of history, Vico, Leach
finds a similar viewpoint:
His key perception in his New Science... was that only the maker of an object fully
understands its nature; for example a carpenter understands why the chair he has
made does not collapse. But human society was made by man, so man should be
able to understand society, in an engineering sense, for example why it holds together
and does not collapse. Behind this there is the further perception that all the artifacts
(including human society) which man thus 'makes' must necessarily be projective
transformations of what the human brain already 'knows'. This implies, to use
computer terminology, that social products are generated by 'software programmes',
operating through but limited by the computer-like machinery of the human brain.
The 'software' comes from our cultural environment, the 'hardware' derives from
our genetic ineheritance... I reject the notion that I have swung back and forth between
being a functionalist and being a structuralist; I have quite consistently been both at
once (1984, 19-20).
Going much further back in 20th century Anthropology, Malinowski also seems to have held
an almost "existentialist" view of the Functionalist approach:
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Functionalism contents itself with directing attention to stable configurations and
contributions to the stability, without invoking any intentions supposedly carried out
by the contributions... When functions are interpreted as intentions, real social
processes are replaced by fictitious goal-directed behaviour of abstract entities like
'institutions', 'social classes', or 'the culture' itself (quoted in Kaplan 1984, 37).
From this tradition within Social Anthropology we can obtain a model of society as patterned
form rather than predicted content; this form needs to be well-structured and coherent for a
society to work and endure. For the content, adaptation to the natural world and to essential
requirements of social cooperation can be expected, but only as an effective normative
structuring. The exact and particular mechanisms adopted by each society are not predictable
and are to be understood by historical analysis not by general laws and deterministic principles.
Significantly Evans-Pritchard cites Maitland:
By and by anthropology will have the choice between being history and being nothing
(1962, 152).
History
The American historian, William McNeill, in a paper published in 1986, has been looking
with insight into the way historians make sense of the past, with an eye, once again, to the
Post-Positivist critique. Although "scientific history" has been a great advance on what went
on before, its Limitations
were far more constricting than its devotees believed. Facts that could be established
beyond all reasonable doubt remained trivial in the sense that they did not, in and
of themselves, give meaning or intelligibility to the record of the past. A catalogue
of undoubted and indubitable information, even if arranged chronologically, remains
a catalogue. To become a history, facts have to be put together into a pattern that is
understandable and credible; and when that has been achieved, the resulting portrait
of the past may become useful as well - a fount of practical wisdom upon which
people may draw when making decisions and taking action.
Pattern recognition of the sort historians engage in is the chef d'oeuvre of human
intelligence. It is achieved by paying selective attention to the total input of stimuli...
Here is the great secret of human power over nature and over ourselves as well.
Pattern recognition is what natural scientists are up to; it is what historians hav
always done, whether they knew it or not.
The great and obvious difference between natural scientists and historians is the
greater complexity of the behaviour historians seek to understand. The principle
source of historical complexity lies in the fact that human beings react both to the
natural world and to one another chiefly through the mediation of symbols... Resort
to symbols, in effect, loosened up the connection between external reality and human
responses, freeing us from instinct by setting us adrift on a sea of uncertainty. Human
beings thus acquired a new capacity to err, but also to change, adapt, and learn new
ways of doing things.
What a particular group of persons understands, believes, and acts upon, even if
quite absurd to outsiders, may nonetheless cement social relations and allow the
members of the group to act together and accomplish feats otherwise impossible.
Moreover, membership in such a group and participation in its sufferings and
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triumphs gives meaning and value to individual human lives... shared traits that
provide a sanction for common effort have obvious survival value. Without social
cement no group can long preserve itself... The historic record available to us consists
of an unending appearance and dissolution of human groups, each united by its own
beliefs, ideals, and traditions (1986, 2-3).
Later in the same paper, as quoted earlier in this essay, McNeill expresses his belief that we
can and should evaluate, through objective criteria, all patterns claimed for the past, not least
such past ideologies, and that historical knowledge is not only real but cumulative.
We have already put to full use the penetrating and illuminating discussion of objective/
subjective interpretations of the past in the discipline of History, offered by J Steinberg in the
form of a review article (1981). Although, as we have seen, he comes down clearly on the
side of an objectively-knowable History, he qualifies this by introducing an important
distinction between rigorously-validated interpretations and those where we perceive the
essential structure of how things happened by virtue of our recognition of shared experience
and shared values:
Popper is right to show us the objective evidence of the past around us... I am sure
that we can make statements about that past which are either true or false. On the
other hand... I am equally sure that the sciences of man simply cannot be covered
by the techniques of the physical sciences. Popper is wrong... Historians know their
material reflexively; the natural scientist does not The past is then knowable, but
not all of it by the same techniques nor with the same degree of certainty. Some
knowledge, however secure it may feel to the knower, will not easily be contested
and proved false; other knowledge can be refuted by techniques not all that different
from the scientist (1981, 472).
We sit somewhere between the two contrasted positions. On the one hand, we recognize that
Popper and others who
posit an objective, rational, discrete, knowing subject separate from, and independent
of, the object of knowledge are too simple.
Yet
Those approaches which, be it through dialectical materialism, or hermeneutic
"Verstehen", link the knowing subject and the object known, run into perilous
circularities(1981, 472).
Common themes that link these approaches to society and the human past in Social
Anthropology and History are:
(a) Society, past and present, is knowable. Much of our reconstructions and model-building
is directly amenable to validation procedures as practised in the natural sciences. But there
remains a further level of analysis where we operate "uniformitarian" principles of pattern
recognition in social and historical process. As human social beings, we are uniquely able to
find our path through the endless data and distinguish key structures of cause and effect,
significance and relevance. Even here, however, explicit statement of models and the data
provoking them can and must lead to critical evaluation of alternative "readings" of pattern,
so that at any time the closest fit to the knowable true pattern is achieved. Knowledge in both
spheres of analysis is cumulative.
(b) We can accomplish the selection of the most significant facts and processes for a given
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society over a chosen time-span because societies consist in essence of, and function and
endure because of, structures of behaviour and cultural values which are normative for the
majority of their members.
(c) Social structures serve the function of regulating inter-personal and inter-group relations,
and community-environment relations. In an important sense therefore, social structures are
argued to be adaptive, promoting the stability of a society and encapsulating advantageous
learned procedures in exploiting the natural world. The individual members of these structured
societies are considered to be adaptively advantaged likewise through their participation in
ordered structures of behaviour. Yet on the other hand, the elaboration of human culture, as
a potentially "open system" subject to immense and rapid variation in time and space, is seen
to have freed human behaviour, however normative it appears to be on the intra-community
level, from having to conform in anything but the most general terms, to the constraints of
natural selection. That society needs order and structure is therefore an adaptive constraint.
But the exact mode of expression which a structure takes might be as variable as there are
known societies - this is a central distinction of form versus content.
(d) To analyze the most significant features of a society we therefore operate on three levels:
we begin by seeking to identify the patterns, firstly conscious, secondly unconscious, that
dominate the changing nature of that society. Thirdly, we seek to disentangle with an historical
and "outsider" critical perspective how such patterns grew and declined, and the degree to
which patterned behaviour and values have been adaptively successful to that society as a
whole, its subcultures, and individual members.
Geography
Geographers have been adapting and adopting facets of the Post-Positivist paradigm since the
early 1970's, and their mature deliberations on its themes are of particular interest to
archaeologists, since our subject matter overlaps so considerably. The mainstream opinion
appears to agree on a compromise, where the most useful features of the new "people-
orientated" Geography are built onto the stable structure of the New Geography with its central
emphasis on scientific procedures.
Thus Smith, in a review paper of 1979 entitled Geography, Science and Post-Positivist
Modes of Explanation, upholds the position of necessary validation:
By seeking scientific laws and theories, by applying models and systems scientif-
ically, or at the very least by testing hypotheses according to scientific criteria,
geographers made geography a science... What is important is that new research in
geography, whether strictly "scientific" or not, can no longer ignore the scientific
criteria according to which the discipline's findings are internally judged. To be sure,
this is not quite the science on which so much euphoria and hyperbole were wasted
in the early sixties (1979, 357).
Smith goes on to the important theme we have just seen arising in History and Social
Anthropology, the merging of those areas of analysis where we can with confidence use
natural science validation procedures, and those where we "recognize" significant pattern
through our-use of a uniformitarian perspective, our shared-experience recognition facility.
Thus, whereas Buttimer suggests that geographers introduce interdisciplinary confusion if they
accept a behavioural/Phenomenological/perspective:
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Phenomenology muddies the waters for those who believe in separating "subjective"
and "objective" modes of knowing; it questions the assumptions and ideological
foundations of conventional scientific models (cited by Smith, op cit 365).
Schutz on the other hand has managed to square the circle. For Schutz, natural science studies
the physical world and abstracts from it, social science abstracts from the commonsense
constructions through which people experience this "Lebenswelt". Both are united in "people".
The key to integration of the two perspectives is "intersubjectivity":
we share the everyday world with others and share or understand many of their
interpretations and experiences of it. Social scientific explanations therefore employ
constructions with intersubjective meanings; out of this intersubjectivity objectivity
becomes possible. Moreover, it is an objectivity capable of conveying the emotion,
feeling and meaning of everyday life (Smith, op cit 365-366).
This holistic view of the intended merging of "objective" and "subjective" pattern recognition
reminds us of McNeil!'s view from History that "knowable truth" emerges through the
ever-closer fit of "mythistories" that converge from contrasting initial perspectives, and of
Leach's adoption of Vico's philosophy. Popper has also recognized the importance of
intersubjective validation, arguing that "objectivity":
is not a product of the individual scientist's impartiality but a product of the public
character of scientific method (cited in Steinberg, op cit 458; cf also Lewthwaite,
this volume).
An overview paper, also of 1979, by A R H Baker, examined the possibilities of Positivist
and Post-Positivist merger (Historical Geography: A New Beginning?). Relating the current
debate to some very long-standing contrasted positions in Historical and Regional Geography,
Baker points out that the French tradition of "Possibilism" may offer an appropriate resolution,
stressing the constraints/potential that the environment and selective/adaptive pressures offer
or enforce for any given society. Taking advantage of selective potential, operating within
selective constraints, still allows "a hundred flowers to bloom" in the variety of human cultural
expressions and historical trajectories.
This approach, balanced between possibilism and idealism, needs to maintain contact
with both while rejecting the excesses of each (Baker, 564).
Gregory (1976) adds an additional dimension to this "insider/outsider" framework for analysis
- our "outsider" position should incorporate structures within society recognized by a historical
materialist perspective: it is
only by relating the way in which individuals constitute and apprehend their
phenomenal world to the deeper structures framing their actions and experiences that
such experiences can be transcended (cited in Baker, op cit 564).
Geographers also provide us with a practical suggestion about the appropriate scale for
operational research in an integrated new synthesis of Human Sciences: the Region. Baker
(op cit) argues that the unifying theme of much of the newest generation of Positivist and
Post-Positivist geography is regionalism; here we find on a manageable, research project, scale
a mixture of the particular and historical in place and time - yet permeating all is structure
and system. R J Johnston has recently stated (1986, 451-452) that in a search for a new
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common ground for the different subdisciplines of geographical endeavours:
Regional rather than systematic subdivision would seem to provide a better ap-
proach... Regions are identifiable entities and are deserving of study, but not in the
exceptionalist mould... they must be seen as place-bound responses to general
tendencies... we must produce general theories of the economic, social and political
manipulation of space... in order to understand particular events, places and periods.
A final and powerful argument which one can discover in a perusal of recent geographical
debate on Positivist/Post-Positivist, or Value-free/Value-laden ("Reflexive") approaches, ap-
pears in a forceful paper by Ian Douglas, a contribution to a symposium on The Unity of
Geography (Tr. Inst. Brit. Geogrs. 11, 1986). In essence, Douglas points out that convoluted
philosophical debate, often leading to totally inconclusive statements of unprovable and
contradictory nature, should be circumvented in order to focus attention on what geographers
actually do or what they should be doing. The world is heaving with moral and practical
challenges which geographers are particularly well-equipped to tackle. Moreover, these issues
of practice offer a pragmatic merger of objective methodology, moral, social and emotional
commitment of a reflexive nature, and a measured involvement in the perceptual worlds of
those who occupy problem regions. Ecology has hitherto occupied much of this expanding
niche due to neglect by geographers:
Debate on the unity of geography suggests some worry about what geographers are
doing, yet devotion of time to the debate may seem foolish when so many other
urgent problems of geographical concern press upon us: growing global, European
and British spatial, inequality of wellbeing; continued land degradation and food
shortages; the environmental implications of pollutant emissions, forest clearance and
nuclear waste disposal; not to mention the awesome implications of ever-expanding
defence industries and weapons' stockpiles
By the 1960's:
So many of the new texts produced in the ecoscience and environmental field looked
better geography texts than many offered by geographers. Issues like population,
resources, food, pollution were presented in dramatic and effective ways that gripped
the imagination of the students, public and media alike. The unity of people and
environment was clear - but it was called ecoscience or environmental studies, not
geography (Douglas 1986, 459, 461).
We as archaeologists can detect strong resonances from this statement. Under the external
pressures discussed in the first part of this paper, we are also being forced or encouraged, to
bring the past "out there" alive to the public and to ourselves. Douglas' approach is far from
one rejecting theory, but rather it reminds us that the merger of theory and practice should
be going on "out there" where the philosophical paradoxes cease to hinder successful practice
and problem-solving. Although we cannot prove philosophically that every pavement-edge is
like another, who outside their book-lined study examines each one before stepping off it?
«
Evolutionary Zoology, Biology and Human Evolution
In a series of books and papers, Stephen Jay Gould has refashioned the Darwinian theory of
Evolution in a way that converges directly on trends already identified in Anthropology,
History and Geography. His most recent general paper is a clear statement of his approach
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and is significantly entitled Evolution and the Triumph of Homology, or Why History Matters
(1986). It begins (60) with a quote from E H Carr:
The real importance of the Darwinian revolution was that Darwin, completing what
Lyell had already begun in geology, brought history into science.
History, Gould continues (61), is supposedly the domain of narrative, unique events - science
works with prediction and experiment - attitudes seemingly incompatible:
How then can we marry these two apparently contradictory statements - the claim
that Darwin's "long argument" made history matter and the usual impression that
Darwin was a great scientist? The problem vanishes when we locate Darwin's singular
greatness in his extended campaign to establish a scientific methodology for history
- to make history doable for the zealous researchers of science.
Darwin followed Lyell who said that small scale accretionary changes were not just all we
had to work with but the world really works that way too. Another key concept of Darwin's
was to deny a "purpose" or "direction" to evolutionary trajectories;
Darwin's greatness as a scientist lay in the middle ground between his most basic
elucidation of evolution as a fact, and his most general development of the radical
implications (randomness, materialism, nonprogressivism) that so upset Western
culture(61).
Recently there have been impressive arguments that, if accepted completely, would alter
features of Darwin's overall model, whilst still conforming to his central theory of selection.
One of these is the pace of evolutionary change:
The "gradualist-punctualist debate"... is but one small aspect of a broader discussion
about the nature of change: Is our world... primarily one of constant change (with
structure as a mere variation of the moment), or is structure primary and constraining,
with change as a "difficult" phenomenon, usually accomplished rapidly when a stable
structure is stressed beyond its buffering capacity to resist and absorb. It would be
hard to deny that the Darwinian tradition, including the modern synthesis, favoured
the first view while "punctualist" thought... prefers the second (Gould 1982, 383).
The key noteworthy feature of both models is that "history" is crucial to understanding
development, with "structure" constraining either constantly varying material or largely stable
material. For this reason an evolutionary scientist makes no pretence to "predict" future
evolution, yet on the other hand he can successfully "postdict" evolution by teasing out the
general structural regularities from the unending variety of life forms over space and time
(Gould 1986, 65).
A second radical change to Darwin's approach (Gould 1986, 62) is to broaden the range
of selective pressures, so that the original "competition" between organisms yields to a
hierarchical theory of selection, independent at several levels from genes to species, yet with
complex interactions occurring between the levels. The effect of this alteration is to allow
more far-reaching and rapid evolution to occur at times, and to open up selection to a broader
set of subject-matters, which in human terms could include whole societies, or cultural and
other behavioural patterns.
A third and especially interesting modification concerns the degree to which non-adaptive
variation is permitted in living forms:
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creativity lies in the process of variation, and selection only eliminates the unfit
(Gould 1982,381).
Much greater scope must be given to non-adaptive variation which offers raw material for
eventual selection if needed. Randomness can be a direct source of modification in form, not
just for raw material; indeed:
most evolutionary changes, particularly large-scale trends, include major non-adaptive
components as primary directing or channeling features, and if they proceed more
in an episodic than a smoothly continuous fashion, then we inhabit a different world
from the one Darwin envisaged (op cit 382)... many features of organic architecture
and developmental pathways have never been adaptations to anything... we tend to
think of these nonadaptations as a... set of small and incidental modifications with
no major consequences. I dispute this assessment and claim that the pool of
nonadaptations must be far greater in extent than the direct adaptations that engender
them. This pool must act as a higher-level analogue of genetic variation, as a
phenotypic source of raw material for further evolution... No one doubts that the
human brain became large for a set of complex reasons related to selection. But,
having reached its unprecedented bulk, it could... perform in an unimagined range
of ways bearing no relation to the selective reasons for initial enlargement. Most of
human society may rest upon these non-adaptive consequences... I do not claim that
a new force of evolutionary change has been discovered. Selection may supply all
immediate direction, but if highly constraining channels are built of nonadaptations,
and if evolutionary versatility resides primarily in the nature and extent of nonadap-
tive pools, then "internal" factors of organic design are an equal partner with selection
(Gould 1982, 383-384).
In an earlier publication Gould (1981) had elaborated on this model of hierarchical selection
that thrives on a looser, more flexible subject-matter such as human cultural variety, as
follows:
Humans are animals, and everything we do is constrained, in some sense, by our
biology. Some constraints are so integral to our being that we rarely even recognise
them, for we never imagine that life might proceed in another way.
Examples given are size, growth patterns, sleeping and eating patterns, ageing patterns:
These are all results of our genetic construction, and all are important influences
upon human nature and society.
These biological boundaries are so evident that they have never engendered
controversy. The contentious subjects are specific behaviours that distress us and
that we struggle with difficulty to change (or enjoy and fear to abandon): aggression,
xenophobia, male dominance, for example·... I believe that sociobiologists have made
a fundamental mistake in categories. They are seeking the genetic basis of human
behaviour at the wrong level. They are searching among the specific products of
generating rules... while the rules themselves are the genetic deep structures of human
behaviour...
If intelligence sets us apart among organisms, then I think it probable that natural
selection acted to maximize the flexibility of our behaviour. What would be more
adaptive for a learning and thinking animal: genes selected for aggression, spite, and
Review of Contemporary Perspectives 29
xenophobia; or selection for learning rules that can generate aggression in appropriate
circumstances and peacefulness in others? (Gould 1981, 328, 329, 331).
There is an immense amount of food for thought here for those of us concerned with the
human past, and I shall merely underline the key repetition of themes met already: form rather
than content as the principle for permitting the general and unique to coexist; in corollary,
"content" can only be studied "historically"; the trajectories of evolutionary change and
development are unpredictable in content but post-dictable as a succession of structural
regularities; much of the variety of life, including human behaviour, can arise in a nonadaptive
way and follow its own pathways alongside but ultimately constrained by selective pressures.
In the field of Human Evolution there has naturally been a strong theoretical input from
these developments in Evolutionary Biology and Zoology. Alan Bilsborough, for example,
has recently discussed the relevance of the "punctuated equilibrium" model for the physical
development of Palaeolithic hominids (1986):
The observed pattern of variation within Pliocene and basal Pleistocene specimens
indicates polyphyly, whatever the underlying processes may be, and, as such,
contrasts with the later (post-1.5 mya) stages of human evolution. These contrasts
in turn imply differing selection processes and adaptive strategies between Vil-
lafranchian and later hominids... at the least this supports an "historical" not
uniformitarian simplistic view (1986, 213).
Archaeologists studying the same transformation, have implied a new relationship after the
transition, towards that looser interaction of human culture and adaptive, selective pressures
identified by our other disciplines. Before the changeover it is possible that more instinctive
hominids prevailed, dominated primarily by ecological, demographic and genetic forces, even
including the earliest tool-users. These creatures are arguably not "human"in their behaviour
and mental patterns, and our understanding of them will continue to follow non-empathetic
approaches such as experimental archaeology on technological sequences, or game theory for
human palaeoecology (Issac 1986, 237).
Let us turn to the evidence for, and interpretation of, the elaboration of distinctively human
culture in the later Lower Palaeolithic. Isaac and Gowlett have shown that the hominid makers
of the enormously successful Acheulean industry c. l mya:
show great precision in the execution of what appear to be standardised designs...
Gowlett uses this to argue that the materialistic/economic approach that has been in
vogue among Palaeolithic scholars in recent years may have led to underestimates
of the material and cultural ability of early Pleistocene hominids... we need to seek
methods for assessing the balance point between minimising mechanistic indications
and maximising mentalistic ones (Isaac, op cit 234).
The same mutual feedback between a semi-independent cultural trajectory and necessary
selective pressures occurs with the next major industrial tradition of the early Middle
Palaeolithic:
Prehistorians have long made a fuss about the emergence of the Levallois method
as evidence of advances in development of mental ability. The validity of this seems
clear enough, but like the increasing refinement and differentiation that has already
been discussed, stressing the cognitive developments leaves unanswered the questions
about adaptive significance... during the Middle Pleistocene the whole of the conduct
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of proto-human life became more and more governed by customs and precepts that
specified with increasing exactitude what procedures were appropriate and socially
acceptable. One way of thinking about this is to use a linguistic/cognitive metaphor
and argue that behaviour in general, including tool-making behaviour, was acquiring
a deep grammatical structure for sociological reasons rather than engineering reasons,
thus calling for an increase in orderliness and predictability... The deep structural
rules, and the specific artefact form-grammars generated by them, would be transmit-
ted by teaching and imitation and would be subject to variation from region to region
and in the same region throughout time. This model of change would predict that if
cultural definition of appropriate conduct facilitated more and more efficient rules
of adaptation, then the orderliness, symmetry and standardisation among artifacts
could be expected to increase even if the same craft tasks could perfectly well be
accomplished by simple, opportunistic tool-kits (Isaac op cit 236).
The convergence of these approaches to the developments just examined in Social Anthropol-
ogy, History and Geography, is very striking.
Cosmology and Theoretical Physics
I am far from being alone in also observing convergence towards these common ideas in the
world of Cosmology, for indeed Gould in his overview paper draws the parallel as well (1986,
69).
Professor Paul Davies, in one of his recent books (1983) has summarised some of the more
startling features of current cosmological theory in order to investigate their wider implications
for other disciplines. The base-point, as always, is the reality of pattern, or order:
Science is possible only because we live in an ordered universe (144). Everywhere
we look, from the far-flung galaxies to the deepest recesses of the atom, we encounter
regularity and intimate organisation. We do not observe matter or energy to be
distributed chaotically. They are arranged instead in a hierarchy of structure: atoms
and molecules, crystals, living things, planetary systems, star clusters, and so on.
Moreover the behaviour of physical systems is not haphazard, but careful and
systematic (145).
Furthermore, according to one prominent theory, the several fundamental laws of matter and
energy may now exist separate only because we observe them as
a low-temperature phenomenon. As the temperature of matter is raised, so the varied
forces that act upon it begin to merge their identity.
The continual search, therefore, for a unified general theory of matter and energy could be
solved by placing them in an historical perspective. In the origins of our universe the physical
laws have evolved just as the matter they control (Davies 1983, 54-55).
More remarkable, and better known, are the implications of Einstein's investigation of the
nature of time through his theories of Relativity:
The revolution of our concept of time which has accompanied the theory of relativity
is best summarized by saying that, previously, time was regarded as absolute, fixed,
and universal - independent of material bodies and observers. Today time is seen to
be dynamical. It can stretch or shrink, warp or even stop altogether at a singularity.
Clock rates are not absolute, but relative to the state of motion or gravitational
situation of the observer (Davies op cit 123).
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Once again, we find a convergence, a compatibility of the unique and the general - the
Einsteinian laws in their generality account for everything in the universe as essentially a
product of particular combinations of spatial location and gravitational forces.
Another significant finding of Theoretical Physics is the congruence at almost every level
of ordered matter, of both order and random disorder. Thus subatomic particles behave in an
unpredictable fashion, at the level of the individual, and their appearance can be argued to
be "without cause"; on the other hand these particles studied in large groups, behave with
statistical regularity (op cit 101). In the same way, as Hofstadter has pointed out, if you are
wondering about what to choose on a menu, this is not a confusion emanating from your
neurons -
the fact that the lower level is ruled by logic need not contradict the fact that the
upper mental level can be illogical and emotional (Davies op cit 84).
Both in this and earlier sections of this paper we have identified (and cf also Lewthwaite, this
volume) an important sphere of scientific analysis where as human beings we respond
"innately" to pattern recognition that cannot always be justified by rigorous objective criteria,
yet can be "tested" by Popper's concept of progressive "intersubjective" evaluation. Mirroring
this situation is that identified in Physics in relation to the curious implications of Heisenberg's
"Uncertainty Principle":
It says you can't know where an atom, or electron, or whatever, is located and know
how it is moving, at one and the same time.
According to Bohr, the foggy and nebulous world of the atom only sharpens into
concrete reality when an observation is made... It only materializes when you look
for it... Look for its location and you get an atom at a place. Look for its motion and
you get an atom with a speed. But you can't have both. The reality that the
observation sharpens into focus cannot be separated from the observer and his choice
of measurement strategy (Davies op cit 102-3).
As David Bohm has expressed it:
A centrally relevant change in descriptive order required in the quantum theories is
thus the dropping of the notion of analysis of the world into relatively autonomous
parts, separately existent but in interaction. Rather, the primary emphasis is now on
individual wholeness, in which the observing instrument is not separated from what
is observed.
Bohm here echoes the words of Werner Heisenberg:
The common division of the world into subject and object, inner world and outer
world, body and soul is no longer adequate (both quoted in Davies op cit 112).
Finale: Structural History
In the preceding section, we have brought together from disparate sources in sister disciplines,
some convergent approaches and concepts, which I would maintain could cohere into a
complex body of unitary theory for analysing and understanding human society and human
development in a future holistic Science of Man. We also identified the "Region" as an ideal
location for such unified research.
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As a final but very significant piece in the jigsaw, I would like to introduce a further
methodological procedure, the analytical framework developed by the French Annales school
of historians and geographers.
Its core characteristic is a sophisticated model of history. We have seen that a central theme
of new approaches in many disciplines in both the Sciences and Humanities is the contention
that the analysis of the general and particular leads to all the sciences being seen as ultimately
forms of History. If History is to become a unifying feature, we need an effective analytical
programme for structuring and hence simplifying the phenomena of the past in all their
complexity. French "Structural History", the central model of the Annales school, offers an
analytical framework that incorporates all the key elements of structure in the human past
already identified earlier in this essay.
The best known representative of the Annales tradition is the late Fernand Braudel. His
elaboration of Structural History can be brilliantly observed in his classic study of the 16th
century Mediterranean world (1972): here Braudel illustrates how the texture of the past is
created by the constant interaction between historical forces operating on different timescales.
Firstly we witness the short-term events (EVENEMENTS) that dominate conventional
History, and in which we may identify actions and persons, if we are lucky. To offer a familiar
example from Archaeology, Ian Richmond's excavations of the Iron Age hillfort at Hod Hill,
Dorset, uncovered a dense settlement attacked by the Roman legions under Vespasian. The
largest internal enclosure was interpreted as the chieftain's hut, and a concentration of ballista
fire around the hut suggested a policy of striking at the heart of the community to compel
an early surrender (cf Richmond 1968).
These "events" interact with influential views about the world shared by past social groups
or even whole societies, so-called MENTALITES. Here a bridge to Symbolic, Structuralist
and Cognitive Archaeology can be made, and the valuable information from art works and
literature invoked into the analysis. But we would argue that as much "mentalité" is
subconscious normative, as it is conscious normative behaviour, and we need both "insider"
and "outsider" perspectives. To cite an example from Archaeology, a recent case-study of
Egyptian painting and colour technology successfully related the symbolic content of different
colours in Egyptian ideology to advances in Egyptian chemical technology (Ragai 1986).
Next, permeating past societies are medium-term pressures of which most contemporaries
are inadequately, if at all, aware. The upward and downward trends of population cycles,
agricultural cycles, climatic perturbations, core-periphery effects in political and economic
macrosystems: these phenomena, operating over timescales frequently of the order of several
centuries, are termed CONJUNCTURES and are the kind of recurrent, patterned phenomena
"New Archaeologists" pick up from their excavations and surveys. My own project with
Anthony Snodgrass in Central Greece has provided very clear evidence of "conjunctural"
cycles in the medium-term development of Boeotian society (see Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985,
Bintliff 1988). Further evidence for similar cycles in the archaeological record can be found
in my studies of Neolithic to Iron Age Europe (European Social Evolution, 1984, chapters 3
and 7), and in essays on Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilisation by Adams and Butzer
(respectively 1978, 1980).
The final structural element is Braudel's famous long-term perspective or LONGUE
DUREE, where operate the almost timeless constraints on human behaviour set by certain
properties of landscapes or by slowly-changing technologies and worldviews.
In essence I have tried to demonstrate in this essay that the core of our discipline of
Archaeology must remain positivistic and scientific - all is structure; at the same time our
discipline is immensely enriched by the addition of post-positivist, humanistic perspectives,
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because all is History. To understand any moment in the past is to see it as a unique fusion
of the general and the particular.
Notes
1. In fact English Heritage is already funding 'battles' and 'tournaments' at sites in its care. It is also
amusing but true that the producers of the 1963 film Cleopatra were so unimpressed by the original
dimensions of the Roman Forum that they rebuilt it in the studio on a far larger scale.
2. Cf. 'History proceeds by the accumulation of knowledge' (Steinberg 1981, 464).
3. For very pertinent commentaries regarding the role of the Historian in modem Britain, and pointing
towards similar conclusions to the views here expressed, see D Carradine (1986) and M Goldie
(1987).
4. "Positivism" has many definitions and variants. What is meant here is that highly influential brand
of Logical Positivism which has underlain so much of the attitudes and strategies adopted by the
postwar Western World's Establishment in key areas such as national planning, social development,
and academic research in the Sciences and Humanities. In essence, this kind of Positivism rejects
as meaningless all observations and experiences which cannot be subjected to experimental
verification or validation, as if under laboratory conditions, or reducible by logic and rational
analysis to empirically-verifiable statements. The whole of Metaphysics, including all questions of
morality or religion, are thereby ruled out of serious consideration as valueless. Furthermore, by
stipulating that valid knowledge and any reliable basis for action must rest on propositions of an
empirical, ideally also statistical or mathematical nature, any scope for "irrational behaviour" (which
would include decisions and actions affected by emotional or spiritual factors rather than pure logic),
at either the level of the individual or that of the community, is therefore excluded on a priori
grounds. People's feelings and perceptions about what they do or experience are also of little
relevance compared to the scientific establishment of the supposedly rational pattern observable
by positivists from their analysis of aggregate, impersonal human behaviour. In its most extreme
form, a world ideally suited to analysis and manipulation by logical positivists would consist of the
faultlessly logical behaviour of characterless human automata.
5· Of the trend away from Positivism and towards a more "Humanistic Geography", Neil Smith has
commented wittily:
'As Lancelot sought the Holy Grail, geographers in the last twenty years have sought the scientific
paradigm. Lancelot failed but he learnt the pleasures of more earthly things. So too geographers'
(1979,356).
6· Very uncharacteristically Popper has toyed with an approach ("situational logic") to the role of the
individual in history that is little removed from Collingwood's empathy:
'to judge the problem that each individual actor in the past faced and by that logic assessing his
reactions to them' (Steinberg 1981, 459).
According to Popper:
'if we know anything about different attitudes in different historical periods, then it is from
experiments carried out in our imagination'(1976, 94).
Steinberg comments:
'Professor Taylor Watkins shows clearly that Popper must end up by admitting into the heart of his
system the very subjectivity he denies. This paradox is inherent in questions such as: "Why did X
act in the way he did?" It justifies the instinct by which examiners and tutors refuse to set such
questions... The whole notion of reconstruction is not only unhistorical, as Popper conceives it, it
is profoundly unscientific by his own standards. How do I falsify by a thought experiment what
an agent in the past tells me when his is the only account?' (Steinberg 1981, 459-460).
7. Steinberg (1981) finds that 'methodological individualism fails' for similar reasons:
'What is an individual? Are you and I not made up of all sorts of sub-systems and categories? As
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I type this, the pound in my pocket is depreciating at a measurable rate, so my relationship to the
means of production is altering. I can be aggregated in all sorts of ways and subjected to chi-square
analyses, as an immigrant, as a voter, as a person of a given age and sex, as a member of a profession
or resident in a community. I change over time and in relation to others. My hair falls out. I lose
my ability to read small print without spectacles' (473).
8. To quote Evans-Pritchard in a standard textbook (1951):
'As I understand the matter, what the social anthropologist does can be divided into three phases.
In the first phase, as ethnographer, he goes to live among a primitive people and learns their way
of life. He learns to speak their language, to think in their concepts, and to feel in their values. He
then lives the experience over again critically and interpretatively in the conceptual categories and
values of his own culture and in terms of the general body of knowledge of his discipline. In other
words, he translates from one culture into another.
In the second phase of his work, and still within a single ethnographic study of a particular
primitive society, he tries to go beyond this literary and impressionistic stage and to discover the
structural order of the society, so that it is intelligible not merely at the level of consciousness and
action, as it is to one of its members or to the foreigner who has learnt its mores and participates
in its life, but also at the level of sociological analysis. Just as the linguist does not merely learn
to understand, speak and translate a native language but seeks to unravel its phonological and
grammatical systems, so the social anthropologist is not content merely to observe and describe the
social life of a primitive people but seeks to reveal its underlying structural order, the patterns
which, once established, enable him to see it as a whole, as a set of interrelated abstractions.
Having isolated these structural patterns in one society, the social anthropologist, in the third
phase of his work, compares them with patterns in other societies. The study of each new society
enlarges his knowledge of the range of basic social structures and enables him better to construct
a typology of forms, and to determine their essential features and the reasons for their variations.
Most of my colleagues would, I fancy, disagree with this description of what a social
anthropologist does. He would prefer to describe what he does in the language of the methodology
of the natural sciences, whereas what I have said implies that social anthropology studies societies
as moral, or symbolic, systems and not as natural systems, that it is less interested in process than
in design, and that it therefore seeks patterns and not laws, demonstrates consistency and not
necessary relations between social activities, and interprets rather than explains' (1951, 61).
As an example of a totally-realized analysis of another culture, Evans-Pritchard cites his own
classic, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937), which
'is about a Central African people. It is an attempt to make intelligible a number of beliefs, all of
which are foreign to the mentality of a modem Englishman, by showing how they form a
comprehensible system of thought, and how this system of thought is related to social activities,
social structure, and the life of the individual' (1951, 98).
The third tier, cross-cultural comparison, is made explicit with cross-reference to witchcraft in
historical Europe.
9. Even when dealing with a clear "insider" contemporary literary account:
'we face substantial problems if we take what a text appears to tell us... at face-value, or even at
face-value interpreted through our own subjective, common-sense logic... It may well be that much
analysis based in such terms turns out to describe correctly aspects of another society and even to
suggest explanations for these aspects. But this is, to a greater or lesser degree, coincidental. For
there is no way in which it can justify these descriptions without the help of some more structured
critical and interpretational framework which can demonstrate the logic of its conclusions — one
may disagree with this logic, but the grounds can at least be specified and the disagreement located.
Without this, we are left merely with a variety of individual responses to the data, and no way of
knowing where or why these responses differ' (Haldon 1986, 60).
10. Initially,
'we obviously need to provide a wider structure of cultural meaning which will mesh in with social
and cultural practice as we can observe it through the medium of literary production and other forms
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of evidence. This should provide some sort of motor or dynamic for the things people do, and at
two levels: on the one hand, what Byzantines themselves thought they were doing; and on the other
hand, why we think they did them... For Byzantium, we can try to relate these general clues - these
inherited cultural characteristics - to more specific historical determinants: the nature of Byzantine
political orthodoxy, the symbolism surrounding the emperor, the nature of the state and its relations
institutionally with its representatives, with the agricultural producers whose surpluses supported it,
with its military and civil bureaucracies; and most importantly, we can relate these clues to the
interaction between the social institutional aspects of Byzantine culture... and people's beliefs about
what they do' (Haldon 1986, 61-61).
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Whose Archaeology is it anyway?
Henry Cleere
Council for British Archaeology
In Ά perceptive essay entitled 'Archaeology, the public and the sense of the past', Peter Fowler
(1981) defined the public as being, first, 'that minority which is consciously interested in the
past as represented by what archaeology studies and produces', which he quantified - perhaps
a little optimistically - as 'hundreds of thousands'. He went on to divide the remainder of the
population into 'several million people who have some awareness of and perhaps a mild
interest in the past (and) the bulk of the population who, frankly, do not give a damn about
the past or archaeology.' Despite his brusque dismissal of some forty million of our
fellow-citizens, Fowler concluded that, 'if archaeology is to proceed at all other than as an
introverted specialism for the recondite few, the retention and indeed the development of the
public interest is vital. Ultimately, the public pays the piper and its right to influence the tune
has to be accepted.'
This realistic and courageous statement represents a minority view so far as the archaeolog-
ical profession in this country is concerned. It highlights a fundamental source of insecurity
and instability which threatens both the discipline of archaeology and the preservation of
Britain's archaeological heritage, a problem which needs to be confronted and resolved as a
matter of urgency by the whole archaeological profession in this country.
Such statements as this are usually associated with developing countries and not with
countries such as the United Kingdom, which, after all, enacted its first statute for the
protection of the archaeological heritage as long ago as 1882. Britain is not like Cyprus,
where partition of that unhappy island has resulted in wholesale looting of archaeological
sites, or like Guatemala, where archaeologists have been murdered by huaqueros whom they
have disturbed as they have been dismantling Mayan temples, or like Peru, where Machu
Picchu is being exploited ruthlessly for tourism with complete disregard for its great
archaeological importance (Bonavia 1984, Meisch 1985). In this respect the British achieve-
ment in archaeology is a notable one, which merits some acknowledgement here.
Britain has long been a leader in the field of archaeological research: the academic mantle
of Childe fell upon Clark and Piggott and is being handed on by Renfrew and others to a new
generation of scholars, whilst the innovative approach to field research of Pitt-Rivers, Pétrie,
Wheeler, and Crawford continues through the work of Cunliffe, Biddle, Christopher Taylor,
and their pupils and disciples. Although under severe pressure at the present time, university
departments of archaeology continue to sponsor and encourage fundamental research that
commands international respect.
In the field of heritage management, too, Britain is among the most highly regarded nations
in the world, only surpassed perhaps by the Scandinavian countries. Field and aerial survey
are the province of national bodies such as the three greatly respected Royal Commissions
on Ancient and Historical Monuments and of the County Sites and Monuments Records that
cover most of England and Wales (though there are some sad gaps in the coverage of
Scotland). The monuments in State care in the three countries are superbly conserved by
craftsmen with a century of tradition behind them, all are open to the general public, and
many are equipped with display and interpretation facilities. The same can justly be said of
those buildings and monuments in the care of the National Trust, a pioneering British
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organization whose structure and principles have been adopted by many other countries, both
developed and developing.
All might then be thought to be for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Even the
most complacent archaeologist would concede that there are some problems still to be
overcome - a Government that is not overly sympathetic to research that is non-commercial,
insensitive developers, illicit treasure hunters, and so on - but by comparison with much of
the rest of the world the United Kingdom would appear to be doing pretty well by its
archaeology and its archaeologists. The message that so often comes over, in the pages of
Rescue News, for example, is that Britain could be an archaeological paradise if only
archaeologists were given a great deal more money for research and preservation, combined
with tougher protective legislation.
It is salutary at this point to set against this introspective view of archaeology and its
objectives the public perceptions of the subject. In a treasure chest of a book, David Lowenthal
(1985), a geographer by training, has attempted to analyse public attitudes to the past. These
are many and complex, conditioned by a variety of stimuli - class, family, education, media
attitudes, psychological makeup, and many more. Here there is space to cover only the more
obvious and contemporary of these attitudes, leaving the in depth analysis of their origins to
Lowenthal.
Let us look first at media presentation of the subject. Of the sober national dailies The
Times publishes short notes on major discoveries from time to time and The Independent has
in a short time shown a keen interest in both the research and the political aspects of
archaeology. Neither The Guardian nor the Daily Telegraph has any discernible pattern in its
presentation of the subject. For the rest of the national press, archaeology seems to be
identified with treasure hunting and the more sensational and salacious discoveries - witness
the coverage given to the more macabre aspects of Lindow Man or more recently to the
discovery of 17th century contraceptives in Dudley Castle in newspapers such as The Sun or
the Daily Star.
The local press varies widely. There are rare examples of informed presentation, usually
where archaeologists have succeeded in establishing a foothold (best exemplified by David
Miles's regular column in the Oxford Times), but the more general treatment is usually
perfunctory and inaccurate, with the more substantial stories being reserved for the finds
made by metal detector users - often described as 'amateur archaeologists'.
On radio and television archaeology is treated as a minority interest, best left to off-peak
transmission times on Radio 4 and BBC2, by contrast with wildlife programmes, which
regularly go out at peak viewing times. This is not to belittle the work of Roy Hayward, John
Knight, and Malcolm Billings on radio or the late Paul Johnstone and his disciples on
television. It is sad that the esteem in which Chronicle was held by BBC programme planners
in the 1960s and early 1970s has declined. Of the independent television companies, only
Anglia regularly broadcasts programmes on archaeology, produced by Paul Jordan, formerly
of Chronicle.
The standard of these programmes is generally high; they are conscientious in their
presentation and usually succeed in giving an account of archaeology with which most
archaeologists would wish to be associated. Their viewing and listening figures are, alas,
depressingly' low - corresponding in effect with the readership of the AB readership
newspapers. It may be that archaeologists have only themselves to blame for this failure to
reach a wider audience; they have certainly failed to produce a charismatic figure since
Mortimer Wheeler who can front these programmes in the way that the younger David
Attenborough and David Bellamy have served natural history.
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Elsewhere on television the image of the archaeologist is projected by feature films such
as The Curse of the Mummy or Indiana Jones. The great American archaeologist, Alfred
Vincent Kidder, once characterized the public perception of archaeologists in a memorable
antithesis: 'In popular belief, and unfortunately to some extent in fact, there are two sorts of
archaeologists, the hairy-chested and the hairy chinned.' He described the former as 'a
strong-jawed young man in a tropical helmet, pistol on hip, hacking his way through the
jungle in search of lost cities and buried treasure', and the latter as 'old' and 'benevolently
absent-minded. His only weapon is a magnifying glass, with which he scrutinizes inscriptions
in forgotten languages. Usually his decipherment coincides...with (his) daughter's rescue from
savages by the handsome young assistant' (quoted in Gumerman 1984, 7). These stereotypes
still prevail in the minds of the modem public; the archaeologist deals in death, treasure, and
the occult, working either in an ivory tower or in romantic or wild places. The reality of so
much archaeology is such that it is rejected in favour of treasure hunting with a metal detector
or the wilder flights of fancy of leylines or the Atlantis myth. Public acceptance of the
discipline of archaeology and of its cognate concern, the preservation of the archaeological
heritage, is seriously weakened by misleading perceptions of this kind.
The prime concern of archaeology at the present time should, therefore, be to bridge the
gap between these public perceptions and the reality, and to present an image of the subject
and the profession that is sufficiently stimulating to command the interest and support of a
much wider section of the public. This is not a view that will necessarily be accepted by the
whole of the profession. Some years ago the CBA wrote to all directors of excavations
advertised in its Calendar, urging them to make their digs open to the public, or at least to
arrange one or more Open Days. One university archaeologist wrote back indignantly, stating
that in no circumstances would he allow the public anywhere near his site, since this was a
scientific project and no concern of the hoi polloi; he made no reference to the fact that his
excavation was being supported to a considerable extent by public funds. It is some
consolation that he was in a minority, and that the CBA initiative has gradually become
accepted by more and more directors of excavations.
What in fact is the involvement of the public with archaeology? It may be argued with
some justice that most university research is directly funded by the State, through the
University Grants Committee, the British Academy, or one of the British Councils. Similarly,
the Ancient Monuments legislation can be seen as having been enacted in the public interest,
though it is interesting to note that nowhere in any of the Acts since 1882 is this specified.
The parliamentary history of this legislation is of considerable interest (Cleere 1984), not least
some of the opinions expressed in debates on the 1882 and 1913 Acts (Kennet 1972, 21-48).
The clearest statement of public interest was made by Lord Curzon in an olympian speech
to the House of Lords in 1912, in the following words: Owners now recognise that they are
not merely owners of private property but trustees to the nation at large.'
Although the protection legislation is deficient in this respect, public interest is explicitly
defined in the National Heritage Act 1983, which set up the Historic Buildings and Monuments
Commission for England. Section 33 (1) (c) of that Act lays a duty upon the Commissioners
'to promote the public's enjoyment of, and advance their knowledge of, ancient monuments
and historic buildings situated in England and their preservation.' There can be no clearer
expression of the public purpose of monuments protection and presentation, and by implication
of archaeology, which underpins this work. Archaeology has a social responsibility towards
the general public; to what extent has it discharged that responsibility?
It has to be said that archaeological research has so far failed almost completely to get its
message over. Very little of the work in the field and in the laboratory carried out in the past
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decades has been communicated to the public in terms that are accessible or comprehensible.
There are honourable exceptions; following the precedent, above all, of Sir Leonard Woolley,
Barry Cunliffe has been assiduous in producing 'popular' accounts of his excavations at
Fishbourne (1971), Bath (1971, 1985), and Danebury (1983), whilst the York Archaeological
Trust has presented its Coppergate excavation to a wider public (Hall 1984) and the
Department of Urban Archaeology at the Museum of London has done the same for its long
series of waterfront excavations (Milne 1985). The Roman period is always popular among
general readers and has been the subject of a number of popular accounts (eg Wacher 1978,
Webster 1978, 1980), whilst there is a plethora of books about London (eg Marsden 1980,
Merrifield 1983).
These works, however, have aimed at the public already reached through television and
radio programmes such as those referred to above; indeed, several books (eg Hills 1986) have
been 'tied in' to TV series. They have sold well - in relative terms - through the Ancient and
Medieval History Book Club, but none has achieved the best-seller lists published regularly
in The Bookseller.
Nor does archaeology have an outlet for communication with the public through journals
and magazines. Current Archaeology has always eschewed distribution through bookstalls and
the attempt by Popular Archaeology to do so was unsuccessful (though in its new incarnation
as Archaeology Today it may try again). No popular archaeological journal has achieved the
success of Archéologia in France, with its circulation nearing 100,000 and its availability at
newsagents and bookstalls all over France. In short, the results of archaeological research, of
whatever form, are not getting over to the public who are paying for the work.
Much research, of course, is virtually impossible to impart to a lay audience. Leafing
through the annual list of Archaeological Theses in British Universities the reader may, on
occasion, be reminded of Lucky Jim's description of research as 'throwing a non-light on
pseudo-problems', but even when that unworthy thought is repressed it is difficult to see how
most research, especially that emanating from the New Archaeology, can be interpreted for
any but the specialist. That, of course, is equally true of research in most other fields, not
least the sciences. It is significant, however, that the Royal Society has recently become aware
of the increasing alienation of scientific research from everyday life and is taking vigorous
action to close the gap (Royal Society 1985). It behoves archaeology to take stock in a similar
way.
Let us now turn to the field of archaeological heritage management, that of English Heritage
and its Welsh and Scottish counterparts. Officials of these bodies - notably the administrators
- are at pains to stress that their responsibilities lie in the fields of preservation and
presentation of monuments and not that of archaeology pur sang. Whilst this is undeniable
in terms of the statutory duties laid upon them, it is to some extent sophistry on their part to
seek to isolate themselves from the discipline of archaeology, since the monuments that are
their concern are the raw material of archaeological research and the criteria by which they
work are of necessity influenced profoundly by archaeological considerations. To what extent
are they meeting their obligations and promoting the public's enjoyment of, and increasing its
knowledge of, the monuments in their care?
A few short years ago the stereotype of a Guardianship monument was of an earthwork or
ruin that was immaculately conserved and tended, in the custody of a functionary in a peaked
cap whose duty was to sell tickets and guidebooks and to stop children from climbing on the
monument. The monument itself had few, if any, interpretive plaques or boards and the
guidebook was a work of scholarship, drably bound in a blue cover and impenetrable in its
academic jargon to the casual visitor, uncertain of whether the Normans preceded the Romans
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and ill-equipped to deal with the intricacies of reredorter and garderobe, orthostat and trilithon,
porta principalis dextra and prindpia.
Happily, this is beginning to change. The concept of the 'interpretation centre', pioneered
at the Fishbourne Roman palace, is now becoming acceptable. The custodians at monuments
are being recruited from a different social group, the guidebooks are being redesigned, with
publications at several levels at certain monuments, and explanatory notice boards and signs
are beginning to appear at strategic points.
This revolution is not being greeted with acclamation by the entire archaeological
community, however. The 'experience' at the Jorvik Viking Centre, whilst now generally
accepted, is seen as the thin end of the wedge; every new proposal from English heritage for
improved presentation - at Stonehenge, for example, or at Maiden Castle - seems inevitably
to have had the appellation 'archaeological Disneyland' appended to it at some time or other.
The declared aim of English Heritage to attract more visitors to its monuments is often decried,
since 'the atmosphere' of the monument will be lost if there are too many visitors. Whilst
this might well be justified in the case of Grimes Graves, it is not such a good argument
when applied to the 45 acres of Maiden Castle. In any case, it is arguable whether, given its
statutory remit, English Heritage has the right deliberately to limit the numbers of visitors to
its monuments. It is the public that is paying, both through its taxes and its entrance fees, for
the preservation of these monuments, and in return the state organizations must surely have
a duty to make them accessible to the public, both physically and intellectually.
It is this aspect of intellectual accessibility that is in greatest need of concentrated study at
the present time. The 'AB newspaper/Ancient History Book Club' market is now being catered
for adequately, and the needs of foreign visitors are being met at a number of monuments
by multi-lingual signs and guidebooks. There is still, unfortunately, little for the Sun reader,
or even the Daily Mail reader, with little, if any, knowledge of English history and prehistory.
If monument preservation, and therefore archaeology, are to continue to receive support from
public funds, it is imperative that the understanding and sympathy of this group is secured.
They need to be reached through the imagination, not the intellect; a didactic approach is
bound to be resented and resisted. For this purpose it is necessary to distill from The News
of the World and Eastenders those methods of communication that are most effective in
capturing and holding the imagination of this very large group. Language and images must
be used that will evoke the right responses; perhaps it is the advertising industry that can
contribute most in this process.
There is a grave danger at the present time, given the materialistic and monetarist policies
of the present Government in this country (and, indeed, in a number of the developed countries
of the West), that the major effort of the protection agencies will be expended on a very
small number of 'honeypot' sites, to the exclusion of the rest. If the sole criterion is to be a
financial one, such a result might well be inevitable, and all that would remain would indeed
be a series of archeological Disneylands, bereft of historical or social context and relying for
their attraction on extraneous features such as funfairs, safari parks, and motor museums, like
a number of historic houses.
Monuments with little or no commercial potential would be sacrificed to agriculture,
forestry, or housing. Preservation policies would focus on the individual site or monument,
disregarding the overall landscape context and, at the same time, the intimate relationship
between historic, wildlife, and landscape conservation. Excavation would be focussed on the
more spectacular sites and those likely to produce the most important remains, regardless of
their research interest or of the existence or otherwise of any threat to their survival. A crucial
factor in preventing such a disastrous development is the archaeological profession itself.
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There is a growing divergence in the UK at the present time between research
archaeologists, working principally in universities, and archaeological heritage managers,
engaged in survey, rescue excavation, and monument preservation. It is not unlikely that, if
no steps are taken to prevent this split, a situation will develop similar to that in Poland,
where the research archaeologists employed by the Institute for the History of Material Culture
and those working for PKZ (the State Conservation Workshops) will form two distinct
communities, with little or no contact at any level. The absence of the commercial imperative
in Poland means, of course, that preservation is in no way downgraded, but the dichotomy
between the two groups has resulted in the policies for preservation being mechanistic and
without any sound research basis.
A first step towards preventing such a situation developing in the UK should be the
establishment of proper courses in heritage management. Such courses would not be confined
to the more routine aspects of the subject such as legislation and organization, but would
embrace techniques of presentation and communication at all levels. At the present time
undergraduate courses for the most part pay lip service to the 'applied archaeology' aspect
of heritage management. One or two lectures are devoted to legislation and organization, but
these are merely excrescences on the main courses and rarely taken seriously. It may be that
the undergraduate course, directed as it is in most universities to a general humanities
education rather than a vocational training, is not appropriate and that postgraduate courses
should be instituted. However, funding difficulties must regretfully rule out such a solution
in practical terms. The alternative might be to offer a management option in the third year
of the undergraduate course, at a time when most undergraduates will have decided whether
they wish to follow a career in archaeology. The benefit of such a system would be that it
would produce a cadre of trained heritage managers capable of making an immediate and
effective impact on preservation policies and practice. Training in interpretation and commu-
nication would enable these people to make informed contributions to discussions on
presentation, at present the sole preserve of 'specialists' with little or no appreciation of the
limitations and the potential of archaeology in this connexion. It would also open up the
centres of research excellence in the universities to a greater awareness of the problems and
potential of heritage management.
At the same time - and, indeed, as a direct result of such a development - there should
be closer integration between research and heritage management. To the outside observer the
programmes and policies of organizations such as English Heritage in rescue archaeology and
monument presentation give the impression of being dictated solely by expediency and with
little, if any, proper research basis. Similarly, research programmes seem to take little heed
of the requirements of heritage preservation and management. Recent statements of research
priorities (eg Thomas nd) have made no perceptible impact on either the universities or the
heritage agencies. The interdependence of the two needs to be aacknowaledged in practical
terms. The Area Archaeological Advisory Committees set up by the Department of the
Environment in 1975, to be axed along with so many other quangos in 1979, produced some
excellent results in their short existence and might be seen as models for some future system.
Another possibility would be the secondment of heritage managers to universities and
university teachers to heritage agencies for short spells.
These recOmmendations relate only to the internal problems of archaeology and heritage
management, but they are fundamental to any broader considerations. Unless a rational and
cohesive structure can be worked out for the archaeological profession as a whole, it is idle
to contemplate the involvement of the general public in its heritage. Here the leitmotiv must
be communication; without effective communication, the message will not be transmitted.
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The British public has demonstrated, through its avidity to read von Daniken or to purchase
metal detectors, that it finds its past intriguing. At the present time the messages that it is
reading are false gospels; it is the responsibility of archaeology to preach the true word, using
a language and media that the public will be able to comprehend and appreciate. Unless this
is done soon, Mammon will prevail and the meaning and most of the substance of the heritage
will be lost for ever.
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Poor Museums, Rich Men's Media:
An Archaeological Perspective
D V Clarke
National Museums of Scotland
Whether we like it or not museums, in which category I include ancient monuments in the
care of the State, continue to be the prime means by which archaeology communicates with
its non-specialist public. Certainly, particular television programmes and occasional, widely
reported, spectacular discoveries lead to temporary surges of awareness but the base levels
of understanding are set by museums. For most people they are the refresher courses, which
mould or reinforce whatever distorted images of the prehistoric and early historic past were
acquired at school. Effectively challenging these received images, so that they are permanently
altered, is a formidable task because all of us have to understand the past in terms of our own
experience. One of our education officers has a series of drawings mounted on her office
wall. They were done by primary school children and show their interpretation of the houses
at the neolithic village of Skara Brae, Orkney on the basis of information they had acquired
in the Royal Museum of Scotland. Most have come to terms with the absence of windows
in these structures, something that does not conform to their knowledge of houses, but one
has brought them back closer to her experience by surrounding them with gardens full of
flowers. In effect, Skara Brae has become the prehistoric equivalent of a suburban estate of
semi-detached houses.
Now it would be easy to dismiss this as no more than an example of the inexperience of
childhood but to do so would, in my view, be mere delusion. Adults may have more
sophisticated preconceptions but they are every bit as adept at using museum displays to
reinforce them. In the past two years I have been in charge of teams producing exhibitions
shown during the Edinburgh Festival. One, Symbols of Power at the time of Stonehenge, was
archaeological in content and the other, The Enterprising Scot, was not. It would be ludicrous
to claim that the ideas and contents of those exhibitions were mine alone but I had an influence
on what was included and both of them reflected accurately my views on the subject matter.
Yet published comments included descriptions of one as a Marxist production and the other
as an unashamedly monetarist Thatcherite experience. Neither I nor those closest to me
detected the sea change in my views, which these comments imply, during the year that
separated these two exhibitions. My interpretation is, therefore, that the titles of these two
shows created certain expectations on the part of the individuals concerned and that these
inhibited the communication of the messages that the organisers intended. In short, most of
us find challenges to our deep-seated beliefs and prejudices disturbing and readily discover
ways of transforming such information so that it supports rather than erodes our position.
This is especially the case in museums where dialogue is limited and essentially a one-way
affair. The displays have a one-off shot at communicating; they cannot answer supplementary
questions or check whether the visitor has accepted, rejected or misinterpreted the information
on offer.
All of this, of course, applies to museums in general and not just those presenting
archaeological material. Moreover, museums are clearly seen as worthwhile institutions by a
significant section of the community. There are more museum visits than attendances at
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football matches, the national museums and galleries alone get 27 million visits every year,
and the growth in the number of museums over the last two decades has been quite remarkable.
The recent Miles Report on Museums in Scotland notes that the number of museums there
has risen from just over 100 in 1968 to some 320 today (Museums and Galleries Commission
1986, 8). Eleven new museums every year for the last twenty years in Scotland alone. Nor
!S it clear whether the limits of this expansion have yet been reached. The reasons behind this
phenomenon need not concern us overmuch here and I only mention it to emphasise that the
position of museums as the prime communicator of our understanding of the past, far from
being threatened by other media, is actually being strengthened.
On the other hand, archaeology has figured relatively little in all this activity despite, or
Perhaps because of, the fact that it is one of the bedrock disciplines of the museum world.
Right from the beginning of museums in Britain, archaeological objects have been seen as
appropriate material for them to collect. This has had the effect of concentrating holdings of
British finds in a small number of long-established museums, most notably the British
Museum, the Royal Museum of Scotland and the National Museum of Wales. The conse-
quences of this concentration and the fact that virtually all of the museums with major
archaeological collections regard themselves as academic institutions are only now beginning
to engulf us.
Before examining those consequences in a little more detail, it is worthwhile considering
some of the difficulties that have to be confronted in the presentation of archaeological
material. None of them is exclusive to archaeology but in combination and degree they
constitute formidable problems. Even today very little archaeology is taught in schools and
what there is, is normally only provided as a prelude to history. This might not be so bad
were it not for the remarkable emphasis which has been placed on truth and fact in so much
history teaching. The new emphasis on investigative approaches to the past, both welcome
and long overdue, still means that it will be upwards of a generation before the majority of
museum visitors cease to view the displays without expectations dominated by a belief in
truth and fact. Neither concept is much preparation for facing up to the contemporary world
°f British archaeology and its version of information. Facts seem in short supply and those
that are around are heavily hung with qualifications and exceptions, while truth appears to
he more of an individual pursuit than a universal quality. There is every possibility that the
observant visitor will be able to find major discrepancies, both in date and identification,
between apparently similar objects in different museums. Added to this, however, is the nature
of the objects on display. With rare exceptions, they are incomplete and often quite different
m appearance from when they were in use. Understanding them as new and complete objects
is itself a major act of imagination, for which, all too often, no serious information is provided
and no indication given of whether that information exists. The final piece in this jigsaw of
barriers is that the museum visitor's experience will be insufficient, in many instances, for him
to read visually the object before him. Confronted by a flint scraper the level of information
acquired on the basis of visual inspection will be much lower than if the object were a longcase
clock of 1720 or a Charles Rennie Mackintosh chair. Both of these last two objects have
sufficient elements in common with objects known to the viewer for him to make an accurate
initial assessment. This may sound rather trivial but considered in terms of complete displays
rather than individual pieces the effects can be quite serious. Commitment and involvement
to achieve the same level of information and understanding has to be proportionately greater
with archaeological material than with objects of a more recent date. And the dominant image
for the visitor may be more one of his own ignorance rather than a sense of enhanced
knowledge. In saying this I am not trying to suggest that there are no problems for the visitor
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associated with understanding objects of relatively recent date. Lowenthal, for instance, has
drawn attention to the difficulties that functional obsolescence creates for our appreciation of
quite modern objects even when they are presented in contextualising but static displays
(1987, 33).
Not that much attention has apparently been given to these problems. Archaeological
displays, particularly those in museums with major holdings, remain true to the nineteenth-
century tradition -long on objects but short on information and explanation. Few can be said
to be models of effective communication but then, does that make them any different from
most of British archaeology? Our productions for the wider public have a pretty standard
formula: keep it traditional and uncontroversial. In practice this means a chronological format
using the Three Age system for prehistory and a series of historical epithets such as Romans
or Anglo-Saxons for the early historic period.
This basic structure is then cluttered with detail using the maxim, 'Never show one beaker
if you've got ten in the collections'. Moreover, the chronological framework invariably starts
the visitor at the beginning, the earliest point in time represented in the collections. It seems
logical and sensible but it actually puts the viewer at a position on the timescale farthest from
his own experience and knowledge. Could we think of a more brilliant piece of disorientation
even if that was our explicit intention? Nor is this problem seriously dealt with by a quick
ride down a time tunnel as at Jorvik since we do not have time or context to build our way
back into the past from our knowledge of the present. When you come out of that kind of
time-tunnel all you really know is that you are a long way back in time from today, something
which your first sight of the main displays would tell you anyway.
Now all of this takes us back to the spurious emphasis on truth and fact that we noted has
characterised much of the history teaching in schools. By seeking to present only established
views and to do so in a form which suggests that those views are incontrovertible because
they are objective is to mislead our audience and misrepresent our subject. The situation is
not addressed by a cosmetic thinning of the number of objects on display, the introduction
of colour into the display cases or the creation of a more attractive atmosphere in the gallery
as whole. Certainly, these elements can create a more seductive ambience in which to learn
but that is not much use if equal care and consideration has not been lavished on what you
might be learning.
The questions then become how has this situation come about and why are we apparently
so uninterested in changing it? Archaeology as a museum discipline has largely managed to
avoid the recent changes in attitude and approach of much of the museum world. You do not
find too many archaeological curators talking about museums as centres of informal learning
or other such buzz words that characterise the more socially conscious members of the
profession. Largely, one suspects, this is because these attitudinal and methodological changes
are being pioneered in local museums and they, for the reasons I alluded to earlier, generally
have relatively impoverished archaeological collections. One might also add that they may
well have recognised that the problems inherent in creating innovative archaeological displays
require a greater level of resourcing than other areas of their holdings, particularly social
history.
This turns the spotlight, where perhaps it should always have been, on the museums with
major archaeological holdings, particularly the national institutions. Here we have the museum
culture portrayed in its boldest form. Without exception these are large organisations with
interests extending far beyond British archaeology. The one in which I work, the National
Museums of Scotland, is among the smallest but still employs some 260 people, just over
1% of whom work with the British archaeological collections. It is almost a microcosm of
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archaeology's perennial competition for resources in fields that embrace the arts, other aspects
of the heritage and the environment. Clearly, archaeologists inside museums are no better or
worse at securing increased funding than their colleagues elsewhere. But this, of course, is
getting dangerously close to the time-honoured claims that with adequate money and other
facilities we could do a proper job. I would not, for a moment, deny that archaeology is
under-funded but I do believe that all too often lack of resources becomes a convenient excuse
for avoiding the required analysis of what we are doing and why we are doing it.
Certainly, the explanation for the weakness of the major museums' current presentation of
archaeology is not simply or even primarily a lack of resources. It is principally a question
of attitudes, both on the part of the staff of those institutions and, equally important, of their
visitors. As I noted earlier, these museums consider themselves to be academic establishments.
They are also organisations with well developed and highly structured hierarchies. Within
these hierarchies a great deal of power lies in the hands of the curators, particularly when one
w dealing with the style and content of the displays. Yet the curators are recruited on the
basis of their perceived academic expertise and most have no experience at all of display
work before entering the museum's portals. Indeed, we do not just enter this world without
experience, we bring a number of attributes which act as a positive hindrance to effective
communication with the non-specialist. Not least of these is the educational background which
qualified us for the job in the first place. We almost certainly have a wider vocabulary than
average, use more complex sentence constructions and understand a fair amount of jargon,
most of which we have been so conditioned to that we have difficulty recognising it as such.
In the early 1970s I had the labels in our main prehistoric gallery looked at informally by an
educational psychologist with a view to understanding how intelligible they were for our
visitors. On the basis of a fairly cursory inspection he felt that the information they contained
might be accessible to between 5 and 7% of the population. Now this is something that many
curators know but knowing it is different from admitting it or acting upon it. To behave in
this way, to acknowledge that one needs the help of specialists in communication and
education to get your messages across, is usually perceived as threatening the overall position
°f curators in the institutional hierarchy. These hierarchies foster a sense of elitism, which
may be productive in terms of individual achievement but generally creates an air of
schizophrenia. When the organisation is internally stressing elitism and externally its
accessibility to all, how can one give equal commitment to two such divergent attitudes? It
!S not altogether surprising that most of us, in these circumstances, choose to produce displays
that conform to established norms and do nothing to jeopardise our standing with our
colleagues. This is the sense in which museums are truly poor. That they have created
structures in which internal values dominate the needs of their public.
But there is another side to this situation, namely the museum visitors. They, you might
expect, would be demanding a better service more in tune with their interests. After all, most
major museums have boards of trustees or some similar body, one of whose prime
responsibilities is to represent the public interest. A cursory review of the composition of these
boards suggests that the politicians and officials who appoint them have a very curious image
of the public. The trustees of the National Museums of Scotland, for instance, are all eminently
successful middle-aged men, hardly a representative cross-section of Scotland's inhabitants.
Yet they may well be much more representative of our visitors. Surveys have regularly shown
that museum going is predominantly an activity of the best educated members of the
community, that is if we leave on one side the enforced attendance by schoolchildren on
ediucdiiational visits. A recent survey of visitors to the British Museum, for instance, found
that 'nearly all visitors were middle class and well-educated' (Caygill & House 1986, 5). In
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the broadest sense these people are the rich men of our society but like everybody else they
feel most comfortable with what they know and expect
By way of example of this, I would like to look briefly at two reactions to the Symbols of
Power exhibition and the accompanying book. This exhibition set out quite consciously to
present only one aspect of life in part of the prehistoric past and to structure that interpretation
using generalisations based on the present. One visitor, who admitted going to it three times,
felt 'it was a demonstration of modern prejudices and preoccupations'. Why, she asked, 'bother
with archaeology at all if 2086 BC was exactly like 1986 AD' (Current Archaeol, 9 (7), 1986,
222-23). The other reaction was to the accompanying book which the reader believed gave
'cause for dismay' because it was 'intended to be read by non-specialists - those who by
definition are untrained in the disciplines of archaeology and therefore suggestible and
uncritical'. The authors had, she felt, demonstrated a wholly inadequate sense of their
responsibility to show 'an awareness of their readers' vulnerability' (Current Archaeol, 9 (4),
1986, 126).
These are strong reactions to what were, after all, only moderate changes to the traditional
museum presentation of archaeology but they make me think that our regular visitors like the
bland, uninformative displays that are our stock in trade. They want to preserve the idea that
we are the experts who tell them the way it was in ways that they understand but the more
'suggestible and uncritical' members of the community do not. It certainly suggests that some,
at least, of our visitors do not wish to face any explicit indication of bias on the part of
museum staff and displays even though none of us can eradicate bias of one form or another
from our interpretations of the past.
What lies behind much of this is the exaggerated importance of the object brought into
muscology from fine art, the idea that the object embodies some unalterable truth and its
mere availability to the viewer is sufficient to enable it to communicate that truth. There have
been a large number of exhibitions using archaeological material since the invention of the
blockbuster show some decades ago but only Symbols of Power and the recent Archaeology
in Britain have, to my knowledge, attempted to use the objects to convey archaeologically
based interpretations. In all the rest the items have been displayed as art objects. When
Waldemar Januszczak complains, as he did recently in The Guardian, that 'Today's museums
are elegant warehouses. Where once they were temples of enlightenment they are now shrines
to our national greed', he is not concerned with our archaeological and historical museums
but with art museums. And neither is he arguing for enlightenment as I understand it but for
a return to the display techniques of the past where the object unaided by explanation and
information conveyed, as if by magic, what he describes as 'its moral, aesthetic and social
purpose' (Januszczak 1987). Not a single national newspaper employs a critic capable of
reviewing competently any museum exhibition that is not an art show. For these critics the
past has been reduced to not much more than an aesthetic fix and museums to the providers
of a comfortable environment for the sophisticated junkie. This situation is symptomatic of
the attitudes that will keep museums as rich men's media, in which curatorial and visitor
desires and expectations combine to maintain standards that keep the presentation of
archaeology narrow and ineffective.
There are grave dangers in leaving these views unchallenged and complacently continuing
on our way. The balance in museums between education and entertainment will not be easily
maintained in the future as expanding the consumer base becomes ever more important as the
paymasters' touchstone of success. Perhaps the distinction is not as sharp as some might
suppose: 'curators today must lard instruction with lots of entertainment. They might recall
the root term is the same, the Muses being given no less to amusement than to reflection'
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(Lowenthal 1987, 33). Nevertheless, in such a situation archaeology's image is on the wrong
side of the divide as an anonymous friend of Sir Roy Strong inadvertently made clear - 'the
question which is worrying everyone (is) is heritage primarily about archaeology - saving
things - or the nation's cultural lifeblood, relating to live developments outside? If it's both,
where should the emphasis lie?' (quoted in Tait 1987). In the nineteenth century, archaeology,
through its contribution to such matters as the antiquity of man and racial theory, affected the
way men thought about themselves and the rest of humanity. Are we now content to accept
the possibility that the subject's importance is reduced to that of the savers of things and the
providers of early art objects? It does not require much imagination to realise the implications
sfor the well-being of archaeology of such a situation coming to pass.
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Community Archaeology and the
Archaeological Community:
A normative sociological approach?
John Walker
Greater Manchester Archaeological Unit
Introduction
Far from being an irrelevance on the pale of society, archaeology is a very sensitive
indicator indeed of changes in social attitudes and in the elements of society itself.
By and large, society gets the archaeology it deserves; it is next to impossible for
archaeology to dictate its own terms or to break free of social constructs which have
placed archaeology in such a richly frustrating state of tension today (Fowler 1981,
58)
This paper reviews the current position of field archaeology from the viewpoint of one cultural
heritage resource manager, or Unit staff member, closely associated with the growing trend
towards presentation and the use of M S C schemes. The paper takes its stance from the view
that any archaeological work carries with it an explicit theoretical base, and a view of the
past, that has a direct impact on either our society or its social structure. If this is true then
it is a moral imperative that field work should either explicitly state its prejudices or adopt a
conscious methodology that seeks to establish an Objective truth' in terms of the subject
itself, rather than society at large.
This paper adopts the latter viewpoint and assumes that a 'scientific' approach to
archaeology is required. Whether this is methodologically possible has been openly doubted
for some time - however, this paper takes the view that science is not merely a matter of
method but also a matter of mores. It espouses the view that in the absence of a methodology
it is at least possible to adopt a scientific sociology.
The paper consists of four main parts: The Background, Community Archaeology,
Archaeological Paradigms, Future Prospects.
The Background outlines some views of how science functions. The section, Community
Archaeology, by contrast, outlines recent trends, especially political ones, and the dangers
inherent in them. As an alternative to pragmatic field work Archaeological Paradigms outlines,
by an example, how the search for scientific laws and methodology is not at an end. The final
section, Future Prospects, seeks to argue that a sociological approach is not only possible but
perhaps desirable.
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The Background
Science consists of:-
Collectors, classifiers, and compulsive tidiers-up; many are detectives by temperament
and many are explorers: some are artists and others artisans. There are poet-scientists
and philosopher-scientists and even a few mystics.... (Medawar 1985, 10-11)
So said Sir Peter Medawar in 1985. As science, so of archaeology, it is a collection of
individuals with their own attitudes, thoughts, and activities welded together by a common
interest. What archaeology is not, is a coherent body of theory. It is doubtful whether
archaeology per se has contributed one substantial inter-disciplinary theory to modern Western
thought. What Stuart Piggott said in 1959 seems true of community archaeology in 1987:-
The truth is that none of our models of the past, inherited or recently devised, seems
capable of providing a wholly convincing picture of prehistory on its own, there
does not seem to be what a scientist would call a general theory (Piggott 1959, 6)
What field archaeology has done is create or generate data about the past that need explanation.
The large number of schools of thought present in archaeology suggests, as Kühn (1963) has
pointed out, that it is in a pre-paradigmatic or pre-scientific phase, like chemistry before the
periodic table. Horton Smith (1986, 400-504) has analysed the crisis affecting the pre-
Paradigmatic behavioural sciences and the similarity to that affecting archaeology is striking.
The features common to both disciplines are competition between schools of thought, the lack
of cumulation of knowledge and contested models.
There are two main schools of thought about how science, which should be admired, and
other soft science disciplines, function; these are derived from the works of Merton (1970,
1972, 1973) and Kühn (1970, 1977). Merton envisaged that scientists should have common
views of their subject, be disinterested, sceptical and reserve their criticism of colleagues to
technical matters. Merton felt that science had a goal which required a clear code of behaviour
and that it was driven by a reward system of peer recognition. Merton presented a social
model; Kühn saw science as a community of values (a paradigm) which proceeded through
cycles consisting of normal science (applying a paradigm), revolution (the new paradigm) and
"lopping-up (applying the new paradigm). The mopping-up arising out of a new paradigm
constrained puzzle solving, leading to incompatible theories and so to renewed revolution .(For
a critique of these models see Durbin 1980).
The paradigm, that is the collection of coherent thoughts and values we use when looking
at phenomena, as described by Kühn (1964) is three separate things in one (Masterman 1970).
(1) The world view paradigm. The understanding of phenomena or observations against an
agreed concept of reality (eg religion, the mores of politics, culture).
(2) The sociological paradigm. The conceptual model that is a recognised achievement held
up for admiration in a discipline (eg party political creeds).
(3) The problem solving paradigm. The models used for solving particular problems with
Phenomena or observations (eg the matrix model, CP schemes, pragmatic politics).
Recent Trends in Community Archaeology
In 1882 a new Ancient Monuments Act, in part, created a new archaeological activity, that
of the cultural resource manager, the preserver of our heritage. Cultural resource management
as a concept did not really grow in this country until the 1970's and is currently reaching a
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new peak inspired both by the creation of English Heritage and community benefit Manpower
Services schemes. The first act created, funded and fossilised the popular concept that in
some way or another archaeological sites could be preserved as entities, in themselves, without
any explicit acknowledgement of the theories or concepts that are applied to them. The Ancient
Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act of 1979 and the National Heritage Act of 1983
have seen the triumph and extension of that cultural resource management, as it is the avowed
and explicit aim of English Heritage to preserve and display the historic environment. The
impact of this approach is seen in the expenditure recorded in Figure 1, which is the result
°f a popularly held cultural view of, in other words, political values.
G Jones (1969) in her book (see also Durbin 1980, 583-9) saw society consisting of two
elements, one of which may be called political culture, that is the ideas, aspirations, moral
values and aesthetics of a society (what could be called a social world-view paradigm). The
values that form that view are thought by many to be morality, religion, art, science,
economics, politics, law and custom (Durbin 1980, XVIII). Below that can be seen what I
would like to call political pragmatism (a sociological or political paradigm). There is a
relationship between these two elements. The relationship is one whereby the politicians will
only consider those steps which are in keeping with the political culture of their society. This
political culture, or world-view, not only frames our attitudes towards political actions, it
frames our views elsewhere on all aspects of life. As Lipe pointed out:-
Value is not inherent in any cultural items from our past.... Value is learned about
as discovered in these phenomena by humans, and this depends on the particular
cultural, intellectual, historical, and psychological frames of reference held... by the
groups involved (Lipe 1984, 2)
This model of society, which is an artificial construct, is presented for clarity because, in fact
as Jones has pointed out, in a country such as Britain, there is not one particular group of
People that exercises power, but rather a coalition of different power groups and elites (see
Crane 1980) working in different spheres but working under the same political culture (Durbin
1980, XX).
General social values, attitudes and aesthetics that exist within this political culture can and
have been upset by scientific findings and theories - the classic example being the impact
upon the political culture of evolutionary theory (a situation exemplified in Figure 2 on the
next page). Daniel in A Hundred Years of Archaeology and the Origins and Growth of
Archaeology indirectly showed how our archaeological perceptions have changed in keeping
within the political and social culture of Britain so that, for instance, in times of war there
was emphasis on Man the Aggressor (Leakey 1981, 51-8), and now in times of enterprise
there is a new emphasis on the individual (Hodder 1985). As much as science is subject to
fashions, so is field archaeology in practice. Whereas we can conceive of science being a
linear development process indirectly subject to the changing general world-view (indeed US
Science Research and Development obtained government funds in the 1960's without having
to justify them in political terms (Figure 2A), (Price 1965)), field archaeology is directly
subject to changing social problems - that is lower value problem solving paradigms,
exemplified by various M S C schemes (Figure 2B). It seems fairly evident that without a
core theory that relates directly to the intellectual consensus and which is acknowledged by
the political/social culture, in the same way as evolution or defence matters have been, field
archaeology will take its lead from the political decisions (problem solving paradigms)
(illustrated by Figure 2B) or from a world-view fossilised in 1882. This is not to deny the
benefits of community archaeology. The last few years have seen a tremendous growth in
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public awareness of the past, the pleasures derived from such an awareness and an
understanding of the value of historic sites and their settings. M S C schemes, many of which
are bold and imaginative, have provided new facilities, work experience and inspiration to the
long term unemployed. The problem is that the archaeological understanding is not derived
from new general theory and that it is difficult to support theoretical advances in community
archaeology where such advances would be both useful and, if based on objective theory, in
the public interest.
This situation has some interesting general characteristics. Firstly, the greater the change
in the political aspirations of a country, the greater the change in field archaeology. Secondly,
in times of rapid social and economic change, such as we experience today, there will be
correspondingly rapid changes in solutions (Horton Smith 1986).
Thirdly, fund raising activity will be directly aligned to current political issues. It remains
a fact that the majority of field projects are financially assessed either from the view-point
of their pragmatic political content, or from the cultural view expressed in 1882, rather than
their academic content. As any project tends to be self justifying, it is hardly surprising that,
when financial considerations drive field-work into the problem solving political sphere,
political considerations come to appear as justifications. If we look at a current enthusiasm,
presentation, and subject it to this kind of political analysis it becomes quite clear that it
originated, in financial terms, from central and local government and in ethical terms from
1882.
However, as Cherns (1984), Gaston (1978) and others (Open University, 1971) have pointed
out, all decisions about research and development are in the end political, the political freedom
of US Research and Development in the 1960's being an aberration. As such, Research and
Development grants are, of course, subject to instability: internal DOE R and D between
1978 and 1983, for instance, fell by three quarters and SSRC income has failed to keep pace
with costs (Cherns 1984, Table 10 and Table 12).
Nonetheless, it is usually assumed that scientific research grants are made dependent upon
wider science criteria. Typical of such criteria are the following:-
Intrinsic (subject specific) criteria;
(1) Is the field ripe for exploitation?
(2) Are the applicants expert in their field?
Extrinsic;
(1) Does the project support new technological advances?
(2) Does the project, judged by its impact, have scientific merit?
(3) Is there a social benefit?
These criteria have their limitations, as the initial work of Einstein, Planck and Heisenberg
would have scored badly (Open University 1971, 26-8). In practice (see Open University
1971 for examples) these criteria are not hard and fast but it is clear that they derive, in part,
from a scientific world-view paradigm. Grants from English Heritage and M S C do not; the
former basically assesses projects in terms of rescue or preservation, the latter in community
or participant benefit terms derived from other non-archaeological, social or political
paradigms.
The criteria for obtaining rescue grants from English Heritage are, in summary, as follows:-
(1) Cultural Resource value (site condition, period, rarity, vulnerability, documentation, group
value, potential). These conditions are crucial; there must be a threat to the site and the
site must have high cultural resource value.
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(2) Intrinsic (is the project properly organised).
(3) Extrinsic (how does the project relate to the desires of the main period societies).
(Summarised from English Heritage 1986, 4-5)
Clearly these criteria derive, in order of importance, from:
(a) A world-view paradigm based on an aesthetic adopted in 1882.
(b) Political and managerial pragmatism derived from that world-view.
(c) The demands of a pre-paradigmatic subject.
M S C criteria, which govern the operations of over half the community archaeology
e
*penditure (English Heritage n.d.), are derived from current social problems and as such are
even further from normal scientific Research and Development criteria. They are as follows:-
(1) Extrinsic social value (practical benefit to the community, contribution to employment
prospects, non-political).
(2) Intrinsic (the project should be properly organised, funded and monitored and not create
job losses).
(Manpower Services Commission 1985, 1-3)
The impact of their criteria can be measured by the fact the fall in applications for rescue
grants from 765 in 1983 to 504 in 1985 was made good by a corresponding rise in M S C
archaeology schemes (English Heritage n.d., 4).
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In 1984 M S C grants to archaeology equalled those from central government, meaning
therefore, that in general terms half of Britain's archaeological fieldwork was judged
principally on its direct practical community benefits.
It could be said that the current close link between community archaeology and pragmatic
politics has at least the benefit of ensuring that field archaeology is socially relevant. Such a
situation does, however, impose limitations on archaeology because: -
(1) Community archaeology would remain at the beck and call of recent political pragmatic
developments and hence would be financially unstable and so have, ultimately, a poor
career structure.
(2) The practice of community archaeology would tend to confirm current political concep-
tions about the past, thus making the practice of the subject a moral rather than an
academic pursuit.
(3) Community archaTeology would fail to contribute significantly to the intellectual sphere
(or political culture or world-view paradigm) which helps to shape the reality of the
political sphere - something which field archaeologists have done in the past; thus it
would fail to emerge as a major contributor to the archaeological community in its own
right.
It seems that without a sound theoretical base or concept, beyond that legalised in 1882,
the practice of community archaeology, due also in part to its success, will be judged on its
ability to raise resources and follow trends rather than contribute to the community as a
science. Value judgements will be made, as they are now, on the ability to exploit resources
and follow pragmatic decisions, also rather than contribute to the community as a science.
We are aware through a number of contributions in Cleere's (1984) recent volume of the
way in which archaeological work in various countries is tied back to what are seen as the
main political aims or problems facing that society. This again has the attractive implication
that such archaeology is always of social value. As one politician put it:-
The one and only thing that matters to us and the thing these people (archaeologists)
are paid for by the state, is to have ideas of history that strengthen our people in
their national pride.
These words by Heinrich Himmler (Daniel 1964, 120) show the other side of the coin of
archaeology being socially relevant. Pre-paradigmatic archaeology is a powerful political tool
as it can easily be used to create any world-view paradigm. In such a situation it becomes a
moral question as to what the role of the field archaeologist should be. It is worth being
conscious that Nazism grew out of an evolving political culture or world-view paradigm
(Daniel 1964), to create its own world-view based on pragmatism fostered by bad science.
Clearly a subject which fails to make a contribution from its own viewpoint, which it has a
social duty to do, to the political culture or world-view, remains a discipline subject to the
other views current in that culture. This is yet another reason why a move from a
pre-paradigmatic stance in community archaeology is needed.
As Renfrew noted:-
The innocent confidence that archaeologists knew what they were doing and should
get on with it has been replaced by the awareness that they didn't, and that we
ourselves are none too sure (Renfrew 1974, 40).
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Archaeological Paradigms
The preceding section outlined some of the arguments for having archaeological paradigms
and dealt with some of the problems created by their absence, such as competing schools of
thought, uncontrolled developments and the moral dilemma inherent in presenting any vew
of the past. It remains, therefore, to consider what paradigms are available.
This section will look at some of the recent trends in archaeological thought which could
be called theoretical, and what they may hold for the future in terms of acceptable paradigms.
It is not the intention of this paper to review these views (models) in detail and the reader is
referred to Hodder (1985), Wylie (1985) and the Bintliff and Gaffney (1986) volume,
particularly the chapter Archaeology at the Interface by John Bintliff, all of which deal with
the various types of high-level archaeological paradigms that have developed from the
sixteenth century to the present day. Rather this paper presents some of those models in a
diagramatic fashion in order to make it clear how they impinge upon our basic understanding
of the data. Figure 3 shows a series of columns which represent - for want of a better term
- cultural data suites and the attributes that exist within those suites. These attributes are not
fixed; they are not definitive - rather they reflect the fact that what usually happens is that
when any block of data is looked at it is arranged, in human terms, as a series of attributes
which are gathered together to form suites. These attributes could range from cranial capacity
to the advent of pottery to agricultural systems. These columns reflect the basic methodological
way in which most archaeologists still approach their data. In nearly all models these suites,
of data or analysis, are then compared; there are the cross comparison approaches, the
comparisons between suites approach, and comparison with the wider environment.
Diagramatically we can explain these approaches in Α-D of figure 3. Figure 3A shows the
situation or methodology that most archaeologists practice. This is the cross comparison - the
following of a particular attribute of a society through time or between contemporary suites,
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Fig. 3 Diagrams illustrating the basis of the major archaeological paradigms/models
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be that something like pottery forms or the Marxist viewpoint that specific kinds of social
attributes may be seen through time.
Figure 3B is the comparison of complete or partial suites that is generally used with a
positivist point of view - positivism being seen as a methodology, whereby high definition
attributes which show strong trends through time are identified by scientific analysis to give
general laws, or as in structuralism, where both structure and individual (attribute) are
important. Belonging to this approach are some elements of Marxism, evolutionary theory
and historicism. Figure 3C shows cultural systems analysis as used in Marxism and
synergetics. We can see here how suites are described in terms of the interaction of attributes.
Important in this area is the work of the synergeticists, who are exploring the importance of
slaving, whereby we can identify systems, shown here by a bracket, which are in turn
controlled by another attribute, so that systems may vary, but their variation is strictly
delimited by wider and more powerful attributes. Again one can notice a similarity to the
positivist argument under Figure 3B. In Figure 3D we have the theories that deal with
relationships of attributes and their suites to outside factors - a viewpoint used in both
evolutionary theory, and landscape archaeology. Figure 4 shows how many basic methodologi-
cal theories or philosophical approaches analyse the data using either one of, or combinations
of, thsee approaches to create a basic data box. The resultant expansion into three dimensions,
implicit in all archaeological thinking, is done by adding a third onus to represent two things;
the outside environment and/or time. This expansion depends on the assumption that the
outside environment in which we live is not time constant but time variable and that time and
environment may therefore be seen as synonymous. Figure 4 gives then a 3D box in which
to view the competing world-view theories. The fact that these conflicting schools of thought
exist, and are still held strongly by many adherents, indicates, as Kühn would have it, that
archaeology is in a pre-paradigmatic position, which as we have seen above gives rise to real
practical problems.
There is, however, a long tradition in archaeology of the call for a general theory or
paradigm. It is not the intention in this section to present such a general theory but to show
how it can still be sought.
Figure 5 shows the attributes of cultural suites and cultural suites within the box already
created. It is a commonplace of most of the theories that are currently available that they
have limitations in terms of their suites and limitations in terms of their analysis in one form
or another, hence competing schools of archaeology. Clearly, however, when "cultural
attributes" are seen within their time related box, there are limitations upon their possible
existence and combination. It is to the discovery of, or mapping of, the surface of these
limitations that any general theoretical research should be aimed in the hope of its providing
an explanation of the limits and hence a paradigm. We need to know what are the total
possible ranges of human societies, in what total range of natural or created environments,
and their total possible forms of development, in order to obtain a clear viewpoint of how
attributes are formed, defined and related. This may seem a grandiose thing to say but similar
work is already being done by synergeticists, and Horton Smith (1986) has displayed the
development of such models in the behavioural sciences. The definition of that basic model
of how it is possible for human societies to exist, in what combinations and how their detritus
reaches us, should give the desperately needed world-view paradigm. With such a paradigm
no longer would archaeology be placed low in social value, no longer should it be afflicted
by political changes in will or desire and no longer would its own internal values be applied
in a random and often conflicting variety of ways.
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Future Prospects
The call for a general model, a general paradigm, lawlike model - describe it as you will, has
been made many times.
The reason that a general objective model that has an impact on community archaeology
has failed to occur must lie in one of two problems; either theoretically it is unachievable,
and this has been discussed in the preceding section, or it is impossible because of the
behaviour and drive of the discipline itself.
Let us look at the characteristics of behaviour and how it may be driven. Horton Smith
(1980) has developed a basic equation to quantify human behaviour (the chances of someone
altering their behaviour at a particular time).
ß - S(M'-rl'-rd'-rC-rE),
where M' = Individual Λ/ot ivat ion at time I' just prior to behavior Β
at time t,
rl' - /ntellectual capacities relevant to ß at time t',
rd' = Derived plans relevant to B at t ime t',
TC - Physical Capacities relevant to ß at time i,
rE = Environment of the individual relevant at time t of ß.
From this equation it is clear that behaviour is a function of individual motivation,
individual intellectual capacities, the possibility of future plans deriving from it, physical
capabilities and the environment of the individual at the relevant time.
If we take this equation as axiomatic, it is clear why there are few major theoretical advances
in archaeology, especially from field or community archaeology. Three main problems exist;
there is hardly any motivation for anyone to consider theoretical work, the environment is
broadly hostile, and the fact that any success in work on a theoretical base will not lead to
any immediate derived plans. Motivation is low simply because there are no clear rewards
for work on theoretical aspects, since they do not generate further income, esteem, job security
or promotion. Merton in his sociological model of science emphasised the important need for
reward as a motivation. That reward must be not only financial but also appear as recognition
from a peer group. This finding was re-emphasised by Gaston (1971) in his survey of the
reward system in British and American science. Zloczower (1981) in his historical survey of
German scientific advance in the nineteenth century went further - he found that de-
centralised, somewhat competitive structures with the opportunity to create new posts were
responsible for the nineteenth century German scientific boom in medicine. This intellectual
growth was brought to a halt, in part, both by the growth and expansion of municipal hospitals
which provided career opportunities less directly orientated towards medical science
(Zloczower 1981, 120) and increasing bureaucratization. The importance of career oppor-
tunities is also emphasised by Cherns (1984) who identified widespread demoralisation and
staff loss in social science as due to a lack of career opportunities.
The environment is hostile because there are so many competing schools of thought, and
because it is common for many field staff to be worried about being labelled as theorists who
feel more comfortable getting on with the job for which they were paid for, which is, as we
have seen, derived from short term political pragmatic considerations. Equally the environment
is non-supportive; there is little or no cash or funding available for people to undertake
theoretical work when based in community archaeology.
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There are a number of steps that can be taken to solve this problem; firstly, changing the
environment. It must be recognised that basic research or theoretical considerations are
important. This is already taking place not only through conferences such as this but also in
other ways such as calls to Unit heads encouraging them to send staff to theoretical
conferences.
Motivation can be improved by increasing the finances available for theoretical work.
Despite being the largest employers of archaeologists, however, there is no way that the
majority of community archaeology organisations can afford directly to support the cost of
high level theoretical work.
English Heritage (1986) in their rescue archaeology funding policy statement acknowledged
the need to undertake community archaeology within a framework of academic priorities.
However, it is clear from reading their statement (English Heritage 1986, 5) that the framework
of academic priorities is to be derived from the specialist groups which, in the terms of this
paper, can also unfortunately at the moment be seen as part of the schools of contending
thought. It is possible under the National Heritage Act, 1983, for English Heritage to fund
research work which is allied to its own more general tasks. At the moment it is clear that
the money for such work is not available because it is seen that the other more pressing
business, which is imposed by law and a cultural attitude devised in 1882, requires to be
done. The problem here is, one wonders when or how one comes to a point whereby no more
work is required to be done, given the kind of theoretically unconstrained demands inherent
in such an attitude .
The only way of ensuring that finance for theory in the field is available is to establish a
specific research fund within English Heritage.
In calling upon English Heritage to take such a bold move a number of natural questions
arise. Firstly, would there be benefits? This paper outlines the need for basic fundamental
research and makes clear the possible benefit of a new body of certified knowledge (see
Merton and Kühn). The likelihood of success in this aim is debatable but it should help to
foster communication, peer recognition and other values seen as crucial by Merton. Sufficient
time must be allowed for the process to develop, for time lapse in knowledge or approach can
be exceptionally long, as Craig pointed out (1969).
Secondly, is it within the organisation's remit? It is within the 1983 Act and it is government
policy to fund some basic research (Cherns 1984).
Thirdly, why financial assistance? Finance provides clear motivation of the most direct
kind (Horton Smith 1986).
Fourthly, how much would it cost? Government expenditure on research and development
usually averages 3% of GNP (Open University 1971). Of this around 16% usually finds its
way into non-direct matters (Cherns 1984). In terms of the rescue budget for 1984/85 this
would equal twenty-five thousand pounds a year.
Fifthly, to whom would it be made available? Both Merton and Zloczower (1981) in their
different ways emphasise the higher scientific returns available from a de-centralised,
non-bureaucratic, somewhat competitive system such as that exemplified by units. Equally the
Social Science Research Council finds funding non-university bodies acceptable and uni-
versities already have some basic research support systems which should hopefully be more
effective in the future (Hart 1985).
Lastly, what are the possible spin-offs? These are many; it would raise basic research as
an issue within units, improve scientific social behaviour, encourage communication and
Perhaps even force people to re-consider data pushing post-excavation programmes. Grants
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to community archaeology for basic research would also create the beginnings of a crucial
scientific reward system (Gaston 1978).
A new boost to motivation is reflected, by extension, in the Institute of Field Archaeologists'
code of conduct, which has many rules encouraging scientific behaviour of the type advocated
by Merton. This code represents a step forward but adherence to it is volurntary and not
necessarily rewarding. If it is to help, then adherence to it must foster economic and social
gain.
The further development of a peer recognition system can at least be fostered by things
such as awards for theoretical work. It is noticeable that the British Archaeological Awards
are largely for middle level sector work or for general books which, Kühn emphasises, are
symbolic of pre-paradigmatic science. In the past, major recognition in personal terms for
theoretical work has come through the universities. It is clear in the present economic situation
with its poor prospects for university archaeology, that this recognition and the crucial jobs
(Zloczower 1981) are unlikely to be available.
Conclusion
For theorists this article paints a somewhat grim picture of community archaeology; a pursuit
which has made many meaningful contributions to society - a society which, in England,
made over 98 million visits to historic buildings, museums and galleries in 1982 (English
Tourist Board 1983). Whether this view of the quality of fieldwork theory is over-painted is
left to the reader to decide. What is sought is a balanced approach that admits that an advance
in high level theory would also be of major, perhaps crucial, social benefit. The argument is
that such a theoretical advance is possible and its possibility is improved by approaching the
problem of non-scientific archaeology from a social angle. Binford and others (Wylie 1985),
worried about how our cultural attitudes impinged on the data, and chose to study how the
data were formed. Here it is argued that social values do impinge on the data, that science is
a social activity and hence the changes of a scientific pardigm are, at least, improved if
scientific norms of behaviour are observed. Whether this is true, or not, is open to question
but the fact remains that in community archaeology there have never been effective
inducements to observe such behavioural codes.
Community archaeology should continue to struggle for the establishment of higher level
theory, for it would relieve applied archaeology of some of the vagaries of political pragmatism
and establish it as a subject in its own right rather than a vehicle for the achievement of
broader political aims alone.
If a small country like Hungary can fund extensive archaeology (400 excavations a year)
because they recognise that it is a subject with its own demands, requirements and usefulness,
then surely it should be possible to achieve a similar situation in Britain. To create a situation
whereby community archaeology is tied not just to conservation concepts but also to academic
concepts. In Hungary a great deal of order and usefulness is given to archaeological work by
the existence of a general Marxist-Leninist world-view paradigm. Unfortunately, because of
the apparent totality of that explanation, there is little pressure for theoretical growth. In British
community archaeology there are equally few advances. In Hungary it is due to a lack of
pressure to explain, because of the dominance of a social political model. In Britain it is a
lack of pressure to explain because of the absence of motivation and environmental hostility.
Fundamental theory should be part of community archaeology so that field archaeologists
can continue to contribute to the community not only through bold and imaginative physical
Community Archaeology 63
schemes and increasingly successful preservation but also, with support, through bold and
imaginative theory.
Postscript
This paper has presented three main themes; the intellectual and general sea-change facing
archaeology, the possibility of a solution to this derived from theory, the possibility of a
solution derived from a sociological approach.
That the possibilities suggested here will either be implemented or succeed is perhaps
unlikely, especially at a time when most Unit Directors face an impending financial crises
(SCAUM, AGM, 1987), departments face closure, archaeological science is in disarray (Hart
1985) and more and more field work is subject to the instability of political pragmatism (eg
Radice to SCAUM, AGM 1987). At the same time some theoretical schools are moving
towards a greater and greater emphasis on the individual in the past (eg Hodder 1985) or into
the possibility of a pluralist approach to the past (which amounts, by extension, to the same
thing, both approaches seem to be following current social trends).
In view of these trends it would seem sanguine to hope that archaeology can provide a
common objective understanding of the past that is meaningful to our present society. By
common objective understanding one means an apolitical understanding held in common
(which is what scientific laws are) and by meaningful to our society, one means espousing
understanding that shapes our world-view paradigm.
It would seem that the past can only be what we observe and that observation is limited
by comprehension derived from evolving theory and, to an extent, technique. The meaning
that we attach to this past can only be meaningful if it explains the past in terms that are
humanely comprehendable by being related to a, hopefully expanding, body of knowledge.
There is, unfortunately, the possibility that the future holds a lessening of observation through
the scaling down of field activities and that the expansion of comprehension will be limited
both by cost, confusion and indifferent theory.
Notes
The views and opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and
should not be construed as representing those of any institution or organisation either explicitly
or implicitly or as affecting their actions or philosophy.
The author would like to thank Mr P Mayes for his helpful advice and comments.
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Giving Meaning to the Past:
Political Perspectives in Archaeology
Steve Roskams
University of York, Department of Archaeology
Introduction
This conference, entitled "Extracting Meaning from the Past" has set itself the question "What
is the meaning of the past?". In what follows I won't attempt to answer this, since I don't
think that the question itself means anything. Indeed the very title rests on a false assumption
- that there is meaning in the past in some way and that it is our job to try and prise it out
On the contrary I would argue that any interpretation of past societies involves imposition of
the perspectives of the present. So I will ask "How can we give meaning to the past?" or,
more particularly, "How can we make the past relevant to the present?". The change is more
than just one of emphasis or a semantic quibble.
My short answer is that we can only make archaeology relevant by adopting explicit
political positions and that these viewpoints must be derived from our immediate experience
of working in archaeology. The aim is to infuse archaeology with politics or, more accurately,
to make clear the political aspects which have always been present when considering the role
of archaeology in society. Underpinning the whole discussion, therefore, is the often repeated
idea that "investigation of the human condition cannot be ideologically neutral". This is not
just an unfortunate contingent fact, as some believe, but a theoretical necessity and an
opportunity to be grasped.
In what follows, I will make a few points about the political aspects of theoretical
approaches, followed by a rather more detailed look at politics in the practical sphere, before
drawing some conclusions about the implications of all this for how we make archaeology
relevant.
Theoretical Sphere
Drawing attention to the fact that archaeological research is necessarily political does not seem
to be doing anything very substantial to me. But many archaeologists still insist that good
archaeology is apolitical (Rahtz 1985, 15). This view is generated by two devices. Firstly,
knowledge is characterised as a thing-in-itself, divorced from the society employing those
who seek it. Secondly, academic archaeologists reinforce their own position by separating
their subject from other disciplines (often at the same time purporting to be a bridge between
subjects, for example, the humanities and the social or hard sciences - a difficult balancing
act). So they make knowledge an end in itself and give themselves rights over a defined
segment of it With the foundations of the ivory tower so firmly in place, no wonder making
archaeology relevant then becomes difficult
But the arguments for divorcing academic research from society, and separating archaeology
from other areas in this way, are unconvincing. If archaeology is so separate, how can we
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explain the corresponding patterns of development in archaeology and other disciplines
(Bintliff 1986)? Below the surface, the relationship between these developments and the rest
of society is clear. Foucault (1979) has characterised the modern state, which organises most
archaeology, as having contradictory traits, being both increasingly totalitarian and in-
dividualising. Changes in theoretical archaeology reflect the tension between these traits. The
totalitarian needs - to control people, predict reactions etc. - were expressed archaeologically
in the systems theory, quantitative techniques and hypothetical-deductive approaches of the
late 1960s and 1970s. The individualising needs - to divide those with common interests
who, if joined, might counter the power of the state - are seen in the recent return to
individualism via structuralism, or humanism in a poststructuralist phase. "New" archaeology
has not died. It has been changed to old archaeology, not with the passage of time but by
being converted into a more acceptable form. Renewed stress on the importance of the
individual in previous societies gives a past more in keeping with the present requirements
of the government which funds our research.
A good example of this change of emphasis is the recent "new direction" of Peer Polity
Interaction (Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Here, rather than favour diffusion or core-periphery
analysis, social change is analysed in terms of interaction between equal, competing, highest
order units. The approach claims to rely on the inherent characteristics of the data (op cit
153) rather than the political dogma which is said to generate other viewpoints. This is
misleading. Data are produced not collected, just as results are creations not findings. Talking
of their inherent characteristics is simply muddying the waters. Peer polity interaction implies
that competition between equals at the top of society is the "natural" way to development.
The political implications of selecting this type of explanation are surely quite clear. All of
this is not necessarily to deny the validity of this as an approach to interpreting change in the
past. We can still distinguish the reasons for believing in a particular archaeological
interpretation from what causes someone to believe it. But it does mean that the debate cannot
be lifted entirely out of the present political arena. Indeed, it is this attachment which makes
it interesting and important.
Practical Sphere
So much for the political content of theoretical perspectives. What about the practical sphere?
Firstly, the whole split between field and academic archaeology has political implications
itself. Part of the discipline has taken up the challenge to be "useful" and "relevant" (the
empirical/analytical model of Habermas (1974)), leaving the interpretation of what it all means
to academic institutions (the historical/hermeneutic model).
Continuing with this distinction between theory and practice for the moment, it is obvious
that work in the field encounters modem politics directly, with funding via HBMC projects,
the MSC or site developers. Walker (this volume) discusses the implications of this
involvement at a general level. But I would like to consider political aspects at a micro level
- the lessons to be learnt from how data production is organised on site, how technical change
affects the relations between field workers, and how its subsequent analysis takes place.
(a) Organisation of data production
Work on an archaeological project can be organised in various ways. There may be a rigid
hierarchy and set chain of command, the project director (the great polymath) at the apex, the
specialists at defined levels below and the lowly troweller at the base, with all levels paid
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according to their status and "worth". Or it can be a team effort, with or without agreed and
defined areas of responsibility, with economic reward allocated according to need. The above
positions are theoretical extremes on a spectrum of possibilities. In practice, a combination
of such approaches occurs. But where one lies on this spectrum is a political statement about
that particular field project.
(b) Techniques of data production
Archaeology in the field has been very much concerned with developing new techniques for
producing data. Do these transform, or even transcend, the politics of the work place? Not
only is it impossible for advances in technique to produce theoretical advance of themselves,
any such technical changes have no simple relationship with modifications in the political
context in which data production takes place.
Recently, for example, we have seen the formulation of more exact languages for describing
excavated features. The descriptive criteria are set out and the terminology regularised,
especially where computer storage is envisaged. It has been suggested (Carver 1985, 48) that
this will reduce the central role of the site director as recorder and interpreter of all, thus
making data production more democratic. Specialised languages allow communication
between everyone - we can all do the layer description now. But this picture rests on the
assumption that all site workers are allowed to learn the language. The change can be used
in the opposite way, to let one group increasingly dominate the rest. Special site recorders
and stratigraphists are created, these being the only ones who know what the accepted
terminology means (usually because they made it up). Computer storage raises the same issues.
Do we hand it over to the computer "expert" (often someone who jumped on the bandwagon
a few months before the rest of us)? Or does everyone input data? (See Richards 1986 for
discussion). Technological change can break down hierarchical structures, but can equally
well be used to reinforce or extend the pre-existing relationships. Which direction is followed
is a function of the political situation on the project in question.
(c) Manipulation of data
The same alternatives arise in analysing excavated data. Do interpretations derive from the
inspiration of individual directors during the process of excavation? Or from detailed analysis
by individuals, or teams of people, afterwards, some of whom may not even have been
involved in the data production stage? There are real differences of opinion on how these
things should be done. The strength of emotional response which often arises when such
matters are discussed itself suggests that there is something more at stake than just
methodology. I am not recommending one approach over another here. But I do say that there
are alternatives, and that which is selected defines the political context in which data analysis
then takes place.
An Example and Conclusion
Even if it is accepted that work in the practical sphere always has political implications for
its practitioners, how does this help in making the past relevant, in giving it meaning? An
example from our present situation may show one way forward. We are at a conference to
which some people have been invited (the speakers) and some have applied to come (the
audience). Very often this means those who are paid to talk and those who pay to listen,
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though not in our particular case. But, as usual, we do have speakers who stand up in front
of their audience. They adopt an inefficient mode of communication, the lecture, in which
enough is given out to keep up interest, but enough retained to allow the lecturer to keep his
dominant position. It could be otherwise. Everyone could have a copy of each talk beforehand,
split into small groups for discussion and come back together to give collective reactions. Of
course, the control of the lecturer would then be circumvented. The point of this example is
that the artefacts around us - their character and physical disposition - display this approach
to communicating archaeology. There is one large room rather than many small ones; seating
is organised in a particular way, with the seats of the audience bolted to the floor, that of the
lecturer movable. Control of the technology - slide projector, overhead projector - are in the
hands of the person at the front. What is the "meaning" of this particular configuration of
artefacts? One way to clarify it would be to take the political position that knowledge is
power and, in a capitalist system, is subject to the forces of supply and demand. The producer
needs to control the introduction of knowledge into the market place, making sure (s)he creates
enough interest (a saleable product) but retains a residue for future dissemination (owns the
patent). This explains the position of the speaker, the mode of communication and the
organisation of the objects around us to create and re-inforce the impression. It's the political
perspective which gives a meaning to the archaeological record. Similar approaches could be
taken with the remains which we excavate. Analysed in these terms, they could be made
relevant to the situations in which many people outside archaeology find themselves - could
help them understand their position in society. This can never be done whilst we continue to
strive to make archaeology apolitical.
I must stress that I am not saying that there should be a single political viewpoint, still less
that it should be my own. For instance, a group of women seeking to understand the
archaeological evidence in this room, taking on board the fact that some, albeit a minority,
of the audience are women but all the lecturers (and questioners so far) are men, may come
up with a different perspective from that of male ideas on "power relationships". In doing
this, they would no doubt appeal to a different group and convey the "meaning" of the
archaeology in a different way. But this is just to say that the "general public" was never a
useful way of characterising the target of archaeology.
In sum, only when we recognise the political implications of our activities in our own
workplaces - on the site, in the museum, in the lecture room - can we decide on the groups
who may be interested in archaeology. Once we know the messages, and why they are
important to us, then the modes of transmission and the specific audiences will define
themselves.
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Changing Perceptions of the Past:
The Bronze Age - A Case Study
Michael Morris
City of Winchester Archaeology Section
For many years historians have been aware of the profound influence their individual values
have on historical interpretation (Carr 1964), but it is only relatively recently that
archaeologists have begun to come to terms with the ways in which the selection, ordering
and interpretation of archaeological evidence is related to problems and issues facing
contemporary society (Bintliff 1986 this volume; and Patterson 1986). Many archaeologists
feel that they are participating in an ever progressing discipline, accruing knowledge which
brings us ever nearer to the 'truth' about the unwritten past. In a recent paper Wilk has
suggested that this is only part of the story, and that archaeologists also pursue an 'informal
and often hidden political and philosophical debate about the major issues of contemporary
life' (1985, 307). Whilst in practice it is usually impossible wholly to disentangle development
in the discipline from changing values, a greater appreciation of the social factors affecting
the continuing process of construction and reconstruction of prehistory would be of benefit
to the work of archaeologists in all fields and periods.
This paper takes the Bronze Age as a case study, in which the value-laden, revealing, and
sometimes bizzare ideas used to make sense of the period are brought to the surface and related
to broader social issues. It must be remembered that the idea of a Bronze Age is itself an
historical construction, not an independent entity. Its existence is dependent on its relevance
to the conceptualisation of prehistory. The three age system of stone, bronze, and iron, has
in fact proved a remarkably resilient and adaptable framework: originating in Classical Greece
as a model of moral progress; re-introduced in early nineteenth century Denmark as a
chronological scheme for museum display; used as an evolutionary model later in the century;
and given new life by the technological thesis proposed by Childe in the 1930's (see below).
At the present time, the legitimacy of the Bronze Age as an interpretative tool is being
increasingly challenged,1 and a leading scholar of the period has commented that the idea of
the three ages has been retained almost by default in the absence of satisfactory alternatives
(Burgess 1980, 12). This does not however affect the validity of examining the models used
in Bronze Age studies in the past, and of considering the contemporary situation.
The most influential approaches of the twentieth century will be examined in turn. These
are:- 1) The Celtic/heroic model; 2) autonomous development; 3) prestige goods systems; 4)
peer polity interaction; and 5) the new culture history. The impact of these models in academe,
local field studies, and museums will be considered and a brief appraisal attempted. Finally
some tentative comments on future directions are offered.
The Celtic/Heroic Model
Until recently the Celtic/heroic model has formed the dominant way of characterising Bronze
Age society. This concept celebrates the values of competetive individualism and nationalism;
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popular and relevant themes in the context of the political and economic aspirations of the
Western states during the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. Historically this
approach forms part of the tradition of culture history (or historicism) of which two variants
may be identified:
Firstly the chauvinist perspective, which developed directly from national historicism, and
which seeks to establish the origins of particular national characteristics and cultural forms
(Girdwood 1986, 38, and see for example Gimbutas 1965, and 1971); and secondly a broader
approach examining the origins of Europe's special and unique culture which eventually
culminated in the industrial revolution (Rowlands 1984, 147). In British Bronze Age studies
this latter approach has received more attention, although interest in nationalistic concerns is
often apparent. Approaches of this type are usually characterised by the definition of cultures
and peoples and an emphasis on diffusion in the process of cultural development and change.
The central concept which binds both approaches is that of heroic society (defined as a society
dominated by a competitive elite), derived from an amalgam of Iron Age Celtic and Homeric
society. For most writers of this genre, the Bronze Age is visualised as a less developed version
of Iron Age Celtic society. Prior to the acceptance of the three age system, bronze artefacts
were seen as part of a vaguely defined Celtic prehistory peopled by the 'Ancient British',
representing a composite between the barbarian known from ethnographic studies and the
warlike Celtic tribesman depicted in the early literary sources (Ashbee 1978, 30). When the
relative chronology and time depth of the Bronze and Iron Ages became apparent, rather than
start afresh with new models, this idea was merely stretched backwards in time; the
documentary evidence provided a touchstone for British prehistory not available from the
material remains and it was therefore understandable that the secure certainty of the written
word remained as a strong (albeit very elastic) lifeline to those venturing further and further
into the darkness of uncharted prehistory.
This inherited model has had the most profound effect on studies of the period. For two
of the most influential writers of the middle of the century - Childe and Hawkes - Heroic
society began with the appearance of the Beaker Folk, representing the historical point at
which the supposedly European characteristics such as 'individuality, entrepreneurial skill,
and inventiveness' became apparent (Rowlands 1984, 148). Childe writes:
The self sufficiency of neolithic economy was broken down by the advent of warlike
invaders imbued with domineering habits and an appreciation of metal weapons and
ornaments which inspired them to impose sufficient political unity on their new
domain for some economic unification to follow (1940, 91).
He also observes that:-
All the vital elements of modern material culture are immediately rooted in The
Bronze Age though their presuppositions may go back to the closing phase of the
Stone Age (1930, 2-3).
Hawkes took this idea even further by tracing elements of Celtic culture back to the Beaker
Folk, although Childe was rather dubious about this argument (Hawkes 1940, 372; Childe
1940, 261-2). More recently Hawkes has been content to stress the continuity of cultural
aspects from the Bronze to the Iron Age without the benefit of ethnic labels (1976, 2-3).
Supplementing this perspective was the vision of heroic society encapsulated within the
epic poems of Homer, significantly described as the
...first expression of the western mind in literary form (Rieu 1972, 10).
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Piggott for example saw the world of the Iliad and the Odyssey as typifying European Bronze
Age culture of the second millennium (1965,140). The Celtic and Homeric perspectives are
nevertheless basically similar. In his famous paper on the Wessex culture, Piggott's attitude
coincides closely with that of Childe. He writes of a 'somewhat uninteresting and unenterpris-
ing substratum' conquered by an 'intrusive ruling class' who have a 'delight in barbaric finery'
(1938, 52). Piggott also stresses the importance of foreign influences on the Wessex culture
especially from Brittany. Trade routes both local and international are similarly emphasised,
especially the hypothesised Mycenean connection; and the ultimate origin of the Wessex
culture is traced back to central Europe (ibid, esp. 94-6). This concern with the particular
nature of British Bronze Age culture is a common one; Childe for example suggests that the
British superiority over mainland Europe in metal and commerce may be explained by 'the
variety of cultural influences focussed on the islands....'(1939, 321). This approach belongs
to the historical tradition of visualising Britain as a blend of cultures - Celtic, Saxon, and
Norman, and as an independent trading nation (cf S Hawkes 1945, 22-3).
The heroic model of the Bronze Age was fully developed in the 1930's and has exerted a
powerful influence ever since. In 1960 Ashbee restated the position thus:-
The formidable edifice which is our modern technology and scientific knowledge
rests, ultimately, upon the progressive skills of unnamed artificers in bronze who
were active and inventive in the second millennium BC. For Western European
society must be viewed against its own Western European prehistoric past....(1960,
11).
In a more recent book, he presents what is perhaps the most detailed interpretation of Bronze
Age society explicitly based on the Heroic model (Ashbee 1978). He stresses the continuity
of social forms from the Beaker period and earlier, into the Iron Age, and points to the
Wessex Culture as a florescence of heroic society. The Beaker peoples are characterised as
migratory groups perhaps living in 'mobile houses, like Romany caravans' (ibid 139). (A link
between 'Beaker Folk' and gypsy society had earlier been made by Childe, in relation to the
commercial element of Beaker society (1958, 147)). Amongst other explanations of their
presence in Britain he suggests that they may have been employed as mercenaries by Neolithic
chieftains whom they subsequently usurped. The Saxon foederati brought into this country
in later Roman times are used as a parallel for this proposal (ibid 137-9). Similar historical
allusions are made with reference to the Wessex Culture which is interpreted as a principality
at the heart of which lay the Henge/Palace of Stonehenge, associated with a vast royal court
(ibid 150-1, 181). The influence of Wessex spread across much of England, the Wessex type
graves of Yorkshire perhaps representing '... the interments of knightly Wessex warriors who
exercised viceregal powers' (ibid. 150-1, 181).2
Another remarkable characterisation of the Bronze Age is given by Briard (1979, 225-6):
The Neolithic world had glorified the cult of fertility and representations of Mother
Goddesses proliferated... Starting in the Chalcolithic period, mobile bands of corded
ware peoples arrived to upset the traditional religious beliefs and laid the foundations
for the development of individualism.
This perception of the Neolithic as feminine, egalitarian, and soft; and the Bronze Age as
male centred, individualistic and hard can be traced back to Morgan but is reiterated by
modem scholars such as Gimbutas (1973, 1974) and Sherratt (1984, 127). This application
°f stereotyped gender traits represents one of the more bizarre attempts at personifying
Prehistoric society.3
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Briard continues by invoking this 'Macho' competitive vision of the Bronze Age in terms
of capitalist values:
The Bronze Age witnessed the assertion of personality, the recognition of the value
of a spirit of enterprise. This was a consequence of the increase in travel and contacts,
made necessary by this burgeoning industrial society. In short it was the start of a
more elaborate organisation of labour, with the appearance of new professions and
social classes: prospectors, miners, smiths, traders and commercial travellers, not to
mention scrap metal dealers, and the warriors stationed at the toll posts and strategic
points on the trade routes (ibid 221).
It is not just in works of academic synthesis that the traditional culture history approach has
dominated. The fieldwork research priorities of the Council for British Archaeology (1948)
for example, examined each chronological period individually and identified problems and
concerns for future research within an historicist framework. The Bronze Age section, written
by Hawkes and Piggott, presents the period as one characterised by invasions, and waves of
immigrants which were gradually assimilated into the native population. Thus a priority was
to define more clearly the absolute and relative chronology in order to clarify the sequence
of Bronze Age cultures both one to another and to Neolithic and Iron Age cultures. Some
attention was also paid to social and economic considerations although this was done within
the culture history context of the study of lifeways. Thus the total excavation of Bronze Age
settlement sites was advocated in order to gain 'a realistic picture of the mode of life and
social organisation; in other words, to make prehistory live' (1948, 91).
Museum exhibitions also largely remain pragmatically rooted in the three age system.
Devised in the context of museum display, this way of compartmentalising the past has proved
difficult to avoid in the presentation of prehistoric artifactual material. To some extent it is
felt that the visiting public are familar with this scheme and more readily able to grasp
information organised on this basis. The prominence given to the Bronze Age is usually
dependent on the composition of the collection, as at Devizes museum where this period
receives more attention than any other on the basis of its outstanding Bronze Age collection.
Artifact and monument typology remains an important element in museum galleries: at
Devizes the technical development of bronze axes and spears in the Middle and Late Bronze
Age is presented, and henges receive special treatment as a class of monument, with individual
models of each site. Also on a typological theme, both Devizes and Salisbury museum display
a variety of urns in large shop window-like showcases (Conybeare and Viner 1985, 186).
Elements of culture history are also often evidence: cultural developments may receive
attention, for example the distinction between artifacts of Wessex 1 and 2 is illustrated at
Devizes. More commonly it is lifeways (and deathways) which are given emphasis, thus
bringing in the imaginative perspective. This can take the form of single site study (eg. the
Late Bronze age midden at Potterne presented at Devizes) or the display of mortuary practices,
symbolised by the ubiquitous Beaker burial reconstructions found in museums throughout the
country.
*****
Since the nineteenth century models which seek to draw general conclusions about the way
human society is organised have existed in parallel with the preceding, traditional culture
history approach. By their nature they are often more explicit in their value systems, and can
encompass a wide range of philosophical stances. For example, in the nineteenth century the
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most powerful concept was that of progress, linked to the development of industrial capitalism.
This was reflected in the idea of evolutionary stages of social organisation based on the means
of subsistence, as promulgated by Morgan, Engels, Pitt-Rivers and others (Daniel 1975, 49;
Girdwood 1986, 36; Renfrew 1982, 6). Worsaae writing in 1886 of the need for further
research comments:
..it will be long ere each single group of lands and peoples can be assigned its right
place in the whole steadily progressive development of man during the far-reaching
pre-historic ages (1886, xxviii).
At the present time there are three main generalising models used in Bronze Age Studies.
Autonomous development; prestige goods systems; and peer polity interaction. These are
discussed below and their impact on local fieldwork and museums is assessed.
Autonomous Development
For many archaeologists the general evolutionary concept was retained well into the twentieth
century as a framework within which cultures developed and diffused and in which invasion
speeded the process of cultural advancement (Bintliff 1986, 6-8). Until the late 1960's
however, diffusion remained the main explanation of social change in the Bronze Age,
innovation occurring outside the Western European theatre in the Mediterranean and the Near
East.
This was challenged by the concept of autonomous development, noutlined for the British
Bronze Age by Clark (1966) and Coles and Taylor (1971). To a great extent this reflected a
shift in attitude within Western society towards the political domination of external territories,
and was catalysed by technical developments such as radiocarbon determination and
spectrographic analysis (Gilman 1981, 2), the increased use by archaeologists of systems
thinking, and the examination of culture process (which laid emphasis on the functioning of
defined entities rather than external relations and interactions).
There are two opposed camps within studies of autonomous development. Renfrew
presented the 'establishment' case, in which the local elite were seen as managers promoting
social development. For example he stressed the importance of local trajectories of social
development based on generalising anthropological models of chiefdom society developed in
the United States (1973, 540-43). He explained the changes in Neolithic and Early Bronze
Age Wessex as a transformation from group orientated chiefdoms with communal burials and
henge monuments, giving way to individualising chiefdoms characterised by individual elite
burial witth prestige goods. In this model Renfrew accepts Childe's view of the chiefly elite
as the dynamic force in social change (Rowlands 1984, 149) but here the similarity ends.
Whilst Childe was trying to pinpoint a key episode in European development (albeit against
a background of economic stages), Renfrew was profoundly influenced by the theories of the
New Archaeology and viewed Wessex society as a functional system. Thus although his
approach to the Neolithic and Early Bronze Age is consistent with changing western attitudes
towards empires and colonisation, he retains a belief in the functional rather than exploitative
aspects of social elites.
In contrast, Gilman (1981) views the local elite as parasites. His neo-Marxist approach
stresses the importance of the organisation of subsistence production. The desire of certain
individuals to dominate social groups is taken as a natural human trait, and Gilman suggests
that the adoption in the Neolithic of capital intensive subsistence production made the
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segmentation and fission of communities less attractive thereby removing the mechanism by
which self aggrandizement had been previously checked. This development led to the
establishment of parasitical hereditary elites (Ibid 4-5). This vision of regionally evolving
Bronze Age societies has been elaborated by Binuiff, who emphasizes the long term, cyclical
route of social development (1984, 29-30).
Prestige Goods Systems (Neo-Diffusionism)
This model reflects a concern with global relations of dominance and control in the
post-colonial era, emphasizing core/periphery roles. Developed from neo-Marxist
anthropological theory it has become a widely adopted model which rejects the primary
importance of autonomous development but retains elements of the systems functionalism of
the New Archaeology. The locus of social change is seen to be inter-elite competition
associated with pan-European systems of alliances and networks based on the exchange of
prestige goods. Thus for Rowlands the hierarchical nature of Bronze Age society depended
'directly on the manipulation of relations of circulation and exchange and not on control of
production per se' (1980, 46). Elite exchange is also viewed as a force for economic
development. He writes:
The exchange of weapons, ornaments and livestock for example ...operates as a kind
of pump to stimulate the production of food and other forms of surplus, (ibid).
In a developed version of Childe's dependency model Britain is seen as part of a regional
economy spreading over much of Europe. Describing the situation in the ninth century B.C.
Rowlands comments:
such systems never appear to develop in isolation but as peripheries in the expansion
of more dominant communities or semi-commercial state systems, in this case the
Near East and the later Mediterranean world, (ibid 47)
This concentration on the role of the elite and on interregional contacts currently forms the
most widely accepted way of looking at Bronze Age society. Shennan writes:
One could say with little exaggeration that the archaeology of the earlier Bronze Age
is the archaeology of its prestige artefacts and the rituals in the course of which they
were deposited (in Champion et al 1984, 221).
It is illuminating to observe the way in which scholars hop about from culture to culture in
attempting to pinpoint the leading and most powerful social unit (see for example Bradley's
treatment of the decline of Wessex and the rise of the Thames valley in the later Bronze Age
(1980, 64-9), and Shennan's notion of peripheralisation in the same context (1986, 146)).
This interpretative slant is clearly related to the traditional historical approach to nationalism
and power politics. The visibility of elite status symbols determines those societies which are
perceived as successful, important and consequently worthy of study (see for example Daniel
1975, 372).
Peer Polity Interaction
The concept of peer polity interaction (P.P.I.) has recently been proclaimed as a bridge between
the conflicting models of autonomous development and neo-diffusionism (Renfrew and Cherry
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1986, 152). In fact Renfrew strips the critical element from both models - namely the concern
with the nature of political and economic power - leaving only a politically 'neutral' husk
which is in reality ideologically capitalist in terms of its assumptions (see Roskams this
volume). The full range of interactions taking place between adjacent autonomous polities
(particularly at elite level) is ascribed an important role in determining social change. For
Renfrew this is a development of his "Cognitive Archaeology" in which universal mental
concepts could be recognised through material symbolism (Renfrew 1982a). He writes that
in studies of P.P.1. 'The intention is to develop a cross-cultural approach, with the hope of
obtaining general insights' (1986, 18). In contrast to the core/periphery model however,
relations of dominance between polities are seen as one of a range of possible interchanges,
thus demoting the significance of the neo-Marxist concern with power relations between
cultures. As with Hodder's work the structuralist influence is evident in the emphasis on
individual perceptions and actions; a basic question posed by the concept of P.P.1. being:
'Who impresses whom, and how, and what effect does that have upon the future actions of
both?' (Renfrew 1986, 18).
Shennan's work provides the most important application of this approach in Bronze Age
studies in his consideration of the Beaker problem (but see also Lamberg-Karlovsky 1981).
He hypothesises that the occurrence of Beaker cultures across much of Europe was not the
result of movement of peoples but of the spread of ideas and ideology marking a changed
form of hierarchy and control (in Champion et al 1984, 211). He observes that the
accompanying expansion of social hierarchy was the result of:
A convergence of local trajectories and an interaction between them, based on the
influence of a widespread ideology and subsequent elite interactions which followed
from it (ibid 221).
Unlike the heroic and neo-diffusionist models of the Bronze Age which treat the elite as if
they have an independent existence, Shennan considers Neolithic and Early Bronze Age
ideology in terms of its power to legitimate social inequalities. For example he interprets the
construction of ceremonial monuments in Wessex and Brittany as an attempt at elite
legitimation by masking social hierarchy. He contrasts Athis with the ideology developed in
central Europe which was based on elite display, exemplified by rich individual burial. This
overt form of expression was ideologically more robust (although it could lead to intra elite
competition for prestige artefacts) and eventually superseded the use of group ceremonial
monuments in Wessex (Shennan 1982, 158).
The main question which is deliberately shirked by Renfrew and Cherry is the extent to
which PP1 was a major cause of change in social relations, or whether it was a mechanism
used by local "decision makers" to reinforce their position: whilst Shennan argues that the
"Beaker kit" acquired an inherent value which actually changed power relations in society,
Bradley and Chapman suggest that the adoption of common symbols and monuments in the
Neolithic and Early Bronze Age represented '...the use of polity interaction by local elites to
develop their own political power' (Shennan 1986, 146; Bradley and Chapman 1986, 135).
*****
To what extent have such generalizing approaches, with their potential for wide ranging
discourse, permeated Bronze Age studies at the level of local archaeology?
Field Archaeology operates at several different levels and has a number of facets. Unlike
university departments, where research and debate are of considerable importance, it is more
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directly responsible to the state, serving various establishment expectations at the local,
regional, and national level. The full time fieldworker remains largely concerned with data
gathering and management and derives his/her models of the past from academic synthesis.
Although they tend not to follow every fashion and trend in theoretical archaeology, changes
in approach have occurred since World War II.
For example by the early 1980's there had been a profound change in the attitude of the
CBA from its 1948 policy statement (Thomas 1983). The document contains seven sections
divided not chronologically but by categories such as aerial archaeology, historic buildings,
and archaeological science. This emphasis on technique, methodology, and the form of the
evidence appears to take priority over its content (cf Bintliff 1986, 14-17). The Bronze Age
is included in the section entitled 'Research objectives in the countryside', although in
common with other prehistoric periods it is hardly discussed. Instead a number of pan-chronic
themes are outlined as general research considerations eg population levels, settlement
hierarchy, land use and allotment and site catchment analysis (Thomas 1983, 21). Great
concern is also given to the conservation of the archaeological heritage by active land
management (ibid 25).
The Prehistoric Society underwent a similar change in attitude. In the first volume of the
Proceedings, Childe's paper stressed the importance of historical order and temporal sequence,
culture definition and diffusion (1935, 1, 3, 12-13), and the Bronze Age has an important
role in this perspective. In contrast, the 1984 paper entitled 'Prehistory, priorities and Society:
the way forward' states:
Our first priority is to recommend the adoption of a coherent preservation policy for
monuments and historic landscapes throughout the United Kingdom (Prehistoric
Society 1984, 438).
Fieldwork policy forms only one of seven sections of the report and is predominantly
concerned with forms of evidence such as wet sites, colluvium and alluvium covered sites,
and landscapes. Bronze Age burial monuments are briefly considered in the context of
environmental and dating evidence, and the place of ritual monuments in the landscape is
also mentioned (ibid 440). There is however no elaboration of fundamental research directions
or objectives.
Clearly both the CBA and the Prehistoric Society were faced with the difficult task of
reaching a consensus view from the competing approaches and interest groups, and they chose
1) to play down or leave implicit the central role of time depth and chronology; 2) to reject
an overtly theoretical approach (although economic and systems models are enmeshed in the
ragbag of themes presented by the CBA); and 3) partly to provide common ground between
archaeologists, the importance of preserving the data base was given prominence.
Thus by the early 1980's the ahistorical approach to fieldwork had apparently triumphed
in the archaeological establishment; the Bronze Age along with other temporal divisions in
prehistory were largely deposited on the scrap heap. To what extent is this attitude reflected
in the approach of the local fieldworker in today's units, county planning offices and
museums? It is fair to say that most local fieldworkers have not been profoundly influenced
by the New Archaeology and its aftermath (Pryor 1980, 486) and they continue the traditions
of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth century. Barrow excavation is carried out usually
in the antiquarian mould of single monument investigation (although now almost invariably
in response to threat). Barrow chronology remains a central concern as it has from the
mid-nineteenth century, although C14 dating offers new possibilities for the absolute dating
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of artefact typology and culture complexes (Barrett and Bradley 1980a). Reflecting more
recent concerns for economy and environment is the use of barrow excavation for the
reconstruction of landscape history from the molluscs or pollen in the buried soil.
The importance of settlement evidence has also long been recognized and recent years have
seen several notable excavations (eg Barrett and Bradley 1980, vol 2 passim). But it is in
Bronze Age landscape studies that field archaeologists have made the biggest strides.
Developing the geographically based tradition of Crawford, Grinsell, and Fox, recent
approaches have concentrated on defining settlement territories and land divisions in order to
reconstruct economic and social units (eg Ellison 1981, Wainwright et al 1979-81). Given the
geographical limitations of most local fieldworkers their studies are almost invariably
concerned with data gathering from individual sites, or landscapes arbitrarily divided into
modern administrative boundaries. Thus relatively few areas offer the environmental or
archaeological diversity appropriate to the analysis of local trajectories of social change. As
a consequence, locally generated studies are not usually characterised by the application of
specific theories or models. This is exemplified by a recent synthesis of the Bronze Age
evidence for Hampshire by two local fieldworkers. The writers hedge their theoretical bets
by presenting an outline for the period in the county based on accepted chronology, followed
by the examination of the evidence for selected themes such as environment, settlement and
subsistence economy (Fasham and Schadla-Hall 1981, 32-3).
A notable theoretically orientated local fieldwork policy document is that prepared for
Wessex by Ellison (Wessex Archaeological Committee 1981). She proposed a number of
thematically organized regional projects based on sub-systems such as subsistence, exchange,
ideology, etc. Five major projects were suggested, each period based. One is entitled 'Neolithic
and Bronze Age settlements and their associated landscapes', which incorporates the sub-
system elements of subsistence, population, and social organisation. Proposed activities
included fieldwalking, survey and excavation in the areas of the main barrow cemeteries and
Stonehenge (ibid 14-16). Additionally a rank order of site importance is presented, compiled
from Groube's analysis of research priorities for Dorset. Of 28 possible categories, 'later
Bronze Age enclosures and fields' rate equal fourth; 'Bronze and Iron Age linear earthworks'
lie seventh; whilst a 'single bowl barrow' lies miserably at the bottom of the list below the
'average medieval urban site' (ibid 11). Despite the reservations one might have about the
now dated sub-systems model invoked, this polilcy represents a bold attempt by a Bronze
Age specialist to marry a theoretical approach with the practical considerations of field
archaeology.
The bulk of fieldwork however is single site orientated as a scan of the papers in the
Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society demonstrates, and in contrast to the impression given
in the policy documents of the CBA and the Prehistoric Society, the Bronze Age retains an
identity at the level of local studies, albeit an unhappy blend of typology, culture history, and
economic analysis. But in the later 1980's the situation may be rapidly changing. With the
effective reduction of central government funding for fieldwork, and the cash squeeze on local
authorities, resources increasingly have to be obtained from developers or central government
employment schemes. The result is that non-archaeological factors such as site location and
prestige are becoming vitally important in resource allocation, inevitably leading to diminished
emphasis on overall research objectives and a widening gulf between the field unit and the
university.4
Perhaps even more damaging to local Bronze Age studies is the concept of the historic
environment which arose in response to the destruction of monuments and historic landscapes
since the war. Directed largely by central government via the various monument protection
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and scheduling programmes, and supported in many county planning offices, it rapidly gained
ground in the 1970's and 80's. It represents a cheap alternative to the Rescue ethos (an
attractive proposition for state based organizations), concentrating on landscape conservation
and monument management (Hughes and Rowley 1986). The great danger of this approach
is that the record of past human activity becomes transformed into a static ahistoric landscape:
a theme park of interesting lumps and bumps to be enjoyed as leisure experience (Bintliff
1986, 16-7, but cf Baker 1983, 10).
To a lesser extent Museums have also been affected by the increased importance of
generalizing approaches. By and large they have retained their traditional role as interpreters
and presenters of national and regional history and culture, but recent museum practice has
increasingly involved more adventurous display technique and the adoption of themes to
make the past more intelligible to the non-specialist. There are two trends apparent in this
approach: Firstly, the dressing up of culture history in more fashionable clothes in which the
Bronze Age may get only a passing glance. This was exemplified at the very successful
exhibition at the British Museum entitled 'Archaeology in Britain since 1945'. The prehistoric
themes included 'A way of life preserved 4000-1200 BC', concerning waterlogged sites; and
'Landscapes through time 3200 BC-1100 AD'. Secondly, the incorporation of different
models of the Bronze Age; a clear case of this approach was the recent exhibition at the
National Museum of Scotland called 'Symbols of power at the time of Stonehenge' at which
the nature of power in the Bronze Age was directly compared to status and hierarchy in
modem Western society. The model used was a generalizing one: that the prestige goods of
the Neolithic and Bronze Age served fundamentally similar purposes as modern status symbols
such as televisions, cars, and uniforms (Clarke, this vol.; Clarke, Cowie and Foxton 1985,
5-6). For the spectator this presentation cast light in two directions: on the one hand it served
to bring life to prehistoric people by correlating ancient material remains with symbols familiar
to the viewer. As with the British Museum exhibition this lies within the historicist scope of
'lifeways'. On the other hand it showed modern symbols in an almost dialectical perspective.
The impact of this approach can be gauged by the reactions aired in the letters' page of Current
Archaeology. In response to criticism of the exhibition Frankland writes:
It caused a dialectical approach to the objects. Instead of being described, people
began to interact with them and began to understand them in terms of their own
condition. Given this interpretation, an interpretation very much related to 1986,
many thousands of people were able to see the relevance of archaeology to today
(1986, 191).
The authors of the exhibition considered in some detail the historical context of social change
in the Late Neolithic and earlier Bronze Age, using the most up to date syntheses. Additionally
the period was used as a case study illustrating general principles about social hierarchy. This
aspect of the exhibition moves rather close to an ahistorical framework in which Bronze Age
remains represent little more than attractive artefacts and structures illustrative of general
principles.
The New Culture History
The Culture History approach, perhaps with less emphasis on external relationships, looks set
for a big comeback, spearheaded by two ill-suited bedfellows: the first being a reflection of
ideological changes within the elite stratum in the First World, the second being a reaction
to these changes.
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The ascendent ideology in the West lays emphasis on the concept of the competitive
individual, exemplified by the call for a return to Victorian values in the U.K. The idea of
heroic society encapsulates these attributes in a pristine form and therefore one might expect
scholars to indulge in the renewed exploration (and for some, the elaboration) of this model.
We also live in a time of heightened nationalistic feeling, where the government wishes to
see kings and queens and historical dates brought to the fore of history teaching. In this climate
it is likely that changes occurring in the Bronze Age will be included in the search for a British
identify. For example one can forsee a renewed debate in which one side stresses cultural
continuity from the Neolithic whilst the other sees the later Bronze Age as the decisive time
(cf Ashbee 1978; Burgess 1980, 353-4). Furthermore in parallel with this trend one might see
an increase in studies with no explicitly theoretical base, eg art, metalwork, and ceramic style,
etc(cfWilk 1985, 318).5
The second new historicist approach emphasizes the role of individual action and perception
in a more self-aware fashion. This echoes the values of Post-modernism (see Januszcak 1986)
and arguably represents a retreat from the positivist approach of generalising models in such
concerns as group interaction and economic forces. It is most clearly espoused by Hodder
who has recently suggested a return to the theories of R G Collingwood (Hodder 1986). In
this model social change is seen largely as created by individuals within society rather than
pre-determined by ecological factors or imposed from outside by "society" (ibid 89-90).
Hodder emphasizes that every cultural sequence is specific and unique, and that archaeological
explanation should be directed towards reconstructing and interpreting the origins and nature
of prehistoric societies. Influenced by structuralist concepts he criticizes the New Archaeology
and previous culture history for failing to consider the symbolic dimension of material culture.
Thus on the one hand simplistic correlations were drawn between technology and economy,
and social reality: whilst on the other hand the meaning of explicitly symbolic activities such
as ritual and religion were perceived as unknowable. Hodder suggests that with sufficient
consideration of the particular cultural context of archaeological phenomena seen against their
historical background, both tendencies can be corrected.
A particularly important aspect of this thesis is his treatment of ideology. This he defines
as
...that component of symbol-systems most closely involved with the negotiation of
power from varying points of interest within society(ibid 69).
This is rather different to the eotne dimensional approach to ideology inherent in the heroic
model. For Hodder this aspect can ebeeest be explored through study of the 'context of
historical meanings' (ibid 76).
For the purposes of the present discussion it is appropriate to speculate how the Bronze
Age might be tackled by this new historicism. One might expect Childe's suggestion of
distinctive European traits to be elaborated. The data might also be trawled again for the
precursors of Celtic cultural forms. In contrast to the standard heroic model, attention would
be paid to interactions between the various groups in society as manifested in symbolic
systems. This might be undertaken by examining settlement forms (eg Drewett 1980), or
pottery and metalwork styles. Whilst the technology, typology and cultural influences of metal
implements have been the subject of much previous study, increasing attention is being paid
to their symbolic qualities. For example it has been proposed by Needham that axes acquired
a special meaning in the Neolithic. The context of a number of bronze hoards suggests that
this meaning may have been carried forward into the Bronze Age. As Barrett has pointed
out, this phenomenon may be contrasted with the value system associated with bronze daggers
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which occur more frequently in burial contexts (Barrett in Clarke et al 1985, 184, Gourlay
and Barrett 1984).
Burials offer particular scope for Hodder's approach, possessing a variable combination of
symbolic contexts: artefactual, structural, and topographical. Thus to take a simple example
- the Bush Barrow, a large barrow located one mile south of Stonehenge containing a rich
grave assemblage has been interpreted as the burial of a paramount chief of Wessex, possibly
the individual who instigated the construction of Stonehenge III (Ashbee 1978, 23-4). For a
more developed version of this approach one might cite Bradley's comparison between the
Wessex barrows and the Deverel Rimbury cemeteries. He observes:
The patterns of intervisibility among the downland barrows surely symbolise the
extensive exchange networks of the social elites, just as the less prominent siting of
the cremation cemeteries may match the more enclosed world of the ordinary
settlements. Indeed, the small 'family' clusters may reflect the structure of the rural
workforce. (1981, 102; see also Ellison 1981, 432-3).
Similarly he contrasts the permanently visible display of the barrows of the Wessex elite with
the often lavish but evanescent water deposited funerary assemblages of the Thames Valley.
This, he suggests, may represent different attitudes to continuity and ancestry (Bradley 1984,
13). Clearly there is great scope within the period for the detailed study of such aspects within
their extended cultural matrix.6
Conclusion
It is apparent that to some extent Bronze Age studies can be seen as a barometer of the
immediate political and economic concerns of Western society - as Wilk (1985) has suggested
for Mayan studies. Equally important however is the way in which it has been used to address
the issue of social relations at a more profound level. This is perhaps true for every period
division, each one offering different grist to the same interpretative mill. Roman Studies for
example provide special opportunities for examining large scale state structures, the problems
concomitant with empires, etc. The special quality of the Bronze Age utilized this century is
its capacity for exploring the qualities and characteristics of leadership within capitalist society
(that this association is being lost to the Neolithic has already been mentioned - see
introduction and note 1). Thus despite fifty years of debate, elite dynamics are as important
to Renfrew and Bradley as they were to Childe and Piggott. This fundamental concern with
social relations should not become overshadowed by more ephemeral (although important)
matters, or by changes in the ways in which the underlying questions are analyzed.
To accept that all approaches are products of contemporary ideology does not mean that
responsibility for assessing their contribution can be abrogated7 although a good measure of
subjectivity and hindsight is inevitable. Typological study, for long the basis of Bronze Age
studies, has consumed enormous quantities of scholastic energy, but has been hampered by
implicit assumptions about the significance of technological stages and progressive develop-
ment. To a great extent it is a passive approach which has done little to stimulate new methods
of enquiry, and now rightly forms one of a whole battery of analytical techniques available
to the student..
It is difficult not to be harsh on the Celtic/heroic model. It has proved to be an enduring
concept, but a very selective one. Its interest in the elite and with cultural diffusion was largely
satisfied by burial data, which led to something approaching sterility in field archaeology (a
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situation not reflected in Neolithic and Iron Age studies). Furthermore the lack of debate over
the basic principles ascribed to Bronze Age society was a severe drawback to the development
of ideas.
Thus the developments of the past twenty years can be viewed as very healthy, with an
active concern for the full range of information: burial, settlement hierarchy, agrarian
landscapes, etc, and a wide ranging set of interpretative models to foster new methods and
increasingly detailed and precise cultural sequences. In fact it is increasingly said that the
pendulum has swung too far and there are now too many competing models. Perhaps the
time has come to take stock and search for common ground amongst the different
perspectives.8
Lewthwaite has asserted that archaeologists must:
...concentrate on 'tinkering' with a few well chosen models in order to achieve solid
if unspectacular success through a series of infinitesimally small adjustments to some
sort of given 'asset' (1986, 82).
How might this 'asset' achieve coherence in studies of the period in question? Three common
areas might be discerned: -
Firstly there is the delineation of culture development. Hodder's emphasis on specific
culture sequences is an important corrective to some of the ahistorical generalisations of the
New Archaeology. In essence this approach concerns the study of change in terms of
individual and group interactions. Although this may involve the analysis of long chronolog-
ical sequences, the focus of investigation remains the cultural matrix.
The second area concerns long term evolutionary trajectories. Although the nineteenth
century concept of linear progress in social evolution is no longer accepted, empirical
observation of the evidence demonstrates a progressive (if cyclical) development in population
levels, social complexity, and technology. Research relevant to this field includes environ-
mental, demographic, and economic studies, designed to chart detailed patterns of settlement
and subsistence and the monitoring of cycles of expansion and contraction. Ironically this is
the very type of work which local archaeologists are increasingly unable to undertake.
A third area exists at the point where the first two perspectives coalesce. It concerns the
occurrence of general patterns and regularities in social evolution. Although Hodder implies
that culture is adaptively blind and directionless, the long term perspective indicates that there
are underlying general processes at work. It is suggested that the more sophisticated
delineation of culture sequence might be used as an interpretative counterpoint to the
empirically observed long term trends. Thus one could focus on the relationship between
apparently significant cultural changes (such as the introduction of the Beaker complex or the
rise of hillforts) and long term demographic and subsistence change.9
In this manner it may be possible to throw new light on possible correlations between the
restructuring of social relations and economic change, and to abandon the conceptual s
traight-jacket of the three age system.
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Notes
1. For example, hierarchical social differentiation, traditionally viewed as the central feature of Bronze
Age society has been traced back into the Neolithic:- The occurrence of the full range of Early
Bronze Age burial rites in the 4th and 3rd millennium has recently been recognized (Kinnes 1979,
73), and many scholars have placed emphasis on the non-egalitarian nature of Neolithic prestige
artefacts and social interactions (see for example Sherratt 1976). One consequence is a growing
feeling that the importance of bronze especially in the early period, has been considerably
overemphasized in the past (Rowlands 1984, 150).
2. A less scholarly but similar vision of Wessex society is presented by Crampton (1967). The
dustjacket reads: 'This was a warrior society, living by War and pillage and death, with kings and
chiefs and serfs...'
3. Sonia Hawkes relates this contrast to agriculturalist/pastoral communities. She writes that the
Neolithic fertility cult: '...is in stark contrast with a new symbolism, that of the male sky god soon
to be introduced into Britain by the invaders of the Bronze Age. The one is seen here to be
characteristic of peasant communities, probably originally matriarchal in their organisation; the other
of strongly patriarchal nomadic pastoralists' (1945, 17).
4. Thus for example a City of London site scheduled for development by a national company is more
likely to attract funding than a cropmark site being destroyed by deep ploughing.
It will be most interesting to compare the Wessex policy document referred to above with the
new version currently in preparation. One might speculate that it will shy away from broad economic
and social research questions and concentrate more on fund-raising concerns, eg liaison with
developers, display, and public profile. One might also expect the provision of a more community
based service examining local developments in a cultural historical context. Site specific investiga-
tion may also come to the fore in favour of landscape analysis; and the relatively wealthy urban
centres, large and small, might also expect to be targeted.
5. This might be seen as a side effect of the growing "art as commodity" trend, the archaeological
respectability of which is epitomised by Grahame Clark's recent offering (1986).
6. Neo-Marxists are also coming to perceive the significance of using the material symbolism of elite
ideology as a means of analysing social relations, although the importance of economic factors in
the relationships between social groups is stressed, as are external power relations (Kristiansen
1984, 756; Spriggs 1984, 6).
7. Thus for example we can see the power of alternative archaeology, yet at the same time reject its
legitimacy as a view of the past. Although it is a recent development, its roots lie in the Romantic
movement. A number of variants exist including dowsing, leys, geomancy, and para-astronomy,
but a unifying theme is that of an ancient harmony between prehistoric communities and the
"natural" world, which was destroyed by the advent of materialist values (Chippindale 1983, 247).
From this standpoint orthodox archaeologists represent 'unconscious apologists for industrial
civilisation' (Chippindale 1983, 248 quoting Thompson 1978), Piggott's heroic warriors or Briard's
proto-capitalist scrap-metal merchants perpetuating the myth of an uncivilised primitive and
acquisitive prehistory. Although alternative archaeology has predictably been castigated for creating
a 'World that never was' (Burl and Mitchell 1983, 18), it should not be dismissed too lightly.
Indeed a similar sentimentalised view of Aegean prehistory was a powerful influence on mainstream
archaeology until relatively recently (Bintliff 1984a). What this phenomenon shows us is the way
in which our models and perceptions about the past are embedded in contemporary ideology and
the "negotiation of power". This was graphically demonstrated at Stonehenge in 1986 when the
combined forces of the state (including the archaeological establishment) and the media, created
folk devils .out of a relatively small group of people attempting to follow a non-competitive,
harmonious lifestyle in opposition to the 'heroic' values of Thatcher's Britain.
8. This approach relates strongly to the 'Modernist' stance which seeks consensus between competing
views, and rational discourse and the testing of norms leading to the qualitative development of
knowledge (Habermas 1975, Jameson 1984, X).
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9. This is based on Braudel's structured approach to historical analysis which stresses the integration
of the general and the particular (Braudel 1980, and see Bintliff, this volume).
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Living in Interesting Times:
Archaeology as Society's Mirror
James Lewthwaite
Bradford University
Introduction
In this paper I wish to take up and develop further certain points made in an earlier NUARS
context (Lewthwaite 1986). The proposition in question is that since we live, in accordance
with the well-known Chinese curse, 'in interesting times', we are both obliged and peculiarly
privileged to be conscious constantly of our own historicality and therefore variously drawn
or driven to reflection on prior, in a sense alternative, states, indeed to contemplation of the
historical process as such. As archaeologists professionally bound to ask 'how may we acquire
true knowledge of the past?' we are now much less likely to put our faith in naive realism
following the demise of positivism, but as post-positivists we seem as yet unprepared to
accept that there can never be a knowledge 'true' for all times and circumstances, i.e.
unprepared for historical relativism. Perhaps we ought rather to consider ourselves as
'translators' condemned in perpetuity to a Sisyphean servitude; revising the translation of
past into present meaning.
There are as many definitions of 'positivism' as authors who have discussed it; in any case,
the term has come to be used almost entirely by its opponents, as invective (cf Bintliff, this
vol., note 4). To my mind, the best way to grasp the spirit of positivism is not through an
exhaustive list of its attributes (preference for analysis over synthesis, for form over content,
for the context of verification (sensu Reichenbach) over that of discovery) as much as through
its preference for a visual metaphor for comprehension, its equation of knowledge with
perception: sight is science. In effect, the positivist asserts that he can see things as they really
are (or were) and that what cannot be seen is in any case not worth seeing, being metaphysical:
the dominant image is that of a photograph of reality. Meaning is therefore apprehended in
terms of 'etic' categories imposed by the observer: in our case, typically through reference
to a scheme of stages of human progress achieved through the mastery of cognitive and
technical skills. The meaning of acts for the actor is deemed irrelevant. A celebrated case of
this is Childe's insistence that the magical ritual accompanying the fashioning of a flint knife,
being bad science, meant nothing for his project (Childe 1956, 171). The absurdity of
positivism has been demonstrated, most ironically, by progress in the psychology of perception
(the Rorschach test being the example most familiar to the man in the street), that is to say,
by science. For as Heelan points out, 'visual perception - and, by analogy, all perception -is
hermeneutic as well as causal' (Heelan 1983, 181) '... the "text" which science "reads" is an
artefact of scientific culture, caused to be "written" by nature on human instruments within
the controlled context of a scientific environment' (Heelan 1983, 182), '... the perceptual
hermeneutical process of scientific observation is thus a horizon- or World-building process;
it is reality in the process of constitution' (Heelan 1983, 195).
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Moreover, it is worth recalling that the greatest, the most creative, scientists have been those
who were without doubt the most conscious of the meaning of their discoveries for their
contemporaries (sc. Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Einstein) i.e. the most metaphysical. In any
case, even archaeology appears to be struggling free from this reversion to a pre-Kantian
empiricism, if somewhat belatedly.
The humanities are regaining ground lost to science, or rather to a certain caricature of
genuine science; in archaeology this takes the form of the resurgence of the historical idealism
of previous generations of scholars (cf Bintliff this vol), identified with the constructionist (or
constructivist) mode of knowing. A more appropriate metaphor for this mode would be that
of a painter attempting to construct a likeness of a subject faithful to the original, capturing
the "character" or "personality" rather than merely the profile, despite the singular inconve-
nience of the sitter's being hidden behind a screen and assisting the artist in his interpretation
only by answering such specific questions as are put to him (and in an unfamiliar tongue, to
boot). Clearly, the accuracy of the outcome would depend as much on the artist's capacity
for rational enquiry (interrogation) as on his craft skill in translating the resultant idea onto
canvas; in marked contrast to the "photographic" metaphor of positivism, the enterprise would
be achieved by the active reasoning of the artist. (As Kuzminski (1976, 132-3) has noted,
this concept of the artist as a skilled interpreter has ceased to be familiar precisely because
of the intrusion of scientism into the arts).
In plain language, the constructivist builds up a model of reality through the logic of
question-and-answer, until he is compelled by the evidence to accept a certain interpretation
which is in no way "given" by the brute "facts" of the case. In this respect, as Knorr (1979)
has shown, the constructivist prehistorian is not so very different from the scientist: both are
analytical hermeneuticians, even if their respective rhetorics differ!
However, the very triumph of anti- and post-positivism has occasioned unease in some
quarters, not only because of the sheer diversity of approaches being touted (sc. Marxism,
humanism, idealism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism and any number of com-
binations thereof). Awkward questions have begun to be asked: how exactly can the individual
scholar be so sure that he has constructed a true likeness of some past reality? How can he
expect to convince others of the validity of his construction? How can a community of scholars
be expected to reach agreement when a plurality of constructions gives rise to controversy?
(cf Bintliff this vol.) As this problematic is only just becoming perceptible to prehistorians,
and as, moreover, the critical mass of this scholarly community is in any case relatively
small, I make no apologies for referring in what follows to the conclusions of historians and
philosophers of history, not as a substitute for but as a stimulus towards debate in archaeology.
Constructionism in History as a Model for Prehistory
Nothing better indicates the essentially derivative nature of the New Archaeology than its
strident advocacy of Hempelian positivism (CLM) and Humean causality, operationalised in
the search for law-like statements of ever greater sweep, just as historians were tiring of such
a posture (Murphey 1986, 46). Thus Golob (1980, 57) observes:
But the great positivist debate actually went the other way. The autonomy of history
became evident in the very fact of the failure of the positivist takeover bid. There
was in fact a slow and quiet convergence among serious historians, a tacit shedding
of the preordained causal sequences and ineluctable regularities, a search in all
branches of the discipline for the way people small and great thought and enacted
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their thoughts in daily living, in processes of long duration as well as in periods of
intense crisis; a seeking after consciousness, mentality, or even mentalité. The
positivist-idealist debate finally lagged not... because historians could not agree, but
because they began to agree, and the influence of positivism rapidly waned.
The philosopher of science Stephen Toulmin (1977, 144-5) concurs:
By 1976, the pursuit of abstract and universal ideas has become curiously out of
fashion, as compared with the concrete analysis of particular historicocultural
episodes and situations. Mere formalism no longer seems of deep interest, at least
when divorced from considerations of function; and the minutiae of disciplinary
expertise need to be explicated and justified, by being applied to specific instances
and cases. Nowadays, we seek to develop not so much timeless theories about the
general nature of "social groups" and "social action" as historical insights into the
character and experience of this or that human group or collectivity; to grasp not so
much the general statics of cultural equilibrium as the dynamics of particular cultural
changes; to achieve not so much the formal rigour of axiomatic systems as the
practical testability and computability of programs and algorithms... we have in this
way achieved some kind of "relevance" to the fact of human experience, and we
derive a new kind of intellectual satisfaction from the "concreteness" of the resulting
discoveries. That satisfaction no longer rests on any formal, Cartesian warranty of
deductive necessity; rather it comes from a Viconian assurance that we have
succeeded in coming to grips with human actualities.
With the demise of positivism, historians have turned to a greater or lesser extent to the
constructivist mode of knowing.
The Construction of Historical Facts
The basis of Collingwoodian constructionism consists of a rebuttal of the common-sense
fallacy of knowing (naive realism). Its foremost contemporary advocate, Leon Goldstein,
argues thus:
It seems clear that everything we can come to say about the historical past emerges
entirely within the framework of historical knowing. Every attempt to subject to
verificational test the claims that historians make requires that the procedures which
led to the claims in the first place be repeated. There seems to be no way to the
referent of an historical assertion except by means of the procedures of historical
constitution themselves (Goldstein 1977, 51).
Central to these procedures is the method of question-and-answer. Golob (1980, 60) sums up
the method thus:
But historical events cannot be observed like mountains or cows... Historical inquiry,
like all other inquiry, is a matter of asking questions about evidence, initial questions
which frame the inquiry and subsequent questions which, as they proceed from each
other, constitute the inquiry, and their answers the narrative. Thus the direction and
context of the narrative depends on the kind of framing question that is asked.
In short, naive realism errs in supposing that the past is directly accessible to us:
'At no point does nature break into our consciousness -if that makes any sense -to
present itself unmediated by methodologies of knowing' (Goldstein 1977, 47).
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A corollary which is more disturbing for realists is the inadequacy of the correspondence
compared with the coherence definition of truth. W H Walsh (1977, 54) argues the case for
coherence thus:
Historical facts are not so much discovered as arrived at by processes of argument,
and the question whether we can accept something as fact is the question whether
we can fit it in with other conclusions to which we have already committed ourselves,
or can fit it in without disturbing these conclusions to an undue extent... In history,
far more than in perceptual situations, it is possible to argue that we accept or reject
suggested truths not by confronting each of them directly with reality, but by thinking
about their coherence with the rest of our beliefs.
This sounds alarmingly like an equation of facticity with the certitude of the historian in his
own speculative construct. In fact, the constructionist must accept as factual, following
Oakeshott, 'what the evidence obliges us to believe'. As Walsh (1977, 54) put it:
We try to reconstitute the past on the basis of the evidence we now have, but it is
not a question of making our constructions conform to the latter as independent fact.
Rather what we have to do is think out a hypothesis about the nature of past fact
which will allow us to take the evidence for what it is and offer a connected account
of what it is.
The Construction of Historical Consensus?
The weakness of constructionism lies in its inability to specify a mode of reaching
intersubjective consensus among a community of scholars except through a sort of reciprocal,
iterative rethinking by one individual of another's labours, a sort of silent exchange of each
other's intellectual washing. Thus Goldstein argues that rethinking rather than debate is the
appropriate procedure for the testing of all hypotheses, one's own and one's colleagues': 'the
procedures whereby we come to know about the historical past are always cognitive-
constructive; the testing of our conclusions usually requires that the procedures of historical
thinking - inquiry be done again' (Goldstein 1977, 35);
If an historian wants to determine whether a colleague has reasoned truly in the only
sense of the phrase that can be interpreted by a methodologist of history, he must
simply go through the thinking himself. That enables him to think whether, given
the evidence and the ways in which historians think about evidence of that sort, the
conclusions he is examining are sound (Goldstein 1977, 33).
As a result, he (Goldstein 1977, 43) comes to the rather depressing conclusion that 'for
whatever reasons, some historical conclusions will seem to the community of scholars better
than others that have been proposed, and these latter will simply be dropped too'. Walsh
(1977, 55) at least recognizes that
One point which Goldstein stresses and which I and, I think, Collingwood overlooked
is that historical thought is carried on largely on a corporate rather than on an
individual basis. The consensus or near consensus of historians is important both
when it comes to saying what is to be explained and when we ask what explains it
indeed showing a certain complacency:
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If the "real" past eludes us, the whole point of history is to constitute an "historical"
past where authenticity will be recognised by the community of historians. And the
fact that historians do largely agree about the character of the human past shows that
this aspiration is successfully carried out (Walsh 1977, 58).
Is consensus, especially with the implication of finality, either feasible or desirable? An
alternative viewpoint is put forward by Golob (1980, 60): 'each age will rewrite history to
suit its needs, its questions, asked by minds differing through the very process of history from
those of times preceding. Disagreement and perpetual revision, far from being symptoms of
malaise, are in fact the evidence of historical study, and their presence is a sign of health'.
Ankersmit (1986, 24-5) develops this point further, into the 'proliferation thesis':
Philosophy and science in their epistemological cloak always "aimed at putting an
end to writing". If a problem has been solved, it was believed, writing about it comes
to an end; looking through writing at language, we now observe the workings of
nature and reality themselves. Especially in historiography, this picture is utterly
misleading. In historiography, "paradoxically, the more powerful and authoritative
an interpretation, the more writing it generates". The great books do not put an end
to an historical debate, do not give us the feeling that we now finally know how
things actually were in the past and that clarity has ultimately been achieved. On the
contrary: these books have proved to be the most powerful stimulators of the
production of more writing ...the truly interesting historical text does not "wipe itself
out" (by having removed a item from the list of historical problems) but has a
metaphysical relationship to itself... As I have pointed out elsewhere, if we have only
one historical interpretation of some historical topic, we have no interpretation. An
interpretative way of seeing the past can only be recognised as such in the presence
of more ways of seeing the past. Narrative interpretations mutually define each other
and therefore owe their identity to their "intertextual" relations. Consequently, a
maximum of clarity can only be obtained in historiography thanks to a proliferation
of historical interpretations and not by attempting to reduce their number. Historiog-
raphy can therefore never afford to become forgetful of its past; even past
interpretations which we reject at present should still be remembered in order to
define the identity of the interpretations we now prefer. The proliferation thesis thus
also requires us to respect the uniqueness and "difference" of each historical
interpretation.
Such a relativism is new and will be shocking to some: it is one thing to accept that, in
practice, scholars and schools of thought differ on account of all manner of idiosyncratic,
contingent, contextual, wissenschaftssoziologisch factors, while clinging to a notion of
objective Truth, quite another to admit the relativity of truth itself. Yet this, Walsh concludes,
is what constructionism à la Goldstein implies:
Truth, fact and knowledge will lose their total independence and become relative, in
part at least, to the conditions of particular cognitive situations: if what is true for
me remains true for you, unless you show that I am mistaken, that will be only so
far as we share fundamental ways of thinking and recognise the same initial data...
The problem of cultural relativism already threatens the notion of a single unchanging
truth, and though what we have here is clearly something different (since historians
of different generations would normally be thought as working within the same
cultural tradition), once absolute facts age, the way is open to a radically new
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conception of truth and fact generally...Goldstein's arguments point toward it even
if Goldstein himself does not examine the question (Walsh 1977, 70).
Recourse to Judgement
Such relativism does not commend itself to Golob, who leans to the more traditional concept
of judgement exercised by the professional scholar:
The fact that we do not always agree, I have argued following Collingwood, derives
from the nature of historical thinking itself, in its aspects of question-and-answer and
a priori imagination. We justify what we say by showing it is inferred from the
evidence; we explain by constructing narratives; and the principle of understanding
to which we make implicit appeal is not human causality but what Mink calls
"synoptic judgement", the kind of judgement we employ when a sequence has been
completed and when we grasp the interconnectedness among the elements of a picture
(Golob 1980, 61).
The trouble with this exhortation is its permeation by ambiguous visual metaphors: are we
meant to understand a purely internal scrutiny of the facts and logic of the case or are we
invited to perpetuate the fallacy of imagining ourselves outside and above the phenomena, in
a position to deliver a divinely correct judgement? Commenting on Nowell-Smith's recourse
to Collingwood's analogy of the detective solving a murder enquiry, Goldstein observes that:
What is important to ask about the example is whether it resembles the knowing
situation in which historians typically find themselves; and the answer is: no.
Nowell-Smith looks at the situations which make up his example from the outside:
he "observes" the witnessing of the act of murder, and he "observes" the detective
reconstructing it. The purpose of the example is to suggest that the detective knows
- in the end - what Nowell-Smith knows, but the example cannot show this. With
respect to the situation of the example, Nowell-Smith occupies a position which God
is said to occupy with respect to what goes on in the cosmos. The vantage point of
God would enable one to know that some event in the actual human past had precisely
the features that some subsequent historical reconstruction imputed to an event in the
human past; and for God, knowledge of the human past would not have to be
mediated by the discipline of history. But what features an historian felt impelled to
impute to the event he was reconstructing would be determined by an historian
working only within the framework represented by the detective's standpoint in the
example, not by that represented by Nowell-Smith's standpoint (Goldstein 1977,
37).
A divine judgement of a rational rather than visual nature is precisely that which is demanded
by Walsh (1977, 63-4):
One who says that historical events are constituent of historical judgement must
understand the latter in an impersonal sense... The subject of judgement... is the
Kantian unity of apperception, and this is not concrete but abstract. Insofar as each
of us thinks rationally he conforms his actual thinking to the ideal thought of which
the unity of apperception is the subject. To speak of judgement is thus to speak of
a proceeding which is logical rather than psychological, and which is accordingly
not peculiar to the personal history of a particular thinker... judgement has to do with
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mind as such or, in Kantian terminology, "consciousness in general"... What exists
in this objective sense, on this way of thinking, is not what is acknowledged or
concluded to by any actual thinkers, but what would be acknowledged or concluded
to by thought in its ideal form. Error consists of failing to attain this ideal: the Kantian
argument I have suggested, which connects the notion of established fact with that
of warranted judgement, but allows that particular thinkers on particular occasions
may fail to satisfy the requirements of judgement proper, is designed to provide for
this result... And the question about the status of the events which are historically
authenticated gets an answer: they are conclusions forced on us when we think as
we should and with all the resources we need (Walsh 1977, 67).
Walsh moreover places great faith in the competence of the community of scholars:
That there is wide and general agreement among competent scholars that such and
such an event took place will not prove that it did... (sc. but)... The presumption
must be that, given the right conditions... competent historians can be expected to
get things right, with the result that what is widely accepted in the historical
community must indeed have been the case. There may be special circumstances in
which historians fall into collective error. But such circumstances will be rare;
normally things will go right, and hence normally the past as constituted to the
satisfaction of the community of historians can be taken to be the past as it objectively
was (Walsh 1977, 65).
An unduly sanguine evaluation, others may think!
The classic forum for the exercise of collective judgement is of course the law court,
particularly in the English common-law tradition. Golob points out common-sensically that
'as we know, men of contrasting temperament, tastes, moral outlooks, and even ideologies,
regularly reach agreement on the facts of the case, on what actually happened" (Golob 1980,
62) in the context of a jury trial. This forensic analogy is taken to its logical conclusion by
Struever (1980, 67):
The structure of the discipline is argument, and this invests each well motivated
historical text, whatever the form, with a specific and contemporaneous historical
purpose. In other words, history does not simply consider "essentially contested
concepts"; history is an essential contest, with the particular responsibility of
generating these issues.
The Return of Rhetoric
In effect, Struever argues that the historian attempts to make good his case in a legal, indeed
in a specifically rhetorical sense:
As a discipline, history is more like law than literature... Historical and legal rules
pertain to proof and confrontation, evidence and persuasion; they govern a range of
complex activities - investigative, organisational, critical, expressive - ordering them
so as to achieve a single conviction: a goal which could be paraphrased as the
establishment of the nature of a civil event. Thus I do not see "rhetoric as philosophy"
or as counter-philosophy, but as a civil discipline which, like law, depends on
investigative ingenuity as well as expressive force... A case for the intimacy of the
connection could begin with the claim that rhetoric shares with history a "legal"
Archaeology as Society's Mirror 93
purpose: thus... Quintilian insists that the purpose of the orator is not simply to
"instruct", docere, but to "make good your case", sua confirmare (Struever 1980,
68).
The mere instrusion of "rhetoric" into a scientific context is, of course, profoundly unsettling
to 'an Anglo-American tradition that feels most confident when confronted with a rather
simple statement in common language' (Kellner 1980, 9). Nevertheless, it is common
knowledge that some of the strongest emotions aroused by the New Archaeology were
precisely the reactions to its utter contempt for the poetic potential of natural language. As
Struever (1980, 76) remarks of the New Historians, 'thus neglect of argumentative discipline
in "scientific" history can, in spite of its pretentious, technical prose, make it seem rustic and
unsophisticated in contrast with, say, the urbane Tacitus.' It is not difficult, therefore, to
appreciate the brouhaha engendered by Hayden White's Metahistory (White 1973) which, in
the words of Nelson (1980, 89) marked 'a return to a rhetorical conception of argument,
displacing that caricature of formal logic which has been so influential in the guises of logical
positivism and logical empiricism' and offered, along with certain other appeals to the
rhetorical tradition 'the best chance in many years to escape the iron hold of geometric proof
upon the modern mentality'. This is far from being the first instance of a 'rhetorical turn', of
course:
The replacement of a logic with a rhetoric in the interest of eliminating a host of false
problems has been the task of a series of thinkers. Each of them reconfronts the
same opponent - a spirit-deadening scholasticism which refuses innovation and levels
discourse again and again into a series of debates which are in advance impossible
of resolution, (sc. Lorenzo) Valla is the type, but Giambattista Vico is the incarnation
of a more self-conscious philologist... Nietzsche is another apparition of this type...
this procession of "philologist-reformers" includes Hayden White (Kellner 1980,
5-6).
White's mention of the tropological préfiguration of the historical field is but part of a wider
movement in Anglo-Saxon historiography, that of the appreciation of language in both its
rhetorical and hermeneutical aspects:
In historiography it is particularly difficult to distinguish between what is said and
how it is said. Consequently, historiography is preeminently the discipline where
"the compulsion of language" tends to be confused with the "compulsion of
experience" and where that which seems to be a debate on reality is in fact a debate
on the language we use... A linguistic philosophy of history is therefore badly
needed... When philosophy of history finally joined in the linguistic turn in
Anglo-Saxon philosophy it did so under the guise of narrativism. In fact, one of the
most peculiar characteristics of Anglo-Saxon philosophy of history is that it was so
reluctant to develop a linguistic philosophy of history. Most Anglo-Saxon philosophy
has been a philosophy of language since the wane of neopositivism (Ankersmit 1986,
16).
The less contentious part of this 'turn' is the metaphor of translation:
The linguistic turn announces itself unambiguously in White's philosophy when he
compares the historical past itself with a text. Just like a text, the past provides a
meaning that we are trying to discover, it needs interpretation, and consists of logical,
grammatical, syntactical and semantic elements. Therefore, what the historian essen-
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tially does is to translate the text of the past into the narrative text of the historian
(Ankersmit 1986, 18).
What has aroused consternation is White's 'tropological view of historiography':
This translation procedure is always guided by either one or more of the four tropes:
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, or irony... it is here that philosophy of history in
so many words explicitly abandons the epistemological approach and becomes a
philosophy of language. Naive realism, according to which an historical account of
the past is like a picture that is tied to the past itself by epistemological bonds, is
rejected; rather, the historical narrative is a complex linguistic structure specially
built for the purpose of showing part of the past. In other words, the historian's
language is not a transparent, passive medium through which we can see the past as
we do perceive what is written in a letter through the glass paperweight lying on top
of it... the historian's language has more in common with a belvedere: we do not
look at the past through the historian's language, but from the vantage point suggested
by it. The historian's language does not strive to make itself invisible like the glass
paperweight of the epistemological model, but it wishes to take on the same solidity
and opacity as a thing (Ankersmit 1986, 19).
Hermeneutic Historiography
The metaphor of the past as a "text" awaiting only historiographical translation and troping
perpetuates an obvious fallacy which has already drawn its due measure of criticism: no such
text exists in itself, requiring to be constituted through the activity of the historian. Obviously
it is convenient for White to make this simplifying assumption in order to concentrate on the
rhetorico-poetico-historiographical aspect; but as a representation of the totality of the
(pre)historian's profession it is clearly inadequate. In particular White overlooks the "mirror-
image" of his project: the recovery of meaning from the past, a task still more difficult than
the mere constitution of historical 'facts' (cf Bintliff this vol.). The most succinct and eloquent
introduction to this problem of 'interpretative historiography' is that of Rock (1976).
(i) To the question: what is the aim of the historical enterprise? Rock replies
Whatever its level of magnification or abstraction may be, historical analysis must
finally be construed as an attempt to capture the everyday reality of men. Any
treatment of massive historical changes or minor occurrences is no more than an
imploded discussion of that reality. It receives its animation and intelligibility from
its accounts of typical motives and courses of action... As mediator and creator of
order, the historian produces a particular kind of description whose coherence and
plausibility flow from his technique of reconstructing that everyday reality (Rock
1976,354).
(ii) Rock's basic epistemology is faithful to constructionism:
Indeed, the "past" has no existence at all outside its reconstitution by the historian;
it appears only when it has been creatively disinterred, and its appearance can never
be the same as that which the dead themselves experienced. It is simply an artefact,
a contrivance, and not a resurrection... Even if a reconstruction were successfully
accomplished, there are no recognized practices which allow the historian to
demonstrate that his is a faithful rather than a spurious explanation. The materials
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for such a demonstration cannot be discovered by any of the methods which are
available to him. On thse contrary, some independent vantage point is required to
assess the fit between a description and what is described. Historiography cannot
provide that external perspective on itself, and it cannot underwrite any of its
interpretations (Rock 1976, 355, 358).
(iii) The goal to be attained is ideally 'the "we-relation" of the face-to-face encounter... in a
collaboratively constructed, intersubjective world that presumably transcends the personal
environment of each individual participant' (Rock 1976, 356); 'historical projects thus revolve
around the ability of the historian to capture and know what are probably alien existential
worlds' (Rock 1976, 355).
(iv) The problem is that the historian 'shares no intersubjective world which transcends his
existence and theirs... his phenomenological distance from the described events is often acute'
(Rock 1976, 354-5).
(v) The solution cannot be inferred from the material residues themselves, because of the
problem of entering the hermeneutic circle:
Those traces must be read as meaningful productions which stem from stated and
unstated contexts of meaning. They cannot be usefully employed until those contexts
are reassembled... Until that theory is furnished, historical traces must be regarded
as tantamount to meaningless. Although they appear to have some intelligibility, it
is a conjectural and problematic intelligibility that may be held to proceed from the
historian's own common-sense understanding and not from any appreciation of the
outer world... It is in this sense that history becomes a virtually impossible object
of inquiry. If signs cannot be averred until their larger meaning and mode of
production are first established, they must remain closed systems of significance.
There is no totally defensible strategy for entering them (Rock 1976, 355).
(v) Even the construction of ideal types is epistemologically insecure:
The dead are thus known mediately, by means of typifications which are derivative,
inferential and speculative... the historical personal ideal type is possibly the most
complex of all. It raises possibilities of solipsistic imputations... as personal ideal
types, they acquire their unity and coherence chiefly from the historian's ability to
order and synthesize ideas... congruity can only be gauged by matching the tacit inner
world of a past event with the modes of being and knowing that are employed by
the historian and are believed to be typical of his contemporaries (Rock 1976, 354-6).
(vii) Rock rejects one mode of verification suggested by Simmel, which perhaps deserves a
fuller hearing:
Personal ideal types must be continually monitored. If they have any authenticity, it
is likely to stem from their capacity to surprise, inform and change the historian.
They must be experienced as moderately recalcitrant and as part of a world which
is itself resistant and external. They must take on appearances which are novel and
unfamiliar enough to reassure their producer that he is not simply engaged in a form
of solipsistic introspection. They must, moreover, convey the impression that they
are descriptions of 'independent' yet possible persons and events... Additionally, the
historian is obliged to reflexively examine his own thinking in order to gain some
knowledge of its processes. It is from the absence of a complete fit between these
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processes and the processes which he has attributed to his ideal type that plausibility
emerges. The historian is obliged to attend to himself as a problematic figure whose
work is to be dismembered and compared with its productions... some self-distancing
is required to allow the historian to explore the strangeness of his own creations
(Rock 1976, 366-67).
Antihistorism and Alienation: Living in Interesting Times
By way of conclusion I would like to invite the reader to reflect on the interrelationship
between these quotes:
In this respect, our present predicament offers a striking illustration of Nancy
Struever's intriguing thesis that history and a sense of history can only flourish when
absolute certainties (either philosophical, theological, or scientific) have fallen into
disrepute. History with its interest in the 'intermediate and relative' has always been
the archenemy of absolute truth and the formal schemes claiming to justify these
truths (Ankersmit 1986, 14).
The antihistorism of the epistemological tradition is avoided since the strangeness
of the past is no longer reduced to the comforting certainties embodied in covering
laws, in normic statements (Scriven) or in the principles of the philosophy of action
(Ankersmit 1986, 21).
We do not know the laws of that country - a phrase from an essay of Charles Lamb
(Gellner 1971, 173). To write good history is a moral act because, as Kant wrote, to
choose a past by constituting an image of it is to choose a future, to describe a model
of how men ought to live, and to invoke an active sense of will (Kellner 1980, 27).
I think we can relate all four observations to a single argument: that the 'timeless' certainties
of the covering-law theorists are the last line of defence against the irruption of the plurality
of meanings suggested by our divided experiences as scholars in a pluralistic, increasingly
anti-academic society. In effect, we are both privileged to be the spectators of an unprecedented
rate of cultural change and diversification and proscribed as its principle victims. The
alienation of the scholar from the present is likely to be an effective antidote to the
"presentism" which increasingly grips the non-academic majority, but is it not likely to lead
to a search for past Utopias in the archaeological record, wish fulfillment through projection
(cf Bintliff this vol.)? Some, no doubt, will wish to go still further, constructing prehistories
"meaningful" in terms of present-day issues, oriented towards some deeply desired future; in
any case, the principle characteristic will be a refusal to leave the familiar cocoon of certitudes,
to open oneself to the potential strangeness of that far country. That surely is a trahison des
clercs.
Now Maxwell states in his discussion of the rationality of scientific discovery that:
There is a widespread idea that to explain, to render intelligible, is to reduce the
unfamiliar to the familiar. But the familiar is almost bound to be the parochial, the
anthropomorphic, the culturally and socially egocentric; and all this means - once
we grant that objectivity is an essential intelligibility requirement - that a theory
which reduces the unfamiliar to the familiar will be highly unsatisfactory as a good
explanatory theory. Implicit in the very idea of rendering things (objectively)
intelligible or comprehensible is the idea that the more intelligible our theories
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become, so the stranger, the less familiar they will become... All this is, however, a
mistake. It is entirely wrong to suppose that increasing intelligibility involves
increasing familiarity. As we have seen, just the reverse of this is the case. A
necessary condition for the universe to be (objectively) intelligible is that it should
be very, very strange... Our automatic intuitions as to what is intelligible or
comprehensible are thus not to be trusted... (Maxwell 1974, 271).
That the human, including the historical, sciences have been pursuing some such goal with
increasing vigour throughout the post-war period seems undeniable; but, to field a platitude,
such "interpretations", whether positivist or deconstructive, have a habit of changing the very
world they interpret. What is increasingly strange is precisely the parochial, anthropomorphic,
ego or ethno-centric mode of existence, rich in Gadamerian "prejudices" which has been
eroded during our lifetimes by the universalizing, homogeneizing, objectifying, leveslling,
materialistic trend in Western e (csf aBintstsliff this vol.). The particularistic bonds of the
traditional Volksgemeinschaft, the social groupings which intervened between the atomized
individual and the state and which gave everyday life its unquestionable "meaning" - family,
village, region - have succumbed to the double assault of the merchants and the intellectuals.
The "meaning" to be "extracted" from the archaeological past through hermeneutic
prehistoriography is surely that of this "world (or rather, worlds) which we have lost". I have
suggested elsewhere (Lewthwaite 1988) that the Vidalian tradition of French geography may
have atrophied less because of any methodological deficiencies than because the object of its
attention - the traditional lifeworld of the rural pays - had simply ceased to exist;
post-Vidalian geographic discourse asks different, not better, questions of a different, not
better, world (cf Bintliff this vol.). What is profoundly depressing about most contemporary
prehistoric discourse is its reluctance to encounter past meaning on any but its own terms,
with the inevitable result that the past is peopled by moderns in period dress, the plots
guilelessly(?) lifted from the ideological repertoire of the present; what is intolerably irritating
is the complacent assurance that this easy intelligibility is in fact "objective" .Before we bend
our backs to the thorny travail in the vineyards of a hermeneutic, constructivist archaeology,
therefore, we had better ask ourselves, firstly, whether we are really all that interested in the
eventual harvest and, secondly, whether as a "discipline" we are capable of the necessary
work rhythms. Perhaps we can learn from our historical neighbours, who have been toiling
since the break of day whereas, the last to be hired, we face the glare of the noon-day sun.
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